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Appendix I: IMO Memorandum Provided to HousingLink 
Regarding AI Requirements 
TO:   Dan Hylton 
 
FROM:  Myron Orfield & Will Stancil 
 
DATE:  October 10, 2014 
 
RE:  Comments to HousingLink on Legal Requirements Arising from Fair Housing 
Law and the Analysis of Impediments 
 
 
 In its mission to provide fair housing choice and achieve residential and social 
integration, fair housing law places steep fact-finding and remedial requirements on state and 
local governments and their agents. For recipients of HUD funding, these requirements take the 
form of an Analysis of Impediments (AI), which is used to certify that the recipient entities are 
affirmatively furthering fair housing in conformance with their obligations under the federal Fair 
Housing Act. The AI is an important vehicle for pursuing fair housing, simultaneously 
identifying the complex factors underlying patterns of housing segregation and discrimination, 
and offering realistic solutions to the problems existing in a given jurisdiction. In the event of a 
housing complaint, or if HUD believes monitoring of a jurisdiction is necessary, the agency may 
consult an AI to determine what, if anything, the suspected violator is doing to address 
segregation and other problems. 
 
The following memo briefly outlines the extent of existing segregation in Twin Cities 
neighborhoods and schools, and offers a short summary of several governmental actions which 
have contributed to the problem. It then discusses the primary obligations of fair housing law, 
which must be met to ensure compliance with federal statute and HUD rules, with a particular 
focus on the Fair Housing Act, and on the AI’s inquiry into public sector activities. A much more 
detailed summary, particularly with regards to the specific requirements of the AI, can be found 
in HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide, which is available online.1  
 
A successful AI must incorporate any evidence relevant to existing violations of the Fair 
Housing Act. It must also address the broad range of topics covered by the HUD Guide, 
including not only the detailed analysis of public sector activities discussed below, but also 
private sector activities and public-private interactions.  
 
I. Segregation in Neighborhoods and Schools 
 
Racial disparities are as great in the Twin Cities as almost anywhere in the country.  This 
is true despite the fact that the region boasts many organizations that are dedicated to reducing 
inequality.  However, many of the efforts originally intended specifically to reduce inequality 
actually contribute to growing isolation in schools and neighborhoods.  For instance, single-race 
                                                            
1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fair Housing Planning Guide (1996), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=fhpg.pdf [hereinafter FHPG]. 
schools predominate in the region’s charter school system2 and subsidized housing policies help 
to concentrate housing affordable to very low-income households in the region’s poorest 
neighborhoods.3  Sadly, in a generous region with great philanthropy, many of our efforts to 
reduce inequality are making inequality worse.  
 
The Twin Cities area has a reputation for progressive civil rights activism.  Minneapolis 
was the first large city in the country to enact a fair housing ordinance and Minnesota was one of 
the first states to pass a civil rights law outlawing housing discrimination.  Not only did Hubert 
Humphrey and Walter Mondale hail from the Twin Cities, but so did Roy Wilkins, Clarence 
Mitchell, and Whitney Young.  Republican governor Elmer Anderson pushed the Human Rights 
Act through the legislature and Congressmen Al Quie helped build a Republican consensus to 
support the major civil rights acts of the 1960s.   
 
In the 1960s and 70s, the state created a regional government, the Metropolitan Council, 
and enacted a fair-share requirement in the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act that required 
that all suburban communities provide for their fair share of affordable housing. The Met 
Council worked with the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency to adopt the nation’s best regional 
fair housing program.  Also in the early 70s, Minneapolis integrated its public schools pursuant 
to court order, and the state government used the momentum created by this lawsuit to adopt a 
desegregation rule that required racially integrated schools throughout Minnesota. 
 
As a result of all of these efforts in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Twin Cities was on a 
path to become one of the most integrated metropolitan areas in the United States. It had all the 
tools in place to do so, and they were working as planned.  In the early 1990s, only about 2,000 
(or 2.5 percent) of the region’s non-white students were in schools that were more than 90 
percent non-white4 and only 3 percent of the region’s population lived in majority non-white, 
high poverty areas.5   
 
During the next two decades, this all changed. By 2010 the number of schools with more 
than 90 percent non-white students had increased more than seven-fold (from 11 to 83); the 
number of non-white students in those schools had risen by more than 10 times (from 2,000 to 
25,400), an increase in the percentage of non-white students in highly segregated environments 
from 2.5 percent to 16 percent; and the percentage of the regional population in majority non-
white, high poverty areas rose by three times to 9 percent.6 Today, the two central cities together 
only contain about 20 percent of regional population, but nearly 60 percent the region’s 
subsidized affordable housing: 37 percent in Minneapolis and 22 percent in Saint Paul.   
 
                                                            
2 See IMO reports “Failed Promises: Assessing Charter Schools in the Twin Cities” (2008), “Update of IRP's 2008 
Report on Charter Schools in the Twin Cities” (2012), and “Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update” 
(2013), available at http://www.law.umn.edu/metro/school-studies/school-choice.html. 
3 See IMO report “Reforming Subsidized Housing Policy in the Twin Cities to Cut Costs and Reduce Segregation” 
(2014), available at http://www.law.umn.edu/metro/index.html and forthcoming in Housing Policy Debate. 
4 School data are for the 11 Minnesota counties in the Twin Cities metro area in 1995 and are from the Minnesota 
Department of Education. 
5 1990 data from Metropolitan Council, Choice, Place and Opportunity: An Equity Assessment of the Twin Cities 
Region, March, 2014, Section 5, page 5. 
6 Ibid. Section 5, page 5. 
Some of these changes simply reflect the fact that the region became more racially 
diverse during the period. However, other metros of roughly the same size and with similar 
demographic histories have not shown the same pattern of deterioration. For instance, the 
number of schools in the Portland metro with more than 90 percent non-white students was just 2 
in 2009 (up from 0 in 2000); in Seattle it was only 25 (up from 14); and in Pittsburgh it was 25 
(down from 27).7 The neighborhood comparisons are no better. In 2012, 19 percent of low-
income black residents of the Twin Cities lived in high-poverty census tracts (up from 13 percent 
in 2000) compared to just 3.4 percent of low-income black residents in Seattle (down from 3.5 
percent in 2000) and 1.6 percent in Portland (down from 1.9 percent in 2000).8 
 
These imbalances have major impacts on segregation in the region’s schools.  A more 
proactive approach to the location of LIHTC, Section 8 project-based housing and Section 8 
voucher-eligible rental units could have made a serious dent in segregation in the region’s 
schools. An IMO simulation of what the racial make-up of the region’s school would be if the 
existing subsidized housing stock were distributed more evenly across the region shows this very 
clearly. The simulation shows that if Section 8 voucher usage was distributed evenly across the 
region and the distribution of households was race-neutral, a total of 5,531 nonwhite students 
currently in predominantly nonwhite schools would instead be attending a racially balanced 
school. Adding the effects of equalizing the distribution of LIHTC and Section 8 project-based 
units increases the total number of nonwhite students in racially balanced schools to 9,729. 
 
This represents a very substantial share of the total number of student moves that would 
be needed to completely eliminate racially segregated schools (predominantly white as well as 
predominantly nonwhite) in the region. In fact, it represents between two-third and four-fifths of 
the number of students who would need to change schools to reach that objective.9 In other 
words, if subsidized housing was currently distributed more equitably, it would be unnecessary 
to even discuss perennially controversial topics like pro-integrative school boundary reforms or 
the third rail of school reform – bussing. 
 
Not surprisingly, the region now shows some of the widest racial disparities in the 
country. Recent data show alarming gaps between whites and non-whites in income, 
unemployment, health, and education. Poverty rates for black Minnesotans are more than four 
times those for whites while household incomes for blacks are less than half of those for whites; 
reading proficiency rates for black students are less than half those for whites in most school 
grades and years; incarceration rates for blacks are 20-25 times greater than for whites; and black 
unemployment rates are two to three times those for whites. All of these disparities put the 
region and the state near the bottom of national rankings.10 
                                                            
7 Data are from the National Center for Education Statistics. The equivalent numbers for the Twin Cities from this 
source were 112 schools with more than 90% non-white students in 2009 compared to 37 such schools in 2000. 
8 Bureau of the Census data compiled and provided by Paul Jargowsky and the Center for Urban Research and 
Education, Rutgers University. Similar differences for Hispanic residents exist across the metros. 
9 The actual percentage depends on the assumptions made about the willingness of white households and students to 
“replace” non-white students in schools that are now predominantly non-white. See “Why is the Twin Cities so 
Racially Segregated and What Can Be Done about It?” IMO, forthcoming. 
10 See Rose, Jonathan M., “Disparity Analysis: A review of disparities between White Minnesotans and  
other racial groups,” Council on Black Minnesotans, 2013 and various reports available at 
http://minnesotabudgetbites.org for a summaries of racial disparities in the state. 
 II.  Impediments to Integration 
 
Although a number of factors contribute to residential and school segregation, one major 
factor that is frequently overlooked are the housing policies of state, local, and regional agencies. 
Not only do governmental entities have the ability to substantially regulate the siting of 
affordable housing (and therefore the distribution low-income families), they also directly 
subsidize a very significant share of the region’s affordable units. Despite this, few agencies have 
policies designed to fight segregation and promote integration. In the rare instance that the 
subject is addressed, the remedies adopted are manifestly inadequate, the effects overwhelmed 
by countervailing measures. Worse still, the refusal to proactively consider the problem of 
integration has led to the adoption of a number of aggressively segregative policies, while local 
governments remain blithely unaware that they are contributing to racial isolation and division. 
 
1.   Distribution of Affordable Housing 
 
Affordable housing in the central cities is typically segregated twice over: both at the 
municipal level and at the neighborhood level. First, by restricting access to housing to the two 
core cities, state, local, and regional governments have prevented racial minorities from 
accessing the many entry-level jobs and high-quality schools found in the suburbs. For instance, 
between 2002 and 2011 more units of subsidized, very low-income housing were added in 
Minneapolis and St. Paul added than were built in all of the suburbs combined.  The region 
produced 2,249 new very affordable units (affordable to those earning 30 percent of the metro 
median income) during those years.11  Ninety-two percent were produced in the central cities, 
which have only 23 percent of the region’s population.12  In other words, the central cities 
received four times their fair share of very low-income units.  Virtually all of these units were 
located near segregated or re-segregating schools. Of the 7,253 new and preserved very 
affordable units from this period, 74 percent were in the central cities or 3.2 times their fair 
share.13 
 
Beyond that, however, affordable housing within the cities is also far more likely to be 
placed in a segregated neighborhood than affordable housing elsewhere. For example, in 
Minneapolis, the quartile of census tracts with the highest minority populations contain only 17 
percent of all housing units but 49 percent of subsidized units, while the quartile with the lowest 
minority population contains 30 percent of total units but a mere 1.3 percent of subsidized units. 
The highly segregated neighborhoods where affordable units are located are almost universally 
afflicted by a range of severe problems: extremely low incomes, low economic opportunity, poor 
health outcomes, poor educational opportunity, and predatory or nonexistent lending. 
 
The Metropolitan Council, Minnesota Housing (MHFA), Minneapolis, and Saint Paul 
have all played a role in creating this multilayered segregation. Below, a handful of the most 
important segregatory policies are described. 
 
                                                            
11 HousingLink, 2011 Housing Counts. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
2.  The Metropolitan Council 
 
First, the Met Council, under the state’s Land Use Planning Act, has a statutory 
obligation to require that municipal comprehensive plans adequately provide for local housing 
needs, including by providing land zoned for low and moderate housing needs.14 But in recent 
years the Council has declined to enforce this provision, resulting in exclusionary zoning and an 
upsurge of affordable development in the urban core.  
 
The Met Council also has also begun setting affordable housing goals for municipalities 
under the Livable Communities Act (LCA). These goals change over time – one set was in force 
between 1996 and 2010, and another set was recently created for the years 2011 through 2020. 
Unfortunately, the Council has adopted the practice of assigning the highest goals to the central 
cities and racially transitioning inner-ring suburbs.15 This appears to be in part because, in the 
previous LCA round, these are the areas which most successfully hit their targets. (The two 
central cities built 100 percent of their negotiated goal, and many of the poorer suburbs built over 
half.) Meanwhile, the wealthier suburbs, which frequently built less than 20 percent of their 
goals, saw their targets negotiated downwards. The end result is a policy that is backwards, from 
a fair housing standpoint: building a fair share of low-income housing only begets higher 
affordable housing goals. 
 
The Met Council’s other funding sources are also heavily weighted towards the central 
cities. For instance, the Met Council maintains “Housing Performance Scores,” ranking nearly 
200 communities for priority receipt of housing funding.16 Saint Paul and Minneapolis are first 
and second on the list, respectively; most of the inner-ring suburbs are in the top quartile; and 
many white outer-ring suburbs are in the second quartile or below. As a result, when funding for 
affordable units is available, it is prioritized for the cities that have previously constructed the 
most affordable housing. Ironically, this system mirrors the carrot-and-stick approach often 
favored by fair housing advocates, in which funding for municipalities is conditioned on their 
willingness to provide fair housing choice. But by applying the system to only housing funds, the 
Met Council creates the exact opposite effect: municipalities reluctant to accept low-income or 
racially diverse populations are only denied housing they never wanted in the first place. 
 
3.   LIHTC   
 
Additionally, the state’s single largest source of affordable funding for new construction, 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), is disproportionately allocated to the cities, 
which receive, on average, 45 percent of the entire region’s yearly tax credit share.  The same is 
true for all federally supported housing programs. Section 8 vouchers are placed in an even more 
segregated pattern. This is the result of policies instituted by the Met Council and Minnesota 
Housing. LIHTC are provided by the federal government, but states may develop their own 
distribution systems. In most of the Minnesota, MHFA serves as the primary agency for 
allocating tax credits. In the metro region, however, Minneapolis, Saint Paul, Dakota County, 
                                                            
14 Minn. Stat. 473.854; Minn. Stat. 473.859 subds. 2, 4. 
15 See Metropolitan Council, Livable Community Act Negotiated Goals 2011-2020. 
16 Metropolitan Council, Housing Performance Scores 2013. 
and Washington County are all considered “suballocators.”17 Suballocators receive a 
predetermined portion of the metro area’s tax credit share each year, which their respective 
housing agencies can allocate independently. By statute, the Met Council has discretionary 
authority to set these suballocator shares, in collaboration with MHFA.18 The Met Council has 
chosen to distribute suballocator shares in a highly segregative fashion: it gives Minneapolis and 
Saint Paul a combined 35 percent of the regional tax credits, despite the fact that the cities 
themselves are highly nonwhite, and furthermore, have demonstrated a consistent pattern of 
funding affordable housing in segregated neighborhoods. Through a “nonprofit set-aside,” some 
projects in the two central cities are eligible for another 10 percent of the metro’s total tax 
credits.  MHFA, which has the ability to adjust the Met Council’s allocations, has instead 
retained this segregatory policy. 
 
After passing through the suballocator system, tax credits are assigned to individual 
projects by a competitive point system, which prioritizes projects on the basis of project 
characteristics. MHFA, Minneapolis, and Saint Paul all maintain point systems which heavily 
emphasize characteristics likely to be satisfied by segregated developments in the urban core – 
e.g., geographic proximity to light rail and bus rapid tranist, homeless housing, use of preexisting 
infrastructure, single-room occupancy units, and the incorporation of a neighborhood 
stabilization plan – but place very little emphasis on characteristics likely to be satisfied by 
integrated or suburban developments.19 For example, the MHFA system assigns hundreds of 
possible points, but only five are available for economic integration, and none at all for racial 
integration. The central cities’ point systems are similarly uneven, a factor which contributes 
greatly to their highly segregative placement of units. 
 
III. Fair Housing Law Summary 
 
Fair housing law has developed along several parallel tracks for the better part of 50 
years. Today, almost all discriminatory housing practices are prohibited at the federal level by a 
bevy of statutes and rules, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the equal protection 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. However, the most 
important protections derive from the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA), which has been tailored 
by the courts and by Congress to address the specific harms of housing discrimination.  
 
In particular, the FHA, unlike other civil rights laws, specifically proscribes public and 
private activities that tend to perpetuate racial segregation among a population – for instance, 
siting low-income housing in areas of concentrated minority population. It also allows plaintiffs 
to bring claims on the basis of “disparate impact,” even when a defendant had no discriminatory 
intent. This both reduces the evidentiary burden on potential FHA plaintiffs, and increases the 
importance of empirical and statistical evidence when a violation is alleged.  
 
                                                            
17 Minn. Stat. 462A.222. 
18 Minn. Stat. 462A.222 subd. 4. 
19 MHFA, LIHTC Self-Scoring Worksheet 2015; Minneapolis Department of Community Planning and Economic 
Development, LIHTC Self-Scoring Worksheet 2015; Saint Paul Housing Redevelopment Agency, LIHTC Self-
Scoring Worksheet 2015. 
Finally, the FHA was intended to roll back segregation, not merely prevent its further 
advance. It accomplishes this by requiring federal agencies, and state agencies receiving federal 
housing funds, to “affirmatively further fair housing.” As a result of this provision, most 
government bodies involved in housing are obligated to enact measures that facilitate housing 
choice and integration, even if their activities do not otherwise promote segregation or 
discrimination. 
 
Following below are summaries of the most salient provisions of the law, and more 
detailed descriptions of their requirements. 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) 
The FHA’s § 3604(a) declares that it shall be unlawful to make unavailable or deny a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin.20 
The expansive language of this provision – in particular, “otherwise make unavailable or deny” – 
has been held to create a broad prohibition against a wide array of discriminatory housing 
practices. In addition to refusals to sell or rent, § 3604(a) also covers racial steering, 
discriminatory or exclusionary zoning, redlining, and discriminatory appraisals.21 This list is 
non-exhaustive; courts have demonstrated a willingness to apply the § 3604(a) prohibition to any 
number of unforeseen scenarios with discriminatory consequences.22 In the words of the 
Southern District of New York, this provision “has been construed to reach every practice which 
has the effect of making housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds,” and it is 
accordingly at the heart of most FHA claims.23    
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 
In § 3605, the FHA explicitly extends its protections to the realm of real estate financing, 
prohibiting “discriminat[ion] against any person in making available” loans or financial 
assistance for “purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling,” as 
well as discrimination in loans “secured by a dwelling.”24  In order to ensure that the statute does 
not interfere with legitimate underwriting activities, the section does specify that lenders are 
allowed consider non-protected characteristics when making loans.25  This allowance, however, 
does not permit potential defendants to avoid liability by simply generating underwriting criteria 
which have the effect of serving as a proxy for a protected characteristic; instead, as recent HUD 
regulations make clear, a lender’s activities are sufficient to trigger § 3605 liability if they have 
unjustifiably discriminatory effect on a protected class, regardless of intent.26 Often, to 
demonstrate illegal redlining, plaintiffs must rely on statistical evidence of lending patterns.27   
3. The Disparate Impact Standard and Perpetuation of Segregation 
                                                            
20 Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013).   
21 Robert G. Schemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation, §13-3. 
22 Id. 
23 U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F.Supp 1276, 1291 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
24 42 U.S.C. § 3605  
25 Id.  
26 78 Fed. Reg. 11463 (“[V]iolatons of various provisions may be established by proof of discriminatory effects, 
including . . . 3605.”). 
27 Robert G. Schemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation, §18:4. 
FHA plaintiffs do not need to prove that defendants had intent to discriminate; they only 
need to demonstrate that a defendant’s policies or actions created a discriminatory effect on a 
protected class. In this way, the FHA implicitly acknowledges that housing segregation is not 
merely the result of a conscious desire to exclude, but can also result from self-reinforcing trends 
in the unregulated market. This standard greatly expands the scope of the FHA’s protections. 
 
The discriminatory effect standard has been applied for over four decades and been 
affirmed by eleven federal circuit courts. Some minor variations remained in its application, 
however, and HUD finally codified a universal standard by issuing its new disparate impact rule 
in 2012.28 The new rule states that “a practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or 
predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons” or where it “creates, increases, 
reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin.”29   
 
The latter provision codifies the long-standing judicial rule that “perpetuation of 
segregation” is a sufficient discriminatory effect to sustain a FHA claim.  While most 
antidiscrimination fair housing rules are analogous to other civil rights legislation, the 
“perpetuation of segregation” claim is unique to the FHA.  It exists because the FHA’s drafters 
explicitly stated that the law is intended to promote integration. These pro-integrative aims have 
taken a central role in the law’s implementation. For instance, HUD’s commentary on the new 
rule states:  
 
The Fair Housing Act’s language prohibiting discrimination in housing is “broad 
and inclusive;” the purpose of its reach is to replace segregated neighborhoods 
with “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.” . . . “[T]he intent of Congress 
in passing the Fair Housing Act was broad and inclusive, to advance equal 
opportunity in housing and achieve racial integration for the benefit of all people 
in the United States.”30  
 
The new rule also takes care to ensure that its protections extend to government 
regulation and administration of housing development: it specifies that “[e]nacting or 
implementing land-use rules, ordinances, policies, or procedures that restrict or deny housing 
opportunities or otherwise make unavailable or deny dwellings to persons because of race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin” is a disparate impact discrimination.31 
 
 In promulgating the new rule, HUD resisted efforts to curtail its applicability or clarify 
that it cannot be used to challenge segregative affordable housing construction in low-income 
neighborhoods. Several commenters asked HUD to specify in the final rule that the mere 
approval of LIHTC projects in minority areas alone does not establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact under the Act, or, alternatively, that locating LIHTC projects in low-income 
                                                            
28  24 C.F.R. § 100.500. 
29 Id.. 
30 78 Fed. Reg. 11461 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (internal citiation 
omitted)).  
31 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(5). 
areas is a legally sufficient justification to claims of disparate impact discrimination.32  HUD 
refused, defending the flexible standard applied by the judiciary: “The rule does not mandate that 
affordable housing be located in neighborhoods with any particular characteristic, but requires, 
as the Fair Housing Act already does only that housing development activities not have an 
unjustified discriminatory effect.”33 Another commenter requested that the final rule provide safe 
harbors for state and local programs that have legitimate policy and safety goals such as 
protecting water resources, promoting transit orientated development, and revitalizing 
communities.34 HUD responded that “it does not believe that the suggested safe harbors or 
exemptions from discriminatory effects liability are appropriate or necessary.”35 HUD’s 
comments confirm the continuing vitality of the FHA’s anti-segregative aims.  
 
Case law demonstrates that the disparate impact rule can force the hand of government 
agencies that refuse to consider whether their activities perpetuate segregation or comport with 
the requirements of § 3604(a), even if their refusal takes the form of inaction.   
 
The classic example of a § 3604(a) disparate impact violation is exclusionary zoning, in 
which a municipality refuses to allow housing that will be disproportionately occupied by a 
protected racial or social group. In Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the city of 
Huntington refused to rezone a parcel to accommodate low income housing in the white part of 
the jurisdiction, allowing the continued concentration of affordable housing in the poorer, non-
white part of the jurisdiction.36 The Second Circuit found this failure to rezone to be a disparate 
impact violation that perpetuated segregation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604.37   
 
In recent years, affordable housing construction has become a considerably more 
complicated industry, with the government increasingly taking on the role of financier while 
leaving many project and siting decisions to private market developers. But this division of 
responsibilities does not alter or reduce the duty to prevent discriminatory effects: in the eyes of 
the FHA, sophisticated subsidies are just another form of public housing. 
 
In Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of Community Affairs, a federal 
court in Texas found a “perpetuation of segregation” disparate impact violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
3604 when the state housing agency disproportionately awarded low income housing tax credits 
in minority neighborhoods.38  The court made clear that the low income housing tax credit was 
no different from other forms of federally supported affordable housing for purposes of 42 
U.S.C. § 3604. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit did not question the district court’s conclusion that 
the disproportionate allocation of funding to segregated neighborhoods constituted a 
discriminatory effect, and a prima facie violation of the FHA.  Instead, it only instructed the 
                                                            
32 78 Fed. Reg. 11476.  
33 Id. 
34 78 Fed. Reg. 11477. 
35 Id. 
36 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 
(1988). 
37 Id. 
38 See Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d  312 (N.D. Tex. 2012); 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d. 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
lower court to harmonize its decision with the new HUD rule, which had been issued in the 
interim.39  
 
It is worth noting that in the ICP v. TDCA case, Texas relied on a point system for 
allocating tax credits, in almost identical fashion to Minnesota. The district court discussed at 
length the state’s failure to use its discretionary control over the point system to promote 
integration.40  Minnesota uses an extremely similar point system; Minnesota’s housing agency, 
however, has far greater discretionary control over the system than its Texan counterpart. 
Nonetheless, Minnesota too only makes token efforts to support integration.   
 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3608  
 
Governmental recipients of federal housing funds have an obligation under the Federal 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) to “affirmatively further” fair housing, which requires 
them to use their “immense leverage” to create “integrated and balanced living patterns.”41 
 
In a recently proposed rule, designed to provide guidance for recipients of fair housing 
funding, HUD defines “[a]ffirmatively furthering fair housing” as “taking proactive steps beyond 
simply combating discrimination to foster more inclusive communities. Specifically, the 
proposed rule states that affirmatively furthering fair housing “means taking steps to overcome 
segregated living patterns and support and promote integrated communities, to end racially and 
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, and to foster and maintain compliance with civil rights 
and fair housing laws.”42 
 
The rule’s commentary further notes: 
 
[R]acially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty are of particular concern 
because they couple fair housing issues with other significant local and regional 
policy challenges. These areas clearly fall in the domain of fair housing, as they 
often reflect legacies of segregated housing patterns. Of the nearly 3,800 census 
tracts in this country where more than 40 percent of the population is below the 
poverty line, about 3,000 (78 percent) are also predominantly minority. . . 
Consequently, interventions that result in reducing racially and ethnically 
concentrated areas of poverty hold the promise of providing benefits that assist 
both residents and their communities.43  
 
With HUD issuing new guidance on the issue, the outer limits of the obligation to 
affirmatively further fair housing have not yet been tested, and may still expand. Unquestionably, 
however, the provision requires affirmative steps above and beyond merely avoiding the 
                                                            
39 Inclusive Communities Project v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, --- F.3d ---- (5th Cir. 2014). 
40 ICP v. TDHCA, 860 F.Supp 2d at 7-10. 
41 NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J., holding the Title VIII 
imposed  a duty on HUD beyond simply refraining from discrimination) [hereinafter NAACP v. Sec’y of HUD]. 
42 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710-01 § 5.152 (emphasis added). 
43 Id. at 43713 (emphasis added).  
activities proscribed by § 3604 and § 3605. Case law has illuminated some of these 
requirements.   
 
First, and minimally, government agencies must analyze the impact of new housing on 
racial concentration. This obligation was most thoroughly discussed in the foundational case 
Shannon v. HUD, cited at legnth in the new HUD rule.44 In Shannon, plaintiffs sought to block 
the construction of federally subsidized housing, arguing that it would create a discriminatory 
effect by inducing re-segregation of the neighborhood.45 The federal court agreed, holding that 
adding affordable housing to racially segregated or re-segregating neighborhoods was prima 
facie a violation of the federal fair housing law, and that before doing so HUD and all grantees of 
federal housing funds must undertake a careful analysis of neighborhood demographics.  
 
It is essential to recognize that, according to Shannon and its progeny, § 3608 does not 
merely prevent government agencies from building low-income housing in areas of minority 
concentration, which would already be unlawful under § 3604(a)’s perpetuation-of-segregation 
cause of action. It also obligates governments to undertake the analysis required to demonstrate 
that they are not creating segregation, in advance of the siting of low-income housing. In other 
words, while § 3604 disallows certain discriminatory outcomes, § 3608 places on public 
agencies an additional requirement that they use particular methods. In one notable case, HUD 
was found to have violated § 3608 for administering grants to the City of Boston without 
ensuring that the grants were not creating discriminatory effects – even though subsequent 
analysis showed that no discrimination was occurring.46 Governments are not permitted to “fly 
blind”, so to speak, when it comes to housing.  
 
 Shannon and follow-up cases have demonstrated that while HUD and local agencies are 
due administrative deference in interpreting siting rules, they cannot arbitrary assert that an area 
is not one of minority concentration or “racially mixed,” when census data show otherwise.47  
Further, the assertion by HUD or recipients of federal housing resources that there are 
comparable opportunities for non-whites outside of minority areas requires a factual showing of 
such comparable opportunities.  All federal siting cases, even those in which HUD siting 
decisions are sustained against civil rights claims, uniformly require HUD and local agencies to 
assemble 1) current census data, 2) subsidized housing location data, and 3) racial tenancy 
occupancy data and to explicitly use these data to formally review all witing decisions involving 
federal funds. Such review cannot involve a post hoc justification of the siting decision, but must 
be concurrent with project planning and occur before the unit was constructed.48  
 
 Shannon also describes in detail a number of questions which should be answered in 
order to determine whether low-income housing is concentrating poverty. While the list is not 
exhaustive, it includes both qualitative and quantitative elements (e.g., an analysis the historic 
                                                            
44 Id. at 43712; Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). 
45 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). 
46 NAACP v. Sec’y of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987). 
47 Glendale Neighborhood Association v. Greensboro Housing Authority, 956 F. Supp. 1270 (M.D.N.C. 1996); 
Project BASIC v. Kemp, 776 F. Supp. 637 (D. R.I. 1991).  
48 See Bus. Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landreiu, 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981); Alshuler v. HUD, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 
1982).   
political trends related to public housing in a region, and the projected racial composition of the 
units). The court takes a decidedly holistic view of housing policy, stating, for example, that 
public agencies should consider the effect of housing on school demographics. 49 
  
  5.   Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing and HUD 
 
 The obligation for state and local governments receiving HUD funding to affirmatively 
further fair housing derives from two sources. First, they are directly subject to § 3608, as 
discussed above. However, in addition, HUD has, in its own efforts to comply with § 3608, itself 
imposed conditions upon grantees and funding recipients.  
 
Local and state recipients of a number of HUD grants, including the Community 
Development Block Grant, the HOME Investment Program, and others, are required to certify 
that they are affirmatively furthering fair housing. In order to do so, HUD requires these entities 
to complete an Analysis of Impediments (AI). In its Fair Housing Planning Guide, the agency 
provides significant guidance on what must be included in an AI. 
 
It is essential that state and local grantees comply with HUD’s instructions regarding fair 
housing, because those that do not are placed at risk of losing housing funding. This is because 
the agency is required, by § 3608(e)(5) of the FHA, to administer its own programs in a way that 
affirmatively furthers fair housing. Even if HUD does not take such action itself, its hand may be 
forced by a private plaintiff; courts have upheld suits to compel the agency to eliminate funding 
when “it is aware of a grantee’s discriminatory practices but has made no efforts to force it to 
comply with the Fair Housing Act by cutting off existing federal financial assistance.”50 This 
rule was first described in Anderson v. City of Alpharetta51 and was later affirmed in the Sixth 
Circuit.52 This standard can place many tens of millions of dollars in local funding at risk, even 
in cases where a local entity is not itself subject to lawsuit or discrimination claim.  
 
III.  The Analysis of Impediments and the Public Sector 
 
                                                            
49 “We suggest that some considerations relevant to a proper determination by HUD include the following: 
1. What procedures were used by the [local public agency (LPA)] in considering the effects on racial 
concentration when it made a choice of site or of type of housing? 
2. What tenant selection methods will be employed with respect to the proposed project? 
3. How has the LPA or the local governing body historically reacted to proposals for low income housing 
outside areas of racial concentration? 
4. Where is low-income housing, both public and publicly assisted, now located in the geographic area of 
the LPA? 
5. Where is middle income and luxury housing, in particular middle income and luxury housing with 
federal mortgage insurance guarantees, located in the geographic area of the LPA? 
6. Are some low-income housing projects in the geographic area of the LPA occupied primarily by tenants 
of one race, and if so, where are they located? 
7. What is the projected racial composition of tenants of the proposed project? 
8. Will the project house school age children and if so what schools will they attend and what is the racial balance in 
those schools?” Shannon, 436 F.2d at 821-22.    
50 Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 737 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984). 
51 Id. 
52 Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 758 F.2d 1086, 1208 (6th Cir. 1985). 
As a component of its Fair Housing Act obligations, HUD requires grantees to certify 
that they are Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH). One key component of this 
certification is the Analysis of Impediments (AI), which documents existing impediments to fair 
housing, determines their relative severity, and explores remedies, as well as discussing other 
actions a grantee may have undertaken affirmatively further fair housing.  
 
The AI is not a formulaic document; recognizing that there can be regional variations in 
impediments to housing choice, HUD allows jurisdictions some freedom to tailor their AIs to 
local circumstances. HUD does, however, provide significant guidance to the contents of the AI, 
in the form of the agency’s Fair Housing Planning Guide.  
 
The Guide makes clear that any complete AI should conduct a very searching analysis of 
“public activities, practices, and procedures involving housing and housing-related activities.”53  
 
This component of the analysis can take many forms, but must be broad in scope and 
cannot restrict itself merely to the provision of affordable or subsidized housing. HUD states that 
“[c]larification of the distinction between AFFH actions and affordable housing activities is often 
necessary,” as “[t]he two concepts are not equivalent but they are also not entirely separate.” 
While housing choice requires some consideration of affordable housing, “undertak[ing] to build 
or rehabilitate housing for low- and moderate-income families . . . is not in and of itself sufficient 
to affirmatively further fair housing.”54  
 
In order to help guide jurisdictions in their creation of an AI, the Guide includes a lengthy 
section describing facts or circumstances that might indicate a housing impediment or merit 
further investigation.55 Public sector “actions or omissions” that affect fair housing choice 
include straightforward factors like housing or zoning codes, but also indirect government 
actions such as job creation efforts, patterns in the provision of services, and redevelopment 
activities. The Guide also places an emphasis on intra-governmental interactions – both 
horizontal, between different municipalities, and vertical, between agencies with overlapping 
authority.56 
 
Special attention is given to issues surrounding site selection. The Guide is unambiguous 
on the subject: “[i]f fair housing objectives are to be achieved, the goal must be to avoid high 
concentrations of low-income housing.”57 It also recognizes the considerable challenge of doing 
so: “many communities feel strongly that housing for [low-income, homeless, and disabled] 
persons should be provided but ‘not in my backyard.’”58Additionally, it identifies jurisdictional 
divisions as a major obstacle to providing less concentrated subsidized housing: “in metropolitan 
areas, serious consideration should be given to ways [communities] can participate in 
cooperative, interjurisdictional planning for construction of assisted housing.”59  
 
                                                            
53 FHPG at 2-9. 
54 Id. at 5-4. 
55 Id. at 5-1. 
56 Id. at 5-5. 
57 Id. at 5-6 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
The Guide suggests several specific questions to guide this inquiry. These include “Are 
there concentrations of low- and moderate-income housing in one more localities or 
neighborhoods within the jurisdiction’s geographic area?” and  “Has the jurisdiction adopted 
policies and procedures that promote the placement of new or rehabilitated housing for lower-
income households . . . in a wide spectrum of neighborhoods?”60 
 
 It is also suggested that an AI consider actual demographic trends among public housing 
occupants; for instance, whether “there [is] a pattern in or more assisted housing developments 
of concentration of tenants by race or ethnicity,” or if there is a “pattern, by location and family 
type, of minority and nonminority certificate and voucher holders who rent units under the 
Section 8 . . . voucher housing assistance program.”61  
 
 HUD’s Guide includes a number of “example” impediments, which demonstrate the type 
of public sector “actions or omissions” that should appear in an AI. These include the absence of 
an enforcement mechanism for correcting housing site selection disparities,62 zoning ordinances 
in suburban communities that prevent construction of multifamily housing,63 failure to support 
the local fair housing agencies,64 and even apathy and status quo bias among political and 
community leaders.65 
 
HUD also cautions that revitalization and other efforts to improve living conditions in 
areas of minority concentration, while often desirable, cannot alone provide fair housing choice. 
While these programs are “a significant part of a comprehensive approach to furthering fair 
housing for lower-income minorities, jurisdictions should not focus solely on linking such 
efforts.”66 These programs must be accompanied by activities to “extend efforts to provide 
lower-income housing opportunities . . . to nonminority and more economically advantaged 
neighborhoods.”67 Towards this end, the Guide suggests that an AI consider whether municipal 




                                                            
60 Id. at 5-6, 5-7. 
61 Id. at 5-13, 5-14. 
62 “The State does not have an enforceable site selection policy for affordable housing that will compel its major 
cities to select sites for affordable housing located outside of minority or low-income areas or allocate such housing 
on a metropolitanwide basis.” Id. at 3-13. 
63 “The suburban jurisdictions of the State’s major cities have exclusionary zoning ordinances that preclude the 
construction of affordable multifamily housing and keep out lower-income and minority persons.” Id. at 3-11. 
64 “The local fair housing agencies are under-funded and ill-equipped to enforce their local fair housing ordinances.” 
Id. at 3-13. 
65 “The AI also documents the results of extensive interviews with all segments of the real estate community and 
community leaders of all races and ethnic groups; these interviews and surveys reveal that all parties concerned feel 
comfortable with the status quo of segregated housing patterns, racial hostility as it relates to housing issues, and the 
lack of any resolve to tackle these problems.” Id. at 3-12. 
66 Id. at 5-10. 
67 Id. 
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Ms. Libby Starling       August 15, 2013   
Director of Research 
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council 
 
Re: Comment on Draft FHEA   
 
Dear Ms. Starling: 
 
 I write to express my concern that the draft FHEA is inadequate.  First, it 
improperly allows areas of concentrated poverty and racially integrated areas to be 
considered “areas of opportunity” for the FHEA.  The draft fails to report on the drivers 
of segregation and to note significant impediments to fair housing choice.  These 
impediments include the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council’s (Met Council or Council) 
abandonment of its effective fair housing policy, implemented from 1971 to 1983; the 
creation of a set of central city regional sub-allocators of the low-income housing tax 
credit that perpetuate and intensify racial segregation; a state qualified allocation plan and 
a sub-allocator qualified allocation plan that both perpetuate and intensify racial 
segregation; and the failure of the Met Council and other state agencies to cooperate to 
fulfill the state’s duties under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  
 
I. Areas of Concentrated Poverty (RCAP Areas) and Areas That are Already 
Integrated Cannot Be Considered Areas of Opportunity for Purposes of the 
FHEA. 
 
A. HUD FHEA Official Guidance 
 
 HUD FHEA official guidance makes clear that 1) areas of concentrated poverty 
and segregation and 2) areas that are already racially integrated cannot be considered 
“areas of opportunity” for purposes of the FHEA.   
 
 In the Disparities in Access to Opportunity webinar on March 12, 2012, HUD 
clarified that areas of access to opportunity cannot involve “areas of concentrated 
poverty” (RCAP areas) or areas that “are already racially integrated.”1 HUD Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement Programs Sara Pratt stated: “[A]n opportunity area is 
not an area of concentrated poverty and in general are not areas that are already 
integrated.”2
                                                 
1 See Regional Fair Housing Equity Assessment: Disparities in Access to Opportunity, HUD (Mar. 12, 
2012) (PowerPoint) (on file with the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity).  
2 Transcript of Webinar at 16, Disparities in Access to Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School 
(on file with the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity). 
2 
 
Secretary Pratt continued: 
 
 In some situations, you have higher opportunity areas — that they may be higher 
opportunity areas, but they already have disproportionate amounts of affordable 
housing and/or you may have higher opportunity areas that are already 
integrated.  The research shows that those areas should be, generally speaking, 
avoided for the development of new affordable housing.  You already have 
disproportionate affordable housing in some higher opportunity area, or you’re 
already integrated in that area.  The risk is and the temptation is to put more 
affordable housing there, because the neighborhood’s not going to give you any 
grief, right?  But the problem and the downside of this is that it tends to perpetuate 
segregation by increasing the percentages of African Americans or Hispanics or 
other groups now living in this population in this part of the community.  And so 
for purposes of a Fair Housing Equity Assessment in general, you should be 
looking at areas beyond these areas, even though they are higher opportunity.3 
 
Secretary Pratt’s statements are grounded in judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Federal Constitution, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and Sections 3604 and 3608 
of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  
 
B. The Equal Protection Clause and 1964 Civil Rights Act 
 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids federal government funding of racially segregated 
programs or activities.  Under this provision and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
civil rights proponents, including Martin Luther King, Jr., challenged the siting decisions of the 
Chicago Public Housing Authority and the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.  They argued that the disproportionate siting of low income housing in poor minority 
neighborhoods and the fact that such housing was occupied by segregated population of blacks in black 
neighborhoods and whites in white neighborhoods violated Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution.4   
 
The court agreed and, as a remedy for this violation, said that only twenty-five percent of new 
low-income housing could be built in neighborhoods of minority concentration or neighborhoods with 
more than thirty percent non-white population.5 The court picked this number because experts 
persuaded it that the thirty percent threshold was “a tipping point” because neighborhoods above that 
number most often re-segregated and became overwhelmingly black and poor.  The court ordered that 
seventy-five percent of all new subsidized housing must be placed in neighborhoods at least one mile 
from neighborhoods that were thirty percent non-white or neighborhoods the court believed were not in 
the process of tipping.  The court declared that tipping and re-segregation were some of the most 
important challenges facing American metropolitan areas, and that the remedy to segregative conduct 
could not be placing housing in areas already on the path to becoming segregated.6 
                                                            
3 Transcript of Webinar at 25 (emphasis added). 
4 See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter Gautreaux I].  
5 Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737–38 (N.D. Ill. 1969) [hereinafter Gautreaux II].  
6 Gautreaux I, 503 F.2d at 939. 
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C. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) 
The Federal Fair Housing Act declares that it shall be unlawful to make unavailable or deny a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin.7 The new 
disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, states that a “practice has a discriminatory effect where it 
actually or predictably …perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”8  The rule also provides that “[e]nacting or 
implementing land-use rules, ordinances, policies, or procedures that restrict or deny housing 
opportunities or otherwise make unavailable or deny dwellings to persons because of race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin” is a disparate impact discrimination.9 
At page 5, the rule’s commentary states:  
 
The Fair Housing Act’s language prohibiting discrimination in housing is “broad and 
inclusive;” the purpose of its reach is to replace segregated neighborhoods with “truly 
integrated and balanced living patterns.” . . . “[T]he intent of Congress in passing the 
Fair Housing Act was broad and inclusive, to advance equal opportunity in housing and 
achieve racial integration for the benefit of all people in the United States.” 
 
At page 26, the commentary states: 
 
The legislative history of the Act informs HUD’s interpretation. The Fair Housing Act 
was enacted after a report by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
which President Johnson had convened in response to major riots taking place 
throughout the country, warned that “[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one 
black, one white—separate and unequal.”  
 
The Act’s lead sponsor, Senator Walter Mondale, explained in the Senate debates that the broad 
purpose of the Act was to replace segregated neighborhoods with “truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns.”10 Senator Mondale recognized that segregation was caused not only by “overt racial 
discrimination” but also by “[o]ld habits” which became “frozen rules,” and he pointed to one such 
facially neutral practice—the “refusal by suburbs and other communities to accept low-income 
housing.”11 He further explained some of the ways in which federal, state, and local policies had 
formerly operated to require segregation and argued that “Congress should now pass a fair housing act 
to undo the effects of these past” discriminatory actions.12 
 
                                                            
7 Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013).   
8 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013) (emphasis added). 
9 Id. § 100.70(d)(5). 
10 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710-01 (proposed July 19, 2013), 2013 WL 3757272 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
11 Id.  
12 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The disparate impact rule cites two cases to help define conduct that perpetuates segregation in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604.   
In Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of Community Affairs (ICP) a federal 
court in Texas found a “perpetuation of segregation” disparate impact violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 
when the state housing agency disproportionately awarded low income housing tax credits in minority 
neighborhoods.13  The court made clear that the low income housing tax credit was no different from 
other forms of federally supported affordable housing for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 3604. 
 
 In Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the city of Huntington refused to rezone 
a parcel to accommodate low income housing in the white part of the jurisdiction, allowing the 
continued concentration of affordable housing in the poorer, non-white part of the jurisdiction.14 The 
Second Circuit found this failure to rezone to be a disparate impact violation that perpetuated 
segregation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604.15   
 It is critically important that the FHEA examine the state placement of tax credit units under the 
holding of ICP, the Met Council’s administration of it federal housing programs, the fair share 
requirements of the land use planning under the holding of Huntington, and the new disparate impact 
rule.   
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)  
Recipients of federal housing funds have an obligation under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3608(d) to “affirmatively further” fair housing, which requires them to use their “immense 
leverage” to create “integrated and balanced living patterns.”16 
Executive Order 12892 declares that 42 U.S.C. § 3608 subjects the Department of the Treasury 
and recipients of the low-income housing tax credit to the duty to affirmatively further fair housing.17 
Treasury is ordered to follow HUD’s leadership in enforcing this obligation and to promulgate rules 
pursuant to this duty. See § 4-401. That Treasury has not issued these rules does not change its duty, 
nor does it change the duty of recipients of tax credits to affirmatively further fair housing in the low 
income tax credit program.          
In its proposed rule, HUD defines “[a]ffirmatively furthering fair housing” as “taking proactive 
steps beyond simply combating discrimination to foster more inclusive communities. Specifically, the 
proposed rule states that affirmatively furthering fair housing “means taking steps to overcome 
segregated living patterns and support and promote integrated communities, to end racially and 
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, and to foster and maintain compliance with civil rights and 
fair housing laws.”18 
                                                            
13 See Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d  312 (N.D. Tex. 2012); Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d. 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
14 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
15 Id. 
16 NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J., holding the Title VIII imposed  
a duty on HUD beyond simply refraining from discrimination) [hereinafter NAACP v. Sec’y of HUD]. 
17 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (proposed Jan. 17, 1994), 1994 WL 16189201 (1994). 




“[T]he rule seeks to …foster the diversity and strength of communities and regions by 
improving integrated living patterns and overcoming historic patterns of segregation, reducing racial 
and ethnic concentrations of poverty, and responding to identified disproportionate housing needs of 
persons protected by the Fair Housing Act.19 
 
In further support of the obligation to reduce and eliminate RCAPs, the proposed rule notes: 
 
The United States Supreme Court, in one of the first Fair Housing Act cases it decided, 
referenced the Act's co-sponsor, Senator Walter F. Mondale, in noting that “the reach of 
the proposed law was to replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns.’”… The Act recognized that “where a family lives, where it is allowed to live, 
is inextricably bound up with better education, better jobs, economic motivation, and 
good living conditions.”20  
 
The rule’s commentary further notes: 
 
[R]acially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty are of particular concern because 
they couple fair housing issues with other significant local and regional policy 
challenges. These areas clearly fall in the domain of fair housing, as they often reflect 
legacies of segregated housing patterns. Of the nearly 3,800 census tracts in this country 
where more than 40 percent of the population is below the poverty line, about 3,000 (78 
percent) are also predominantly minority. Racially or ethnically concentrated areas of 
poverty merit special attention because the costs they impose extend far beyond their 
residents, who suffer due to their limited access to high-quality educational 
opportunities, stable employment, and other prospects for economic success. Because of 
their high levels of unemployment, capital disinvestment, and other stressors, these 
neighborhoods often experience a range of negative outcomes such as exposure to 
poverty, heightened levels of crime, negative environmental health hazards, low 
educational attainment, and other challenges that require extra attention and resources 
from the larger communities of which they are a part. Consequently, interventions that 
result in reducing racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty hold the 
promise of providing benefits that assist both residents and their communities.21  
 
“The proposed rule reinforces the proposition that a critical component of addressing 
segregation is providing support for those communities that are integrated or are integrating. Strategies 
and actions to promote the effective and long-term viability of these communities is an important 
component of these fair housing goals.”  
 
The proposed rule uses Shannon v. HUD and Otero v. NY City Housing Authority to define the 
meaning of affirmatively furthering fair housing.22   
                                                            
19 78 Fed. Reg. at 43711 (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at 43712 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 43713 (emphasis added).  




3. Shannon v. HUD  
In Shannon, a black and white residents of a racially integrated Philadelphia neighborhood 
brought suit against HUD to enjoin the construction of a federal subsidized housing project.23  They 
argued that given the predictable racial composition of the tenants of such housing, the project would 
likely tip or re-segregate the neighborhood.  The federal court agreed arguing that adding affordable 
housing to racially segregated or re-segregating neighborhoods was prima facie a violation of the 
federal fair housing law and that before doing so HUD and all grantees of federal housing funds must 
undertake a careful analysis of neighborhood demographics in order to satisfy itself that it would not 
deepen segregation or hasten re-segregation.  
  
Shannon holds:  
 
Possibly before 1964 the administrators of the federal housing programs could, by 
concentrating on land use controls, building code enforcement, and physical conditions 
of buildings, remain blind to the very real effect that racial concentration has had in the 
development of urban blight. Today such color blindness is impermissible. Increase or 
maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is 
thus prima facie at variance with the national housing policy.24 
 
We suggest that some considerations relevant to a proper determination by HUD include 
the following: 
 
1. What procedures were used by the LPA in considering the effects on racial 
concentration when it made a choice of site or of type of housing? 
 
2. What tenant selection methods will be employed with respect to the proposed project? 
 
3. How has the LPA or the local governing body historically reacted to proposals for low 
income housing outside areas of racial concentration? 
 
4. Where is low-income housing, both public and publicly assisted, now located in the 
geographic area of the LPA? 
 
5. Where is middle income and luxury housing, in particular middle income and luxury 
housing with federal mortgage insurance guarantees, located in the geographic area of 
the LPA? 
 
6. Are some low-income housing projects in the geographic area of the LPA occupied 
primarily by tenants of one race, and if so, where are they located? 
 
7. What is the projected racial composition of tenants of the proposed project? 
                                                            
23 Shannon v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). 




8. Will the project house school age children and if so what schools will they attend and 
what is the racial balance in those schools?25 
 
Shannon’s progeny include Glendale Neighborhood Association v. Greensboro Housing 
Authority and Project BASIC v. Kemp.26 These cases demonstrate that while HUD and local agencies 
are due   administrative deference   interpreting siting rules, they cannot arbitrary assert that an area is 
not one of minority concentration or “racially mixed,” when census data show otherwise.  Further, the 
assertion by HUD or recipients of federal housing resources that there are comparable opportunities for 
non-whites outside of minority areas requires a factual showing of such comparable opportunities.  All 
federal siting cases, even those in which HUD siting decisions are sustained against civil rights claims, 
uniformly require HUD and local agencies to assemble 1) current census data, 2) subsidized housing 
location data, and 3) racial tenancy occupancy data and to explicitly use these data to formally review 
all citing decisions involving federal funds. Such review cannot involve a post hoc justification of the 
siting decision, but must be concurrent with project planning and occur before the unit was 
constructed.27  
 
The FHEA must note the MHFA is not collecting or sharing racial data on the tenancy of low-
income housing tax credit units. This is a per se violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3608 as construed by Shannon 
and its progeny.   
 
According to Shannon, housing placement in segregated neighborhoods was allowed if there 
was an overriding need that could not otherwise be met.  This overriding need, however, could not be 
caused by racial discrimination.  
 
4. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority 
 
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, in order to keep a large public housing project 
racially integrated, whites were temporarily given preference for units.28 When the project became 
more than fifty percent white, blacks were given the same preference.  In Otero, the court declared that 




To allow housing officials to make decisions having the long range effect of increasing 
or maintaining racially segregated housing patterns merely because minority groups will 
gain an immediate benefit would render such persons willing, and perhaps unwitting, 
partners in the trend toward ghettoization of our urban centers. . . . Congress’ desire in 
providing fair housing throughout the United States was to stem the spread of urban 
ghettos and to promote open, integrated housing, even though the effect in some 
instances might be to prevent some members of a racial minority from residing in 
                                                            
25 Shannon, 436 F.2d at 821–22.  
26 956 F. Supp. 1270 (M.D.N.C. 1996); 776 F. Supp. 637 (D. R.I. 1991).  
27 See Bus. Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landreiu, 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981); Alshuler v. HUD, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982).   
28 Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (1973). 
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publicly assisted housing in a particular location. The affirmative duty to consider the 
impact of publicly assisted housing programs on racial concentration and to act 
affirmatively to promote the policy of fair, integrated housing is not to be put aside 
whenever racial minorities are willing to accept segregated housing. The purpose of 
racial integration is to benefit the community as a whole, not just certain of its members. 
In the absence of a history of deliberate discrimination against non-white persons, which 
would necessitate undoing the harmful effects, that objective cannot be achieved by 
adoption of a double standard under which low cost housing would be available to poor 
whites rather than to poor non-whites, or vice versa.29 
 
 Some local preservation advocates inaccurately claim Otero was overruled by United States v. 
Starrett City Associates, which struck down a poorly planned, rigid racial quota scheme in a New York 
housing project.30  However, Starrett City makes it clear that it does not overrule Otero but rather 
reaffirms its central holding concerning the overriding importance of integration.31  Moreover, the 
Starrett court suggested that it would have upheld the integration plan at bar were it based on a more 
data-driven, narrowly tailored effort.32 
5. Regulatory Codifications of Gautreaux, Shannon, Otero, and ICP  
In response to Gautreaux, Shannon, Otero, and ICP, HUD has promulgated siting regulations 
for construction of new public housing, Section 8 new construction,  senior housing,33 and for the low 
income housing tax credit housing.34  The regulations set out various requirements for sites, crucially 
prohibiting new construction in “an area of minority concentration.”35  In addition, the regulation 
prohibited the siting of projects in neighborhoods of high poverty concentration; 36 re-segregating 
neighborhoods;37 neighborhoods detrimental to family life;38 those with urban blight;39 and those 
without access to basic, decent public facilities and services, meaning the site must have access to 
social and recreational, educational, commercial and health facilities that are at least equivalent to those 
found in neighborhoods consisting or largely unassisted housing. 40  
 
The regulation sets out two exceptions to the general prohibition on locating public housing in 
areas of minority concentration.  Housing can be sited in areas of minority concentration if there are 1) 
                                                            
29 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134. 
30 United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir 1988). 
31 Id. at 1102. 
32 Id. at 1105. 
33 Michael Vernarelli, Where Should HUD Locate Assisted Housing?: The Evolution of Fair Housing Policy, in HOUSING 
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 214–23 (John Goering ed., 1986); 24 C.F.R. § 941.202, 24 C.F.R § 880.206. See 
Bus. Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 869 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing HUD regulations as partially in response 
to Shannon). 
34 See 78 Fed. Reg. 11460-01 at 43741–42.   
35 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2013); 880.206; 891.125. 
36 Id. § 941.202(d) (“The site must . . . avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of 
low-income persons.”); 880.206. 
37 Id. § 941.202(c)(ii) (prohibiting siting in “[a] racially mixed area if the project will cause a significant increase in the 
proportion of minority to non-minority residents in the area”); 880.206. 
38 Id. § 941.202(e); 880.206. 
39 Id. (prohibiting siting where “substandard dwellings or other undesirable elements predominate” and stating that siting in 
such areas is acceptable only if there is a “concerted program to remedy the undesirable conditions”).   
40 Id. § 941.202(g); 880.206. 
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“sufficient, comparable opportunities . . . outside areas of minority concentration” or 2) “the project is 
necessary to meet overriding housing needs which cannot otherwise feasibly be met in that housing 
market area.”41  Echoing Gautreaux, the regulations explicitly recognize that discriminatory 
resistance—presumably by white suburbanites—is not a sufficient reason for focusing on low-income 
neighborhoods.42  Similar to the Shannon court, the regulations also hedged their bets by including 
language that discussed sufficient comparable choices and overriding needs.43    
 
 While federal regulations were very clear that these site and neighborhoods standards applied to 
public housing and Section 8 new constructions.  HUD made clear that they applied to the low-income 
housing tax credit in its recent final disparate impact rule. Several commenters asked HUD to specify in 
the final rule that the mere approval of LIHTC projects in minority areas alone does not establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact under the Act or that locating LIHTC projects in low-income areas 
is a legally sufficient justification to claims of disparate impact discrimination.  HUD responded that 
“the rule does not establish a new form of liability, but instead serves to formalize by regulation a 
standard that has been applied by HUD and the courts for decades, while providing nationwide 
uniformity of application. The rule does not mandate that affordable housing be located in 
neighborhoods with any particular characteristic, but requires, as the Fair Housing Act already does 
only that housing development activities not have an unjustified discriminatory effect.” 
 
Another commenter requested that the final rule provide safe harbors for state and local 
programs that have legitimate policy and safety goals such as protecting water resources, promoting 
transit orientated development, and revitalizing communities. HUD responded that “it does not believe 




II.  The Draft FHEA Fails to Undertake Much of the Analysis Required by Law.  
 
The FHEA is modeled on the Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice (AI).  As such, 
the Fair Housing Planning Guide (FHPG)44 describes how an AI and FHEA should be undertaken.  The 
draft FHEA ignores much of fair housing analysis outlined in the FHPG.   
The proposed Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule states:   
Under the proposed rule, program participants will use HUD data to evaluate patterns of 
integration and segregation, racial and ethnic concentration of poverty, and disparities in 
access to valuable community assets and disproportionate housing needs based on 
protected class and evaluate the primary determinants of these conditions. Program 
participants will also assess whether laws, policies, or practices limit fair housing 
                                                            
41 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2013). 
42 Id. (noting that the “overriding need” exception cannot be threat of racial discrimination). 
43 Id. 
44 HUD, Fair Housing Planning Guide, vol.1 (1993), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf.  The 
Fair Housing Planning Guide is “firmly rooted in the statutory and regulatory framework and consistent with the case law” 
and is “entitled to respect.”  See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr v. Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d  375, 
387–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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choice, as well as the role of public investments in creating, perpetuating, or 
alleviating the segregation patterns revealed by the assessment. Examples of such 
laws, policies, or practices include, but are not limited to, zoning, land use, financing, 
infrastructure planning, and transportation.45 
  HUD official FHEA policy program guidance states:  
 
As the regional planning grantee cooperative agreement indicates, all grantee must 
conduct “activities pertaining to a regional analysis of impediments.”  Fulfilling the 
requirement of the FHEA satisfies this obligation.46   
 
HUD guidance further notes that the “FHEA is quite similar to the regional AI in scope and 
content.”47  “The key take away is there are a finite set of places where the FHEA and regional AI are 
different.”48 The major differences between the FHEA and regional AI are 1) the FHEA does not cover 
familial status and disability discrimination;49 the FHEA, unlike the AI, must assess physical 
infrastructure and housing transportation linkage; and that “the strategies and option plan” required in 
the AI is optional in the FHEA.50 
 
 The Fair Housing Planning Guide is “firmly rooted in the statutory and regulatory framework 
[of the Fair Housing Act] and consistent with the case law” and is “entitled to respect” in evaluating an 
AI.51  FHEA program guidance states that the FHPG “provides helpful information” and 
“[a]pproaching the FHEA in the manner described in the fair housing planning guide will provide 
jurisdictions with a comprehensive picture of the status of fair housing at the local and state levels.”52 
 
 The FHPG defines the FHEA as a “review of impediments to fair housing choice in the public 
and private sector.”  The FHEA involves: 
 
1. A comprehensive review of State or Entitlement jurisdiction’s laws, regulations,  
and administrative policies, procedures, and practices 
 
2. An assessment of how those laws, etc. affect the location, availability, and 
accessibility of housing 
 
3. An assessment of the conditions both public and private affecting fair housing 
choice for all protected classes 
                                                            
45 78 Fed. Reg. 43710-01 at 43715. (emphasis added). 
46 HUD, Program Policy Guidance OSHC 2012-03 (Feb. 17, 2012) (FHEA Guidance), available at  
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=OSHC2012-03FHEAss.pdf/. 
47 HUD, Regional Fair Housing and Equity Assessment, available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/sustainable_housing_communities/regional_fairhsg_equityasses
mt/. 
48 HUD, The FHEA Compared to the Regional FHEA, available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=FHEA_vs_Regional_FHEA.pdf/. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 




4. An assessment of the availability of affordable and accessible housing in a range of 
unit sizes53 
 
The FHPG defines “impediments to fair housing choice” as: 
 
Any actions, omissions, or decisions taken because of race, color … or national origin 
which restrict housing choices or the availability of housing choices 
 
Any actions, omissions, or decisions which have the effect of restricting housing choices 
or the availability of housing choices on the basis of race, color…national origin. 54 
 
Policies, practices, or procedures that appear neutral on their face, but which operate to deny or 
adversely affect the availability of housing to persons because of race, ethnicity, disability and families 
with children may constitute such impediments. Impediments to fair housing choice include actions or 
omissions in the state or entitlement jurisdictions that:  
 
1. Constitute violations, or potential violations, of the Fair Housing Act 
 
2. Are counterproductive to fair housing choice such as: 
A. Community resistance when minorities, persons with disabilities and/or 
low income persons first move into the white and or moderate to high 
income areas 
B. Community resistance to the siting of housing facilities for persons with 
disabilities because of the persons who occupy the housing 
 
3. Have the effect of restricting housing opportunities on the basis of race, 
color…national origin.55 
 
The FHPG requires analysis of the following data items:  
o Public policies, practices, and procedures involving housing and housing related 
activities 
o Zoning and land use policies, tax assessment abatement practices.  
o The nature and extent of fair housing complaints/suits or other data that may 
evidence a state or entitlement jurisdictions achievement of fair housing choice 
o Demographic patterns 
o Home mortgage disclosure act (HMDA data) 
o Results of testing 
o Results of fair housing initiative FHIP grants 




53 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.3. 
54 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.7. 
55 HUD, supra note 47, § 2–17. 
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The FHPG states that “[d]ata source include HUD and other agency data bases and studies; 
State and local sources, private housing industry reports, and college and university studies.”56  
 
The FHPG requires the establishment of procedures that “accommodate diverse views and 
interests” and that provide for a conflict resolution and decision making in the event that initial 
conflicts cannot be resolved.”57 “The FHEA structure should provide for effective, ongoing 
relationships with all elements of the community with clear and continuous exchange of concerns, 
ideas, analysis and evaluation of results.” 58 
 
Finally, HUD strongly encourages states in entitlement jurisdictions to become familiar with all 
studies that apply to their community and region as a first step in planning, and FHEA jurisdictions 
should not waste efforts re-studying and re-analyzing problems for which good information already 
exists. Instead, they need to plan and carry out actions to address the problems.59 
 
A. The FHEA Fails to Document How the Placement of Subsidized Housing Has Acted as a Driver 
of Segregation in the Region 
Recent analysis by the Institute Metropolitan Opportunity of U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development data shows that in 2010, forty-five percent of LIHTC units and twenty-five percent 
of all housing units are located in the region’s central cities.60  In the suburbs, eighty percent of LIHTC 
units were in white or integrated area. In the central cities, eighty-six percent of the units were in 
neighborhoods with more than thirty percent minority households and virtually all of the units were in 
areas with predominantly non-white, high poverty, low performing schools.  Regionally, half of all 
LIHTC units were in predominately non-white elementary school attendance areas, while only twenty-
three percent of elementary students attended these schools.61  
There are also major disparities in the racial mix of LIHTC households between the central 
cities and suburbs.  According to recently released data on 2011 MHFA-administered LIHTC, tenants 
in the central cities are much more likely to live in developments that are predominately minority than 
in the suburbs. In the central cities, eighty-six percent of householders lived in places (by census tract) 
that were more than fifty percent minority, and in the suburbs sixty-nine percent of householders lived 
in projects (by census tract) that were more than fifty percent white.62 
                                                            
56 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.4, 2–9. 
57 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.5, 2–2. 
58 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.5, 2–12. 
59 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.7, 2–18. 
60 Data from 2010 U.S. Department Housing and Urban Development LIHTC database, available at 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/lihtc.html from Minnesota project extract for projects placed through 2010.  The 
percent of housing units were calculated by IMO from 2010 U.S. Census SF1 data. 
61 Id. Calculation of housing and students by 2012 school attendance area by IMO of Minnesota Department of Education 
data. 
62 Minnesota Housing data on counts of low income housing tax credits (LIHTC) by census tract does not provide the full 
universe for the racial characteristics of tenants by excluding data on projects that were administered solely by non-MHFA 
sub allocators and by not reporting the full range of minority percentages for tracts with LIHTC households under twenty-
five percent minority as well as for tracts seventy-five percent or more minority.  As a result, we are unable we are unable to 
fully determine how integrative the LIHTC program has been overall in the Twin Cities.  
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IMO analysis of tax credit allocation data from MHFA’s annual publication of “Housing Tax 
Credit Awards and Applicants” shows that the percentage of LIHTC awards going to suburbs, 
measured in dollars, hovered near sixty percent from 2005 to 2009, dropping to fifty percent in 2010 
and 2011. (See chart below.) Thus the central cities with only a quarter of the region’s population and 
deeply racially segregated schools received roughly fifty percent of the tax credit units and recent tax 
credit funding during the period. In addition, between 2005 and 2011, $10 million of funding resulted 
in about 1200 of new LIHTC units in the central cities, often in segregated neighborhoods. At the same 
time, the state rejected about $32 million worth of requests from suburban areas more likely to have 
higher achieving and more integrated schools. 
The most recent data for 2012 show that HUD-administered subsidized housing units (not 
including LIHTC) in the seven-county area are still disproportionately concentrated in the central cities 
of Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Subsidized units occupied by minority households are also 
disproportionately located in the central cities. The following map shows that census tracts with greater 
numbers of subsidized units (larger circles) and higher percentages of racial minorities (redder circles) 
are mainly located in the central cities.63 The two central cities contain 56.5 percent of the region’s 
subsidized units, compared to only 24.6 percent of all housing units. The central cities also have a much 
higher percentage of minority headed households in subsidized units than the suburbs. Seventy-five 
percent of subsidized units in the central cities in 2012 were headed by people of color, compared to 




63 The data include all HUD-administered subsidized housing, but not low income housing tax credits, which guidelines are 





Subsidized units are also disproportionately placed within the FHEA opportunity areas. Green 
areas (located almost entirely in the central cities) contain forty-five percent of the region’s subsidized 
housing, but only fifteen percent of the region’s overall housing. Yellow areas (located in the central 
cities and many inner suburbs) contain thirty-two percent of the region’s subsidized housing and 
twenty-nine percent of the region’s housing. In contrast, the blue areas (the remaining area within the 
Metropolitan Urban Services Area) have only twenty-two percent of the region’s subsidized housing, 
compared to fifty percent of the region’s housing. There are also disproportionate percentages of 
minority householders in subsidized housing in the FHEA opportunity areas. In green areas seventy-
seven percent of subsidized householders are occupied by minority households, followed by fifty-five 
percent in the yellow areas and thirty-seven percent in the blue areas. 
Finally, subsidized housing units in the suburbs since 1986 continue to be located primarily in 
areas with schools which are predominantly non-white or that are re-segregating. The map below 
shows the attendance boundaries of elementary schools in the region, divided into three categories – 
predominantly white (schools with non-white shares between zero and thirty percent), integrated (non-
white shares between thirty and fifty percent), and predominantly non-white (non-white shares greater 
than fifty percent). 
Combining the 2012 HousingLink data on all subsidized housing except vouchers with school 
attendance areas shows that fifty-nine percent of all subsidized housing units in the region were inside 
the red areas on the maps where nearly all schools were predominantly non-white. Only sixteen percent 








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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course, where educational opportunities are strongest, crime is lowest, environmental and health 
conditions are strongest, and where jobs are growing most quickly. 
This pattern is very similar when compared to neighborhood characteristics (rather than 
schools). Subsidized units are disproportionately in neighborhoods with high minority concentrations. 
In 2012, fifty-six percent of subsidized units (including LIHTC and Section 8 project units) were in 
census tracts with more than thirty percent minority residents, more than twice the percentage of the 
region’s population living in those tracts. 
A simulation by IRP of the potential effects of the placement of subsidized units in 2005 
showed that more proactive placement of existing LIHTC units in attendance areas for low poverty 
schools could have significantly increased school integration at that time.64 For instance, if LIHTC and 
project-based Section 8 units had been assigned randomly by race and located across the region in the 
same proportions as overall population, then the region could have been brought nearly a third of the 
way to the goal of integrated schools in 2005.65 It is thus conceivable that pro-integrative placement of 
new units in low poverty school attendance areas could do most of the work necessary for a racially 
integrated regional school system.66  Indeed, in the long run, if housing policy returns to the more pro-
integrative strategies of earlier decades it may be possible to have integrated schools with less pro-
integrative busing than exists today.   
Overall, as many central city schools have collapsed under segregation and poverty, the central 
cities have been allocated much more than their regional fair share of subsidized housing. Subsidized 
units have been placed disproportionately in neighborhoods with schools that are predominately poor 
and non-white, have failing test sores and that are growing worse and more isolated from college or 
middle-income jobs. 
Action Steps: 
o Return by the Met Council to setting strong fair share goals and monitoring of 
segregative behavior in suburban areas. 
o Provide full race data on LIHTC: HUD does not report on, and Minnesota Housing does 
not provide the full universe for the racial characteristics of tenants in LIHTC units. As a 
result, it is impossible to determine how integrative the LIHTC program has been. The 
lack of collection and availability of race data in LIHTC by U.S. public housing 
agencies is troubling. It is hard to see how housing agencies can follow their obligation 
to affirmatively further fair housing if they do not collect data on the race of tenants in 
LIHTC units. 
                                                            
64 See Institute on Race and Poverty, A Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Twin Cities Schools and Neighborhoods 38, 
available at http://www.irpumn.org/. 
65 Id. at 39. 
66 If a random placement of units does half the work, a pro-integrative placement of all of the units by logical deduction 










B. The FHEA Fails to Collect and Report Data Required by HUD Regarding Racial 
Discrimination and Racial Segregation.  
The FHEA does not analyze the racial occupancy of the low-income housing tax credit 
program. Sections 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (e)(6) and 3608(a) both require HUD to collect and make available 
to the public on an annual basis the racial occupancy data for potential beneficiaries of programs 
administered by the HUD, including but not limited to the CDBG and HOME program.  This would 
include any unit with any HUD funds involved it its construction in any way. Section 42 U.S.C. 
§1437z-8 requires each state housing finance agency to collect data on the racial occupancy of the tax 
credit program.  I requested this information formally in June 2012 and have not received it. Recently, 
Minnesota Housings stated that they would make this available only after the completion of the FHEA, 
and only for a fee of $2000, an onerous fee to a citizen or small research organization.  It is likely that 
Minnesota Housing has never collected this data and thus never fulfilled its legal obligation under both 
42 U.S.C. §1437z-8 and Shannon.  It requiring us to fund what is its clear legal duty to provide to the 
public.  It is impossible for the Met Council or any state agency to affirmatively further fair housing if 
it is intentionally blind to racially occupancy patterns of subsidized housing.  Shannon and its progeny 
requires recipient of federal housing funds to collect and analyze racial occupancy data before they 
make housing placement decisions.   
 
C. The FHEA Fails in Its Obligation to Identify the Most Significant Impediments to Fair Housing 
Choice. 
The draft FHEA should have included “a comprehensive review of a State or Entitlement 
jurisdiction’s laws, regulations, and administrative policies, procedures and practices,” and “an 
assessment of how those laws, etc. affect the location, availability, and accessibility of housing.”67  By 
failing to mention several of the most important state agencies and local governments with duties and 
powers to affirmatively further fair housing, the FHEA prima facie fails in this obligation. 
 
1. The FHEA fails to report on the abandonment of Met Council Policy 13/39, one of the 
nation’s most effective and pro-integrative regional fair housing systems, in favor of an 
uncoordinated series of racially segregative programs. 
From 1970 to 1986, the Met Council, together with the state housing finance agency, 
implemented a regional fair share housing program through coordination of its land use and housing 
policies.68 In direct response to the passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the promulgation of its 
siting rules, the first school desegregation lawsuit against the state of Minnesota,69 and the New Jersey 
                                                            
67 HUD, supra note 47, § 2.3, 2–7 (defining the FHEA). 
68 The Twin Cities’ fair share program during this period was “one of the highest-performing regional programs in the entire 
nation.”  Edward G. Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbara Lukermann, The Rise and Fall of Fair Share Housing: Lessons from 
the Twin Cities, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 251 
(Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).  For evidence of the success of the program during the 1970s, see Myron Orfield, Land 
Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 919–20 
(2006). 




Supreme Court’s decision in Mount Laurel,70 the Met Council (pursuant to its statutory and 
constitutional duty to achieve a fair share distribution of affordable housing) and the Minnesota 
Housing Finance Agency (now Minnesota Housing) created and operated the most effective suburban 
affordable housing plan with the greatest pro-integrative civil rights effect in the nation’s history.71  
This program, known as Policy 13/39, operated under both the fair share requirement of the Minnesota 
Land Use Planning Act and federal A-95 review power with clear guidance from HUD.72  Both state 
and federal law provided an independent statutory basis to support the program. Through Housing 
Policy 13 (later renumbered Policy 39), the Met Council used its authority and the withholding of a 
wide variety of federal and state funds to encourage affordable housing development in the suburbs.73 
 
a. History of Fair Share and Policy 13/39 
 
On the heels of the New York Court of Appeal’s decision in Golden v. Town of Ramapo, it 
became clear that the type of staged urban growth system the Met Council sought to establish would be 
legally defensible.74  The Council hired the renowned land use scholar, Robert Freilich, who drafted the 
Ramapo system to design a new Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act (Act) for submission to the 
Minnesota Legislature.  From the outset it was clear the Act would contain a “fair share” housing 
requirement, for Freilich believed that the staged growth system the Council wanted would be 
unconstitutional without it. In January of 1974, Freilich produced a report to the Met Council outlining 
the proposed act and its fair share provisions.75   
 
Just as riots throughout the country in the late 1960s lead to the Kerner Commission Report and 
ultimately to the passage of the Fair Housing Act, serious civil disturbances in North Minneapolis and 
the growing racial segregation in both central cities school systems were driving forces behind the Met 
Council’s fair share housing policy.  The Met Council was also influenced by the progress of the 
Booker76 school desegregation lawsuit, which many, including the its chair, Al Hofstede, believed 
could not be effectively carried out within the borders of the city of Minneapolis alone.77  Hofstede and 
the Met Council believed that racial segregation was destroying the education and economic prospects 
of black citizens in North Minneapolis, the fabric and vitality of their neighborhoods and that growing 
                                                            
70 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel]. 
71 See Robert H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential Controls—The Essential Basis for Effective 
Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan 
Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974) (Freilich and Ragsdale drafted the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act, which was 
revolutionary for its time.).   
72 See 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2013); Orfield, supra note 68, at 920. 
73 Orfield, supra note 68.  
74 Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). 
75 See Robert H. Freilich and John W. Ragsdale, Jr., A Legal Study of the Control of Urban Sprawl in the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul Metropolitan Region, submitted to the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (January 10, 1974) [hereinafter Freilich Legal 
Study]. The report was later published in the Minnesota Law Review with the following note, “This article is the result of a 
1971-73 grant from the Met Council to Professor Freilich to study and recommend a legal policy for regional growth in 
accordance with the council’s decision to pursue growth in a timed and sequential manner.” See Freilich and Ragsdale, 
Timing and Sequential Controls – The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis for the New Directions 
for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974) n.1.  
76 Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972). 
77 Interview Albert Hofstede (Dec. 19, 2012). 
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racial and social segregation would hurt the economic vitality of the metropolitan area.78  The Met 
Council’s goals were also shaped by the Gautreaux case79 in Chicago, the Shannon case80 in 
Philadelphia and the Mount Laurel case81 in New Jersey.  It appeared that federal courts under the new 
Fair Housing Act were going to encourage housing authorities to change the practice of concentrating 
most low-income housing in poor minority neighborhoods and that exclusionary zoning practices 
would be found to exceed the delegated police powers of growing suburban communities.  Prior the 
passage of the Land Use Planning Act, the Met Council had begun to push fair sharing housing 
allocations in cooperation with the state housing finance agency.  
 
 Freilich grounded his “fair share” proposals in explicit goals already annunciated by the 
Metropolitan Council,82 the requirements of the Federal Fair Housing Act, and the evolving case 
prohibiting exclusionary zoning.  The “fair share” requirement embodied in the Metropolitan Land Use 
Planning Act (LUPA) was intended to represent a legal “term of art” clarified by court decisions rather 
than a vague open-ended term subject to a broad range of council interpretations. 
 
 In its guiding documents, prior to LUPA the Met Council had declared that its fair share system 
was intended to reduce racial and economic segregation, eliminate exclusionary zoning, and to use the 
its affirmative powers to increase regional racial and economic integration for the benefits of 
individuals, neighborhoods and in order to strengthen the region’s workforce and economic vitality.      
 
The Met Council’s “Development Framework Objectives” declare “[t]he principal reason for a 
physical development plan is to improve the quality of life enjoyed by all Metropolitan residents.” Its 
objective included providing “actual choice for a variety of opportunities for living, working and social 
interaction throughout the Metropolitan area for persons of all income, racial, and age groups” and 
prohibited the “forced concentrations of minority in lower income families and individuals in the older 
portions of the Metropolitan area.”83   In its “Central city and Older Suburban Areas Development 
Policy” the Met Council’s goals include “[r]educ[ing] forced concentration of minorities in low-income 
persons.84 
 The LUPA directs the Met Council to plan for the “orderly and economic development” of the 
region.  In its planning documents the Council states: “[t]he orderly and economic development of the 
Metropolitan area” “will be supported by actions to reduce forced concentration on minorities in low 
income persons,” by providing “new housing in renewal neighborhoods fitting the density and type 
preferences of the population at large rather than emphasizing low income housing” and by providing 
“housing development opportunities for lower income persons in developed and new development 
areas.”85 
The Council defined the “Social Objectives of Physical Planning,” to include:   
                                                            
78 Interview Albert Hofstede (Dec. 19, 2012). 
79 Gautreaux I, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974). 
80 Shannon , 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). 
81 Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
82 Freilich Legal Study at 67. 
83 Discussion Statement on Metropolitan Development Policy, Oct. 1973, at 7 [hereinafter Discussion Statement].   
84 Id. at 39. 
85 Id. at 14.  
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1.  To increase choice and opportunity for persons in the Metropolitan area, 
particularly people who are in some way disadvantaged such as low income, 
minorities, senior citizens, etc. 
2.   To decrease residential segregation by race, class and income level. To reduce 
the concentration of lower income families and individuals in the lower in the 
older areas of the region and increase housing choice for lower income persons 
throughout the area. 
3. To revitalize the two central cities and attract middle and upper income families 
and individuals to center cities.  
4.   To work toward an area which provides a more complete array of needed 
services and facilities to its residents.  For example to increase the provision of 
social services in suburban areas so that the lack of such services does not reduce 
residential choice. 86 
Freilich began his recommendation by noting the demographic trends to which the Met Council 
must respond in implementing fair share. 
 
With the population in the central cities becoming increasingly poor and nonwhite, the 
industry has left its workforce behind requiring extensive commutation and energy 
drains. The provision of low moderate income housing in the suburbs is now in a set 
necessity to avoid further concentrations in blight in the urban core and adequate job 
link housing at the fringe. At the same time the Council desires to upgrade inner-city 
areas and stabilize older transitional areas in the central cities in first ring suburbs.87   
 
 Freilich makes clear that the Met Council’s housing goals were also its clear legal obligations, 
both under the Fair Housing Act and in order avoid exclusionary zoning. Citing Gautreaux and 
Shannon explicitly, Freilich writes “[u]nder recent decisions of the federal courts, interpreting the civil 
rights and housing law, housing cannot be built in the central cities if it results in the undue 
concentration of low income and minority persons.”88 Citing the Mount Laurel case, Freilich warns that 
state courts are “beginning to enforce mandatory affirmative plans for housing in suburban 
communities.”89  
 
In defining the legal concept of “fair share” Freilich references not only the Mount Laurel 
doctrine, but similar fair share definitions developed by the Delaware Valley Regional Planning 
                                                            
86 Discussion Statement at 7.   
87 Freilich Legal Study at 68. 
88 Freilich Legal Study at VI n.2 cited Shannon, 436 F.2d 809; Lakewood Homes Inc. v. City of Lima, 258 N. E.2d 470 
(Ohio 1970); Gautreaux II, 304 F. Supp. 736; El Cortez Heights Ass’n v. Tucson Hous. Auth., 457 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1969). 
89 Freilich Legal Study at VI n.22 cited Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super 164, 290 A2d 465 (1972).  Before the passage of the 
land use planning act, the Mount Laurel doctrine was further elucidated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (Mount Laurel I) and 
subsequently further clarified in Southern Burlington County. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 
A.2d. 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II). 
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Commission (DVRPC) and the Montgomery County fair share housing initiative in the Dayton, Ohio 
Metropolitan area.  In so doing, Freilich makes clear that the “fair share requirement” in the land use 
planning is a well-defined, pro-integrative, and inclusionary housing strategy in which all regional 
communities would undertake similar, predictable responsibilities to house their ‘fair share” of the 
region’s low-income households.90  
  
Freilich concludes by making clear that without a substantive fair share provision in the land 
use planning act, the Met Council’s staged development system would be declared unconstitutional.91  
The legal mind behind the Ramapo decision wrote that a staged urban growth system would be 
challenged as an unconstitutional taking and/or a substantive due process and equal protection violation 
and, as such, would be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.  Without making explicit provision for the 
poor in all region communities, he did not think that a staged growth system would survive a strict 
scrutiny challenge.  
 
b. The Mount Laurel doctrine informs the meaning of “Fair Share” under the Minnesota 
Land Use Planning Act     
 
The Mount Laurel case is one the most important state constitutional decisions in American 
history.  A typical law student will study Mount Laurel in property, in land use law, and state and local 
government law, and constitutional law.  Whenever question of the meaning of “fair share” arises, 
whether to delineate the meaning of a statutory or regulatory phrase or to fill out another states’ 
constitutional obligations, courts virtually always follow “the Mount Laurel doctrine.” 92 
 
The Mount Laurel court notes: 
 
The effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend upon 
the adventious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades or even 
centuries ago, and based in many instances of considerations of geography, or of politics 
that are no longer significant with respect to zoning.  The direction of growth of 
residential areas on the one hand and of industrial concentration on the other refuses to 
                                                            
90 For the influence of Mount Laurel on the evolving concept of regional general welfare see generally Associated Home 
Builders v. City of Livermore, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473 (1976); Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 
1991); Boothroyd v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Amherst, 868 N.E.2d  83 (Mass. 2007); Homebuilders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. 
City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4 188, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, cert. denied¸ 535 U.S. 954 (2002). 
91 Freilich wrote: “Whatever the methods used in less the region utilizes extensive provisions for low moderate income 
housing, there is a grave danger that a regional planning system of growth control a regional planning in general will be 
subject to a strict scrutiny staff tested declared unconstitutional is violating equal protection of the laws.” Freilich Legal 
Study at 69 and n.28. Freilich notes that the Ramapo court used a strict scrutiny test on the staged development system the 
Met Council sought to emulate.   
92 In Oregon for example, the Oregon Land Use Development Commission uses Mount Laurel explicitly to define the 
meaning for the housing obligation of the Oregon land use law and the law has been followed very clearly and effectively.  
See Seaman v. City of Durham, 1 LCDC 283, 288 (1978); see also, Robert Liberty, Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A 
Natural Policy Alliance for Environmentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581, 592 
(2003); Liberty, 1998 Planned Growth: The Oregon Model, 13 Natural Res. and Env’t. 315 (1998).  Moreover, New York, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and many others follow Mount Laurel.  See, e.g., Bereson v. Town of New 
Castle, 463 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1983); Nat’l Land and Inv. Co. v Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).  In all nineteen states that have 
growth management laws, Mount Laurel jurisprudence shapes the application of these laws.   
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be governed by such artificial lines.  Changes in methods of transportation have served 
only to accentuate the unreality in dealing with zoning problems on the basis of 
territorial limits.93   
 
Based on this, the Mount Laurel doctrines hold that every community in a metropolitan area has 
a constitutional obligation to provide for its “fair share” of the region’s “existing and projected” need 
for affordable housing.  It must do this through its zoning code, development agreements and 
development practices.  If these practices do not themselves provide for the community’s fair share of 
affordable housing, the community must take affirmative measure such as inclusionary zoning to 
accomplish its obligations. Such a community moreover cannot generally deny a reasonable proposal 
by another level of government or private developer that would help them accomplish such a goal.   
Mount Laurel provides that if a community does not adapt its land use planning to achieve its fair share 
goals and if it shows a pattern of denying other levels of government or private developers proposals 
that would achieve these goals, then builders proposing projects that would help the community 
achieve its goal would have a constitutional “builder’s remedy,” an automatic zoning variance to 
proceed, and the city would have no power to impede their progress.  The city would only regain such 
authority when a court or appropriately constituted agency had certified that the city was in compliance 
with its constitutional obligation.  
  
Mount Laurel goals are allocated on a regional basis.  In general each community must provide 
for its fair share of affordable housing, although the doctrine allows the court to give higher goals to 
suburbs with more entry level jobs and or greater “local fiscal capacity” than communities that are 
simply bedroom communities without jobs and with modest local tax resources. Mount Laurel makes 
clear that it does not wish to concentrate more affordable housing in communities that are poor and or 
declining.  Mount Laurel also makes clear that if a community has its fair share of affordable housing, 
it can and sometimes should resume otherwise exclusionary practices until they threaten its ability to 
meets its responsibilities as a part of metropolitan region.  
 
Mount Laurel is based on legal principle that zoning and land use regulation is a state power 
that can only be delegated to a city to undertake valid police powers that advance the health, safety and 
welfare of the state’s residents. A zoning provision or other development activity that prevents a local 
government from housing its fair share of the region’s poor exceeds the authority that could be 
delegated by the state.  Such exclusionary behavior is without legal authority and also contrary to the 
general welfare of the state’s citizens.    
 
Mount Laurel explicit rejects the argument that local fiscal zoning—or the preferential 
treatment of expensive housing and commercial industrial property and the exclusion of affordable 
housing—is necessary to keep local taxes low and services strong.  Such fiscal zoning, the court 
declares, while perhaps a rational response to the preferences of local voters is impermissible 
justification for communities without their fair share of affordable housing. 
 
                                                            




It is all but certain that the Minnesota Supreme Court would follow Mount Laurel.  Shortly after 
Freilich’s report was released, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Burnsville v. Onishuk sustained the 
Fiscal Disparities Act, after it was declared unconstitutional under the General and Uniform Clause of 
the state constitution in a lower court.94  The uniformity clause requires that “taxes shall be uniform 
upon the same classes or property and shall be levied and collected for public purposes.”95  In enacting 
fiscal disparities the legislature forced local communities to share the growth in their commercial and 
industrial property tax with other regional communities.  In creating this system the legislature failed to 
create a regional taxing district and thus required local government to levy taxes on their property for 
the benefit of other jurisdictions at rates that were not uniform.  Such efforts had always been voided by 
the Minnesota courts and famously disallowed in the neighboring state of Wisconsin in the leading case 
of Buse v. Smith in which a state wide school property tax sharing system was declared unconstitutional 
under Wisconsin’s very similar Uniformity Clause.96  
 
Echoing Mount Laurel’s rationale, the Onishuk court reversed the trial court holding that the 
interdependence of the cities and suburbs of the Twin Cities metropolitan areas was so fundamental 
that they could no longer be treated as separate local governments for purposes of the state 
constitution’s Uniformity Clause.   
 
The Onishuk court noted: 
 
[W]e are quick to concede that a strict application of our prior decisions would require 
us to lead strongly for affirmance. The trial court cannot be faulted for reading those 
decisions as it did.  Nevertheless, we are today dealing with a viable, fluid, transient 
society where traditional concepts of what confers a tax benefit may be too parochial…. 
The seven County Metropolitan area, it is pointed out, has a high degree of mobility and 
political, social, and economic interdependence. There is an increasing use of facilities 
and one municipality by those who reside or work in a different municipality. The 
payment of taxes in a Metropolitan area may have only slight relationship to the use and 
enjoyment which residents make of other areas in the district. Defendants argue 
effectively that the indiscriminate encouragement of commerce and industry in a 
particular municipality may detrimentally and irretrievably affect the policies and plans 
for the development of parks and open space and frustrate well considered housing 
policies for both low income and moderate income residents. The fiscal disparities acts 
recognizes that’s to some extent the location of commercial industrial development may 
be irrelevant to the question of the cost of services which are added to a municipality’s 
budget occasioned by the location of such a development within its boundaries… 
 
In other words, in terms of traditional balancing of benefits and burdens, the burdens 
conferred on the residents of a particular municipality because of the location of 
commercial industrial development within its boundaries may far exceed the burdens 
imposed on that municipality by virtue of the additional cost of servicing and policing 
the particular development which has located there. It is the theory of the fiscal 
                                                            
94 Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 301 Minn. 137, 222 N.W.2d 523 (1974). 
95 Id. at 143–44. 
96 Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis.2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976). 
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disparities act of the residents of highly developed commercial industrial areas do enjoy 
direct benefits from the existence of adjacent municipalities which provide open space, 
lakes, parks, golf courses, zoos, fairgrounds, low-density housing areas, churches 
school, schools and hospitals.97 
 
 Given the Court’s holding that the interdependence of local government no long allows local 
municipalities to be considered independent government for purposes of the uniformity clause in part 
because a contrary result could frustrate “well considered housing policies for low and moderate 
residents” and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s clear decisions limiting the zoning powers to those 
embodies in clearly defined police powers,98 both Freilich and the Met Council believed the Mount 
Laurel doctrine was already a part of the Minnesota Constitution and that fair share requirement of the 
land use planning act simply reflected constitutional requirements.    
  
Mount Laurel and Onishuk are similar cases.  Both are about the interdependence of cities with 
land use planning powers with a single region.  Both recognized the observing the local interest leads 
communities to compete for high valued tax uses and exclude affordable housing.  Both see this trend 
as harmful to the citizen on their respective metropolitan areas.   
  
Following the logic and holding of Mount Laurel, Freilich notes “Growth controls alone, 
however not sufficiently lower land housing will cost to make it feasible for private enterprise to 
construct low moderate income housing without a subsidy. Moreover with the recent moratorium on 
federal housing subsidy programs and impoundment of funds, the Council will have to affirmatively 
implement programs it has already conceptualized for housing stimulus.”99 Such affirmative measures 
were defined by Freilich to include the development of inclusionary zoning for exclusive communities 
and stable neighborhood integration plans for communities in the process of re-segregation.100   
 
                                                            
97Onischuk, 301 Minn. at 153–4, 222 N.W.2d at 532–33.  
98See Gunderson v. Anderson, 190 Minn. 245, 251 N.W. 515 (1933); American Wood Products v. Minneapolis, 21 F.2d 440 
(D. Minn. 1927). 
99 Some of these program should be:  
1. A-95 review of housing subsidy applications to ensure that projects are located in areas of new development. 
2. Development and implementation of regional “fair share” plans for housing of low and moderate income 
families in suburban and new development locations  
3. Development of regional housing authorities with capacity to develop public and turnkey housing throughout 
the region. 
4. Develop, through legislation, powers to finance and construct low moderate income housing through sale of 
tax-exempt bonds, with an exemption from local zoning and planning  
5. Request regional planning authority to review local zoning and planning to assure that it conforms with 
regional plans, is non-exclusionary and makes provision for low moderate income housing  
There is no reason why the region could not request local and state revenue sharing to finance housing allowances 
or rent supplements, seed money or other programs to encourage low moderate income housing construction. 
100  According the report such stable integration plans included: 1) Construction of new towns in town for areas of blight 
beyond renewal and rehabilitation; 2) Judicious use of code enforcement to maintain flexible standards to prevent further 
abandonment; 3) Adoption of ordinances on sale signs, preventing blockbusting, and occupancy permits and 4) Utilization 




In Alliance for Metropolitan Stability v. Metropolitan Council, advocates sued the Met Council 
to enforce the “fair share” requirement of the land use planning act.101  The court held that while the 
advocates had standing, there was no private right of action under the land use planning act.  In dicta, 
the court declared that the Met Council had the authority to determine fair share goals in the present 
manner.  This discussion, however, was not part of the courts holding and not necessary for its 
conclusion.  Further in Alliance, the court was not presented with historical evidence that the framers 
both believed that Mount Laurel principles were already part of the Minnesota Constitution and their 
consequent desire for Mount Laurel jurisprudence to control the meaning of the “fair share” 
requirement. The court did not have the opportunity to distinguish Burnsville v. Onishuk.   
 
 Alternatively, this dicta would support the power that the Met Council, being the state 
administrative agency charged with enforcing the land use planning act to determine the meaning of the 
“fair share” requirement.  Given that the Met Council had enforced a Mount Laurel-like standard 
without objection for over 15 years, the court’s dicta in Alliance would support the council in doing so 
again.   
 
c. The Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act (LUPA) 
 
The text of LUPA follows precisely from Freilich’s recommendations and its preamble 
incorporates Onishuk’s constitutional principle of fundamental urban and suburban interdependence of 
Twin Cities communities.    
 
Under Legislative Findings and Purpose, Minn. Stat. § 473.851  
 
The legislature finds and declares that the local government units within the 
Metropolitan area are interdependent, that the growth and patterns of urbanization 
within the area creates the need for additional state, metropolitan and local public 
services and facilities …Since problems of urbanization and development transcend 
local governmental boundaries, there is a need for the adoption of coordinated plans, 
programs and controls by all local government units and school districts in order to 
protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the Metropolitan area and to 
ensure coordinated, orderly and economic development. Therefore it is the purpose of 
section 462.355, subdivision 4, 473.175, and 473.851 to 473.871 to  (1) establish 
requirements and procedures to accomplish comprehensive local planning with land use 
controls consistent with planned, orderly and staged development and the 
Metropolitan systems plans, and (2) to provide assistance to local governmental units 
and school districts within the Metropolitan area for the preparation of plans and official 
controls appropriate for their areas consistent with Metropolitan systems plans.102 
 
LUPA requires a comprehensive planning approach to metropolitan housing issues and requires 
individual communities to establish programs that meet their fair share of the regional need for low-
moderate housing. The Met Council is responsible for interpreting and implementing the requirements 
of LUPA.  As noted above, Council made clear that “orderly and economic development of the 
                                                            
101Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. App. 2003). 
102 MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Metropolitan area will be supported by actions to: “reduce forced concentration on minorities in low 
income persons; provide new housing in renewal neighborhoods fitting the density and type 
preferences of the population at large rather than emphasizing low income housing; and provide 
housing development opportunities for lower income persons in developed and new development 
areas.” 
In terms of fair share, the statute specifically requires that community comprehensive plans: 
[…] include a housing element containing standards, plans and programs for providing 
adequate housing opportunities to meet existing and projected local and regional 
housing needs, including but not limited to the use of official controls and land use 
planning to promote the availability of land for the development of low and moderate 
income housing.103 
        LUPA also requires that comprehensive plans include official land use controls “to implement 
the housing element of the land use plan, which will provide sufficient existing and new housing to 
meet the local unit's share of the metro area need for low and moderate income housing.” The language 
of meeting its share of the existing and projected need for affordable housing tracks the Mount Laurel 
doctrine precisely.  It is clear beyond peradventure that the legislature intended to embody the well-
accepted legal definition of fair share.   
 
The statute also requires that each comprehensive plan include an implementation program 
describing “public programs, fiscal devices and other specific actions to be undertaken in stated 
sequence to implement the comprehensive plan….”  The implementation program must include: 
 
A housing implementation program, including official controls to implement the 
housing element of the land use plan, which will provide sufficient existing and new 
housing to meet the local unit’s share of the metropolitan area need for low and 
moderate income housing. 104  
 
   These provisions have been virtually ignored by many jurisdictions and by the Met Council for 
decades.  In the late 1970s, the Council had an allocation plan setting numerical goals for low- and 
moderate-income housing for each metro area community.  The Council also adopted “Advisory 
Standards for Land Use Regulation to Promote Housing Diversity in the Twin Cities Metropolitan 
Area.”  The standards included those for land use regulations impacting housing costs such as lot size 
and garage requirements.  It included land use policies promoting affordable housing.  The standards 
were abandoned in the next decade, despite the statutory requirement that the Council provide “model 
plan provisions and official controls.”105   
 
d. Implementation of LUPA and Fair Share 
 
In his evaluation of the effectiveness of LUPA’s fair share requirements, Professor Edward 
Goetz divided the Met Council’s history of its three years of enforcement three waves.          
                                                            
103 Id. § 473.859(2). 
104 Id. § 473.859(4) (emphasis added). 




First Wave: A Racially Integrated Regional Fair Share Housing Policy 1971-1983      
When LUPA was adopted by the state legislature in 1976, Met Council revised the pre-existing 
sector-based allocation plan to provide specific numerical goals for all communities within the MUSA 
line and for “free-standing growth centers” outside the MUSA line. The new allocation plan accounted 
for the number and projected growth of households and jobs, as well as the number of non-subsidized 
low- to moderate-income housing units for each community.106  These goals were allocated as fair 
share goals with a methodology identical to that required by Mount Laurel, DVRPC and Montgomery 
County and as outlined by Freilich’s report.   
  
Taking the affirmative steps recommended by Freilich and required by the Mount Laurel 
doctrine, the Met Council also influenced housing policy when it included housing performance 
evaluations as a part of its review of local government grant applications during the 1970s. In 1971, the 
Met Council started to review local governments' funding applications to the federal government for 
park, sewer, water, and road facilities. During this process, Met Council explicitly considered the local 
government's performance on affordable housing issues when making its recommendations to the 
federal government. The Met Council received direct authority to review these grant applications in 
1973, which gave it even more leverage over local governments.  
   
Following the Mount Laurel doctrine, in 1977, the Met Council adopted a set of development 
guidelines aimed, in part, at producing more affordable housing opportunities.  These guidelines 
included suggestions related to lot size, garages, living area square footage, and other items that have a 
direct impact on housing prices. In addition, the development guidelines established standards for land-
use policies that promoted lower-cost housing and gave communities a sense of best practices.  
 
Goetz identified land that had been set aside for high density residential uses in the first wave of 
comprehensive plans in twenty-five sample communities and found over 7463 parcels (8590 acres) of 
land set aside as high density affordable housing in the first wave plans.107 With this set of tools, Met 
Council was able to change the spatial distribution of subsidized housing in the region. For example, in 
1971, Minneapolis and St. Paul had ninety percent of the region's subsidized housing. Fifteen years 
later, their share was down to sixty percent.  
 
The regional distribution of subsidized housing changed dramatically during the 1970s. At the 
beginning of the decade, roughly two-thirds (sixty-four percent) of new subsidized units were being 
located in the central cities. But by 1979, more than two-thirds (sixty-nine percent) were going to 
suburban locations. As a result, the total (cumulative) share of subsidized housing that was in the 
suburbs quadrupled, from ten percent to thirty-nine percent. This represents a nearly eight-fold increase 
in the total number of units in the suburbs from 1878 in 1971 to 14,712 in 1979. Over 13,000 units 
                                                            
106 The Allocation Plan, first created in 1972 (prior to passage of LUPA), was a formula-based system that provided 
numerical goals for low-mod housing in the region.  Initially, these goals were not broken down for individual communities; 
instead, they were aggregated for nine separate subsectors of the metropolitan area. 
107 Goetz, Edward G., Karen Chapple and Barbara Lukermann, The Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and the Promotion of 
Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in Suburbia, 22 L. & INEQUALITY 31, 31–72 (2004). 
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were added in this period, with 9400 of these units, or seventy percent, at the developing edge of the 
suburbs.108   
The change in subsidized family housing was even more dramatic.  Before 1975, seventy 
percent of subsidized family housing was built in the central cities.  By 1976, almost sixty percent was 
built in the suburbs and by the end of the decade virtually all of family subsidized housing was being 
built in the suburbs.109 
  During the 1970s, the region’s subsidized housing policies effectively defined what 
“affirmatively furthering fair housing” means. 
                                                            
108 See Metropolitan Council, Housing Opportunity in the Twin Cities: A Staff Background Report on the Local and 
Regional Response 1967-1978 (Oct. 1978) at 3 [hereinafter Twin Cities Housing Opportunity].  
109 See Berkeley Planning Associates, Assessment of the Impact of the Housing Opportunity Plan (AHOP) Final Report: 
Volume II, Case Study Narratives (Nov. 1, 1979), prepared for the Office of Community Planning and Housing 




       
Second Wave: The Return to a Segregated Housing Policy: 1983-1995 
Implementation of LUPA's housing elements changed drastically in 1983.  There were several 
causes.  First, a new governor had been elected—Rudy Perpich cared little about metropolitan issues 
and appointed two Met Council chairs with little experience.  Next, Congress slashed federal housing 
subsidies in the early 1980s and President Reagan weakened the important A-95 provision.  Professor 
Goetz argues that as the region became more diverse, growing racial bias also contributed to the Met 






[A]s more people of color moved to the area, greater concentrations of poverty and 
attendant social problems emerged in core neighborhood. The social and economic 
homogeneity that had been the foundation of almost two decades of regional problem-
solving began to disappear. With it went the language of regional commitment to low-
cost housing needs under the fair share method.110  
 
Neither of changes in federal policy listed above should have been decisive.  First project-based 
HUD subsidies would be soon replaced by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which could 
have been used to accomplish fair share goals.  However, the Council never attempted to integrate its 
program with the tax credit and did not object when the legislature, at the behest of the city of 
Minneapolis, dedicated most of the tax credit to the central cities in 1986 making real fair share 
impossible.  
 
Moreover, while the A-95 review no longer mandated that the Met Council review all federal 
requests for federal aid to local government, it still allowed them to do so.  Many federal programs that 
the Council had review authority were discontinued and replaced by state programs over which the Met 
Council had clearer authority.  In the end, the Council was the Metropolitan Planning Organization 
(MPO) and maintained powerful control over federal transportation dollars and because federal sewer 
funds were replaced by new metropolitan funds directly under the Met Council’s direct control, the 
Council actually had more leverage over local government actions that ever before.  First, as the 
region’s MPO and regional transit agency it retained control over this revenue stream and was given 
even greater flexibility to program these funds to reward compact inclusive development by spending 
them for either transit or highways under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
(ISTEA) passed in the early 1990s.  While in the early years it could recommend sewer funds to 
inclusive communities, the federal government sometimes ignored these recommendations.  During the 
1980s, it began through the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission to issue its own bonds for new 
sewer infrastructure and thus had even greater control over these so-called carrots.   It also retained 
control over significant regional park funds that had proven a very persuasive carrot. 
 
Nevertheless, by 1983 the Met Council no longer accounted for the low- to moderate-income 
housing performance of local governments when it evaluated grant applications and it soon withdrew 
its inclusionary development guidelines.  Goetz also notes that the Met Council stopped monitoring 
whether local zoning matched comprehensive plans and quietly allowed the communities he studies to 
rezone seventy-eight percent of the land designated as high-density for affordable housing to other 
uses.  Overall, Goetz concluded that approximately thirty-eight percent of the acreage designated for 
high-density development had been re-designated for low or medium density residential development. 
An additional sixteen percent has been re designated for PUD’s at indeterminate densities and 
seventeen percent zoned for nonresidential use.  Only twenty-two percent of the acreage originally 
guided for inclusionary development remained in place.111 
                                                            
110 Goetz, et al., supra note 107. 
111 According to Goetz, had this acreage remained high density, 104,733 housing units could have been built. By 2001, these 




During the course of the 1980s, the region returned to the segregative patterns of the period 
prior to 1970. From 1980 to 1989, the region added 12,000 units of subsidized housing and about sixty 
percent were built in the suburbs. However, because of changes at the federal and state level, the 
pattern before 1986 was much more pro-integrative than after.  In 1983, all federal Section 8 
construction and substantial rehabilitation was suspended (although 4000 units already in the pipeline 
were ultimately built). In 1986, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) became the 
dominant mechanism for building and rehabilitating subsidized housing. When the program began, 
central cities housing officials, angry at the loss of low income housing funds to the suburbs during the 
1970s, petitioned the legislature to create central city sub-allocators for LIHTC funds.  This move 
guaranteed that the central cities would receive at least fifty percent of subsidized housing, even though 
they were only one-third of the region’s population at the time. The central cities’ housing offices 
wanted the money and suburban legislators would not publically fight to keep a majority of new low 
income housing construction and rehabilitation in their communities.  
 
This change would contribute to the eventual racial and social isolation and academic failure of 
previously racially integrated, academically solid public schools in the central cities. During this period, 
both central cities schools would move from modest shares of poor and non-white students to levels 
that eventually made it impossible to remain racially and socially integrated.  During the 1980s, at least 
partly due to the return to a segregated subsidized housing policy, the concentration of blacks in 
extreme poverty census tracts increased faster in the Twin Cities than in any other large U.S 
metropolitan areas except Milwaukee, Detroit, and Buffalo.112  Had the regional fair share policy been 
maintained, central cities schools today would have had a much greater chance of remaining racially 
and socially integrated, instead of being seventy-five percent non-white and poor, with greatly 
diminished enrollment levels and academic ratings.  It is also likely that the recent devastating impact 
of the mortgage crisis would not have been as great. 
 
Third Wave: The Perpetuation of a Racially Segregated Housing Policy 1995-Present 
 
In 1995, the legislature attempted to prod the Met Council back to its “fair share policies” but 
the Council resist.  The legislature created new regional funds to give the Council more carrots and 
provide it, by statute, the power to “negotiate with each community to establish affordable and life-
cycle housing goals for that municipality which are consistent with and promote the policies of the Met 
Council as provided in the adopted Metropolitan Development Guide.113  This clearly indicated that the 
legislature wanted the Council to resume its fair share goals and enforcement.   The Council was also 
given clear authority to use its leverage to achieve housing goals. The 1995 law stated: “The Council 
when making discretionary funding decisions shall give consideration to a municipalities participation 
in the local housing incentives account.”114  The legislation also greatly strengthened the Council’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
development potential. (These calculations use the maximum possible units under zoning designations.) This means a 
potential 58,618 units were lost on these parcels. In particular some communities have changed their zoning plans or plan 
designation of this land quite extensively or perhaps never updated their zoning maps to conform to their comprehensive 
plans: just thirteen communities account for more than ninety-nine percent of the lost units.  
112 Paul Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Black in the 1980s, 13(2) J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 306 (1994). The 
comparison is limited to metros with more than one million residents. 
113 MINN. STAT. § 473.254(2) (2012).   
114 Id. § 473.254(1)(c).    
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control over local zoning, by making clear that local zoning had to match Council approved 
comprehensive planning.115   
 
The Council however ignored the legislature’s directive to resume its fair share housing system.  
Dragging its feet, it negotiated much less than the fair share goals required by the legislature and the 
state constitution, and it encouraged communities to substitute these weak goals for their fair share 
obligations where they remained in force.   
 
Prior the passage of the Fair Housing Act, virtually all subsidized housing in the Twin Cities 
was located in the poorest urban neighborhoods. In 1974, Minnesota passed a fair share requirement in 
its Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act (LUPA) that required all communities in the region to provide 
for their fair share of affordable housing.  From 1970 to1983, low income housing siting became much 
more racially integrated.  During this fifteen year period, about seventy percent of government 
subsidized housing, and an even higher share of family housing, was built at the developing edge of the 
region, in the whitest and most opportunity rich communities.   
In recent years, subsidized housing policy in the region has reverted to pre-1970 patterns.  From 
2007 to 2011, eighty percent of the very low-income housing was built in the poorest and most racially 
isolated neighborhoods in the region, an even worse record than before the passage of the fair share 
requirement in the land use planning act in 1976.116 
In 2013, fifty-five percent of all subsidized units in the region are in neighborhoods with more 
than twenty-nine percent of population nonwhite, compared to just twenty-three percent of total 
housing units. The poverty rate in these neighborhoods is twenty-three percent compared to six percent 
in the rest of the region. The differences are even more dramatic in the central cities. In Minneapolis 
and St. Paul, eighty-five percent of all subsidized units are in neighborhoods more than twenty-nine 
percent nonwhite, compared to just fifty-five percent of all housing units. These tracts were twenty-nine 
percent poor compared to thirteen percent for the rest of the two cities.117 
 
Subsidized housing is even more highly concentrated near racially segregated and re-
segregating schools and virtually non-existent in areas near predominately white or stably integrated 
schools in the Twin Cities seven-county region.  By 2013, sixty percent of the region’s subsidized 
housing was located near schools that were segregated (more than fifty percent non-white). These 
schools serve only twenty-six percent of the region’s students. Another twenty-five percent was near 
schools that were re-segregating (thirty to fifty percent of students non-white).118  Only sixteen percent 
of the region’s subsidized housing was located by schools that were predominantly white or stably 
integrated.  These schools had fifty-four percent of the region’s students.119 
 
                                                            
115 Id. § 473.865(2); Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2004): Brian W. Ohm, Reviving Comprehensive 
Planning in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area: The 1995 Amendment to MPLA, 8 MINN. REAL ESTATE J. 81 (1995).  
116 HousingLink, 2011 Housing Counts.  
117 Numbers calculated by author. 2013 HOUSINGLINK STREAMS, http://www.housinglink.org/streams/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012); 2012 U.S. Census Bureau sf. 1. 
118 Numbers calculated by author. 2013 HOUSINGLINK STREAMS, http://www.housinglink.org/streams/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012); 2012-2013 Minn. Dep’t of Educ.   
119 Numbers calculated by author. 2013 HOUSINGLINK STREAMS, http://www.housinglink.org/streams/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012); 2012-2013 Minnesota Dep’t of Education.   
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In the central cities, eighty-one percent of subsidized housing was located near segregated 
schools and another eighteen percent near re-segregating schools. Only two percent of subsidized 
housing in the central cities was located by predominantly white or stably integrated schools, even 
though these schools served more than five times this percentage of the cities’ public school students.120   
 
The recent production of affordable housing demonstrates that government housing policy at all 
levels is perpetuating racial segregation in the metropolitan area.  In the last ten years, the Twin Cities 
has gone from 8 to 108 racially segregated elementary schools.  
 Most recently, the placement of very low-income subsidized housing is as segregated as ever.  
Between 2004 and 2011, the region produced 1420 new very affordable units (affordable to those 
earning thirty percent of the metro median income).121  In the central cities, which have twenty-three 
percent of the region’s population, eighty-one percent of these units were produced.122  In other words, 
the central cities received more than 3.5 times their fair share of very low0income units.  Virtually all 
of these units were located by segregated or re-segregating schools. Of the 8261 new and preserved 
very affordable units from this period, seventy-six percent were in the central cities or 3.3 times their 
fair share. The region preserved 3567 very affordable units. Of these units, fifty-four percent were in 
the central cities, or 2.3 times their fair share.123   
Another cut on the data shows that between 2007 and 2011, the Twin Cities produced 3306 new 
units of publicly supported affordable housing. Of these units, fifty-two percent were built in the two 
central cities, or 2.3 times their fair share.124 The Twin Cities produced or preserved 9923 affordable 
units during this period and fifty-two percent of these units were in the central cities—again, 2.3 times 
their fair share.125 Of the 6616 preserved affordable units, fifty-one percent were preserved in the 
central cities, or 2.2 times their fair share.126 
During this period, Minneapolis produced 1335 new publically supported units, or almost forty 
percent of the new subsidized housing in the region, or three times the city’s 13.3 percent share of 
population.127  During the same time, thirty-nine percent of all units built or preserved in the region 
were in Minneapolis, again about three times its regional fair share.128   
The trends, as bad as they are, actually seem to be accelerating.  According to HousingLink, the 
two central cities built seventy-seven percent of the region’s new government subsidized affordable 
units in 2011 and built or preserved sixty-four percent of all units.129 According to HousingLink, 
Minneapolis by itself built fifty-one percent of new subsidized units (or 3.8 times its fair share) and 
built or preserved forty-four percent of units (3.3 times its fair share).130  The Met Council found that 
                                                            
120 Id. 
121 HousingLink, 2011 Housing Counts. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 









sixty percent of all the affordable housing in the region were built in the central cities, 2.6 times their 
fair share.131 By the Met Council’s figures, Minneapolis built thirty-eight percent of the affordable units 
or 2.8 times its fair share.132 
  
a. The FHEA fails to report the 1986 state creation of segregative central city sub-
allocators of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit which unnecessarily intensifies 
segregation in housing and schools.  
 
In 1986, LIHTC became the dominant form of federal subsidy for low-income housing.  Rather 
than continuing Policy 13/39 and fully coordinating the award of tax credits to support the Met 
Council’s pro-integrative fair share goals, the State of Minnesota created a sub-regional allocation 
system that encourages racial segregation rather than promotes racial integration.133  Almost all of the 
housing allocated to sub-allocators has been sited in concentrated minority areas in which the public 
schools are completely racially and economically segregated and academically low-performing. 
 
 
b. The FHEA fails to report that the state Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) incents racial 
segregation by awarding more points to racially segregative projects than racially 
integrated projects. 
 
The Federal Fair Housing Act applies to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. As such, state 
agencies must collect racial data on the location and occupancy of tax credit units.134  The draft FHEA 
fails to report this information and the QAP does not mention either race or the Fair Housing Act.  
Contrary to law, the QAP creates a scoring system that encourages racial segregation and the placement 
of housing projects in areas of minority concentration, rather than fulfilling its clear obligation to 
affirmatively further fair housing and integrate housing.  
 
For example, Minnesota awards no points for racial integration at all.  It awards only one or two 
points for projects in low-poverty areas.  In contrast, virtually all of the other criteria—well over 100 
points—appear to promote the placement of units in areas of minority concentration or re-segregation.   
 
For example, “readiness to proceed” favors areas with less community opposition (twenty-four 
points).  Moreover, “rehabilitation of existing structures” (ten points), “being part of community 
revitalization plan” (two points), “using existing water or sewer” (ten points), “foreclosed properties” 
(five to ten points), “preservation of existing credits”(twenty points), “preservation of existing tax 
credit units” (ten points), “permanent housing for the homeless” (110 points), “transit oriented 
developed” only by light rail transit (LRT), bus rapid transit (BRT) or commuter rail, not basic bus 
                                                            
131 Metropolitan Council, MetroStats: Affordable Housing Production in the Twin Cities (March 2013) at 4 (draft). 
132 Id.  
133 See MINN. STAT. § 462A.222(1) (2012) (creating Minneapolis and St. Paul as sub-allocators of the tax credit); MINN. 
STAT. § 462A.222(2) (2012) (allocating the credit to both central cities at 1.25 times population with additional allocation 
points based on the number of welfare recipients). 
134 See In re Adoption of 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 15−17 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004).   
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service  (three points), “serves lowest income tenants”(thirteen points), and “local philanthropic 
contribution” (which favors local Community Development Corporations operating in segregated 
neighborhoods) (ten points) seem to favor core city projects over areas with high-performing and 
predominantly white or integrated schools.135 
 
Furthermore, even housing growth (ten points), which would generally appear to be pro-
integrative, actually prioritizes housing in Minneapolis and St. Paul, which have recently lead new 
housing starts.  
 
In September of 2012, Minnesota Housing proposed and later implemented changes to the 
definition of “Workforce Housing” as these changes concern the Twin Cities metropolitan area. 136 
These changes would focus workforce exclusively on jobs and job growth and move away from using 
housing growth as a selection factor.  I objected to this because this would bias the criteria for project 
selection toward segregated and unstably integrated neighborhoods and away from predominantly 
white or stably integrated communities.  My comments were ignored. 
 
As a group, the “high existing jobs” category is thirty-six percent non-white compared to the 
“high household growth” cities which were seventeen percent non-white.  By shifting the QAP 
selection criteria to “existing jobs,” Minnesota Housing would incent more projects into the deeply 
racially segregated neighborhoods of Minneapolis and St. Paul and into re-segregating cities like 
Bloomington.  Bloomington is city whose East side schools and neighborhoods are in rapid racial 
transition to majority non-white poor status.     
 
 Further, giving too much weight to job growth, without other race-conscious criteria, will 
prioritize housing in cities, such as Richfield, that are experiencing rapid and negative patterns of racial 
re-segregation, and cities like Maplewood, Shakopee, Eagan, and Eden Prairie, communities that are 
struggling to keep white families in their school districts.     
 
Next, Minnesota Housing appears to believe that locating housing in proximity to jobs or transit 
lines somehow fulfills its fair housing duty to use it “immense leverage to assure racially integrated 
housing patterns.”  This is also clearly wrong under the law.  These criteria are only acceptable to help 
choose between two otherwise pro-integrative locations or to provide alternative factual rationales to 
otherwise pro-integrative siting decisions. To the extent that these criteria are used to cause housing be 
located in a racially segregative or re-segregative manner, they are unlawful.137     
 
c. The central city’s Qualified Allocation Plans incents segregative housing placement. 
   
Together, Minneapolis and St. Paul have also adopted a qualified allocation plan (QAP) that 
directly incents the segregative placement of low-income units within the cities.138 Specifically, the 
                                                            
135 See Minnesota Housing, Self-Scoring Worksheet, 2012 Housing Tax Credit Program, 
http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/groups/multifamily/documents/webasset/mhfa_010882.rtf/. 
136 “Possible Changes to the 2014 Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP)” outlined in Minnesota Housing memo to Agency 
Partners and Stakeholders dated September 24, 2012.   
137 See Inclusive Communities Project, 749 F.Supp. 2d. at 503–4. 
138 See Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board Low Income Housing Qualified Allocation Plan, available at 
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups/public/@cped/documents/webcontent/convert_254711.pdf.  See also 
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central cities’ QAP gives over 100 points for projects likely to be in high-minority, high-poverty 
neighborhoods, no points for racially integrated projects, and only ten points for “economic 
integration.” (By the cities’ definition, an economically integrative project is one in a neighborhood 
which is up to fifty percent non-white and with no limits on non-white and/or poor kids in local 
schools.139)   A similar QAP in Dallas was recently found to be a disparate impact violation of the Fair 
Housing Act.140    In addition, the central cities do not collect racial data on LIHTC units and the state 
maintains that it has no responsibility to monitor the conduct of its sub-allocators.   
 
d. The FHEA does not document the failure of relevant state agencies, including 
Minnesota Housing, the Met Council, and the State Department of Education, to 
coordinate racial integration of housing and schools. 
 
In 1994, the Minnesota legislature provided authority to relevant state agencies to coordinate 
housing and school integration.  State and local governments have created three unique city-suburban 
racial integration districts capable of administering racially integrated schools on a metropolitan 
level.141  This effort to coordinate integrated schools and housing was undermined by later 
developments, including the 1999 desegregation rule and the failure of the Met Council and Minnesota 
Housing to coordinate their efforts with the State Department of Education and the Metropolitan 
Integration Districts.  
 
Both federal and Minnesota law require (or at the very least authorize) housing and education 
agencies to coordinate their integration efforts. The Federal Fair Housing Act requires that HUD and 
public housing authority grantees (such as Minnesota Housing, the Met Council, Minneapolis, St. Paul, 
and their public housing authorities) consider the racial composition of neighborhoods and schools 
when siting low-income family housing.142  The Fair Housing Act mandates that these entities, together 
with HUD, use their “immense leverage” to “further integrated and balanced living patterns.”143  As a 
part of this obligation, federal law presumptively prohibits building new low-income family housing in 
racially segregated or unstably integrated neighborhoods.144  Minnesota law gives the Met Council 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Memorandum from Myron Orfield to Gloria Stiehl, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, 
Comments on 2011 Minnesota Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice (Dec. 31, 2011), 13–14 (attached as 
Appendix) (outlining how the qualified allocation plan incents segregative placement of low-income units within the 
metropolitan area). 
139 Minneapolis and St. Paul have created qualified allocation plans (QAPs) that provide ten points for a segregated 
redevelopment area, ten points for Hennepin Home program match (in segregated neighborhoods), up to twenty points for 
working with non-profits (who, in Minneapolis, virtually all operate only in segregated neighborhoods), five points for 
projects with established resident aid programs (all in segregated neighborhoods), five points for projects with the support of 
neighborhood groups, up to twenty points for rehabilitation (again, almost all existing projects are in segregated 
neighborhoods), up to fifteen points for projects with previous subsidies, up to fifteen points for project with additional 
financial additional support, up to fifteen points for intermediary support, and up to ten points for the most active transit 
corridors. There are no points for racial integration and only ten points for economic integration. See id. 
140 See Inclusive Communities Project, 749 F. Supp. 2d. 486. 
141 Myron Orfield, Regional Strategies for Racial Integration of Schools and Housing Post-Parents Involved, 29 LAW & 
INEQ. 149, 166−67 (2011). 
14242 U.S.C. § 3608 (d); 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (g) (2013); Shannon, 436 F.2d 809. See 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2013). 
143NAACP v. Sec’y of HUD, 817 F.2d at 156 (stating that Title VIII imposes a duty on HUD beyond simply refraining from 
discrimination). 
144Shannon, 436 F.2d 809; see also Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2013). 
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power to comment on local school district siting decisions145 and the desegregation rule authorization 
simultaneously requires the Department of Education to “consult with the Metropolitan Council to 
coordinate school desegregation efforts with the housing, social, economic, and infrastructure needs of 
the metropolitan area.”146  The state legislature has also facilitated the creation of three large city-
suburban integration school districts to facilitate and coordinate more integrated schools on a 
metropolitan-wide basis, in consultation with the Met Council. 
 
While the state did not require the agencies to coordinated state housing and school integration 
efforts, it authorized them to do so. In this context, this failure to act must be interpreted as a failure to 
affirmatively further fair housing.    
 
e. The draft FHEA fails to report on segregative school decisions as drivers of housing 
segregation.   
The Fair Housing Act requires HUD and its grantees to consider the racial balance of schools 
attended by government-supported housing recipients.  The clear implication of this legal requirement 
is that stably racially integrated schools are a central component of fair housing policy.   
On February 23, 2010, Secretary Shaun Donovan clarified HUD’s Fair Housing priorities before 
Congress, stating: 
[S]ustainability also means creating “geographies of opportunity,” places that effectively connect 
people to jobs, quality public schools, and other amenities. Today, too many HUD-assisted 
families are stuck in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and segregation, where one's zip 
code predicts poor educational, employment, and even health outcomes. These neighborhoods 
are not sustainable in their present state.147 
 
When the legislature authorized a metropolitan school desegregation rule, it required the 
Department of Education to “consult with the Metropolitan Council to coordinate school desegregation 
efforts with the housing, social, economic, and infrastructure needs of the metropolitan area.”148 The 
Minnesota Legislature has also facilitated the creation of three large city-suburban integration school 
districts to facilitate and coordinate, in consultation with the Metropolitan Council, more integrated 
schools on a metropolitan basis.149 
                                                            
145See MINN. STAT. §§ 473.145, 473.175, 473.385 (1975) (Council has review over location of public schools, school district 
capital plans, and can reject school districts plans that are inconsistent with regional goals and objectives). 
146 MINN. R. 3535; See also 1994 Minn. Laws, Ch. 647, Art. 8(2)(1)(c) (“[T]he office of desegregation shall periodically 
consult with the metropolitan council to coordinate school desegregation efforts with the housing, social, economic, and 
infrastructure needs of the metropolitan area….The commission of education may request information and assistance from, 
or contract with, any state or local agency or officer, local unit of government, or recognized expert to assist the 
commissioner in performing these activities.”). 
147 Press Release, HUD, Written Testimony of Shaun Donovan: FY2011 Budget Request for HUD (Feb. 23, 2010) 
(emphasis added), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/testimonies/2010/2010-02-23.  
148 MINN. R. 3535; See also 1994 Minn. Laws, Ch. 647, Art. 8(2)(1)(c).  
149 For information on the three integration school districts, see West Metro Education Program (WMEP) at 
http://sites.google.com/a/wmep.k12.mn.us/wmep-k12-mn-us/; East Metro Integration District (EMID) at 





School data for the Twin Cities shows a dramatic increase in racial isolation. In 1995, there 
were only fifteen elementary schools and twenty middle/high schools with more than seventy-five 
percent of their students nonwhite. By 2011, the number of elementary schools in this group had 
increased six times (to ninety percent) and by more than three times for middle/high schools (to 
seventy-one percent). 
 
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related. Segregated neighborhoods, of 
course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also feedback from school 
characteristics to neighborhoods. Potential residents, especially families with children, evaluate local 
schools when deciding where to live. This means that racial or social transition in schools— and the 
record shows that schools can change character very rapidly— can accelerate neighborhood transition. 
Indeed, racial change in schools is very often the precursor of neighborhood change. By the same 
token, stably integrated schools can stabilize neighborhoods. 
 
 When local school districts gerrymander school boundaries, adopt transfer or construction 
expansion policies that facilitate greater segregation, this causes the housing market to become more 
segregated.  In Eden Prairie, when Forest Park elementary school was becoming more non-white than 
the other schools in the city, local officials reported that real estate agents began to steer white families 
away from that school area.  When whites withdraw from a school attendance area, prices fall and 
blacks respond to this signal, by tightening credit to these neighborhoods.  When schools tip and 
become segregated, more often than not the neighborhood follow.   
 
Data clearly shows that in parts of the county were the schools are more segregated the housing 
market are more segregated.  When proactive means have been undertaken to increase school 
integration, housing integration improves, as does the stability of housing integration.   
 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that housing and school segregation are factually 
and legally intertwined.  In Milliken, the Court found that state level housing discrimination could 
justify a city-suburban or metropolitan school busing order and several federal courts have used 
evidence of housing discrimination to justify such orders. Similarly, under the Fair Housing Act, the 
federal courts have declared that the racial composition of local schools must be taken into account 
when siting federally supported low income housing in order to avoid violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 
and 3608.150  
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the Supreme Court held that once a school district, as an 
agent of the state, was found to have committed an act of de jure segregation, federal courts must enjoin 
school construction policies that would foster further segregation.151  At the time of the drafting of 




150 Shannon, 436 F.2d 809; 24 C.F.R. 941.202; 24 C.F.R. 880.206; 78 Fed. Reg. at 11460-01 at 11479–81 (proposed Feb. 
15, 2013), 2013 WL 550406 (2013).       
151 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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Professor Robert Freilich who drafted the land use planning act, was also an expert on school 
desegregation law.  He stated that was one of the most important reasons that he insisted that schools be 
included in the land use planning act and that school construction specifically be under the supervision 
of the Met Council, was in order to help the state avoid a possible constitution violation that would 
result in a metropolitan wide school desegregation order.   
According to statute, the Met Council “shall adopt a development guide” that “will encompass 
the physical, social and economic needs of the metropolitan area and those future developments which 
will have an impact on the entire area” including “the location of schools.”152 LUPA states that for 
purposes of Chapter 473 “local government unit” means “school district”153 and the Met Council is 
required to provide notice of rule changes and related hearings to all school districts in the metropolitan 
area.154 The law further requires the Council to “construct an inventory” of all schools in the 
metropolitan area and the unused space within each school155 and the council may submit its comments 
to the commissioner of education on any school district facility that is proposed in the metropolitan 
area.   
 
  LUPA requires that a local government unit’s comprehensive plans shall contain a statement on 
“the effect of the plan on affected school districts”156 and these comprehensive plans must be submitted 
to the affected school district for review and comment six months prior to their submission to the 
Council.157  Finally, it suggests that these comprehensive plans contain an intergovernmental 
coordination process for cooperation with school districts generally and the siting of public schools in 
particular.158  There are four other additional references to schools in LUPA.159  
 
School Choice Programs: Minnesota is a national leader in school choice. The state’s 1988 
mandatory open enrollment law was the first of its kind in the nation. Similarly, it has the longest 
experience with charter schools of any state in the country – the state’s first charter school opened in 
1991. By 2010, more than 35,000 students open enrolled from one school district to another and more 
than 30,000 students were enrolled in charter schools in the Twin Cities.160 This represents roughly 
thirteen percent of the public school students in the eleven Minnesota counties included in the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area. 
 
                                                            
152 MINN. STAT. § 473.145 (2013) (emphasis added). 
153 Id. § 473.121(6); MINN. STAT. § 473.852(11) (2012) (stating that “school district” has the meaning given by MINN. STAT 
§ 120A.05). 
154 MINN. STAT. § 473.174(5) (2012).  
155 Id. § 473.23(1).  
156 Id. § 473.859(1). 
157 Id. § 473.858(2). 
158 Id.  
159 MINN. STAT. § 473.3875 prioritizes transit for livable communities grants to evaluate projects coordinating school and 
public transportation.  Minn. Stat. §473.625 discusses the process of detaching airport land from school districts, MINN. 
STAT. §473.629 addresses proper valuation of property for bond issues by school districts and MINN. STAT. §473.661 covers 
airport noise mitigation resources for school districts. 
160 Minnesota has long experience with other choice programs as well. The Choice is Yours Program, a choice option which 
allows low-income students in the Minneapolis School District to enroll in suburban districts, is a central part of the State’s 
response to a desegregation suit brought in the 1990’s. Magnet schools are also used by many school districts in the state. 
Although magnets are most often offered by districts as an option for their own students, in some cases they are used to 
encourage inter-district student transfers. 
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Both of these choice programs were originally promoted as a means to increase racial 
integration in schools.161 However, recent research shows that each, instead, now actually increases 
segregation in the region’s schools. 
 
Published studies show that both of Minnesota’s major choice programs have clearly allowed a 
pattern of transfers that increases segregation in the region’s schools.162 Two recent studies by the 
Institute on Metropolitan opportunity show that charter schools in the Twin Cities are much more 
segregated than their traditional counterparts.163 The most recent data show that in 2010-11, charter 
schools were twice as likely as traditional public schools to be segregated and only one-half as likely to 
be integrated.164 
 
Put another way, the 2010-11 data show that eighty-nine percent of all black students in charter 
schools attended nonwhite segregated schools. This compares very poorly with traditional public 
schools where only forty-four percent of black students attended nonwhite segregated schools. The 
equivalent comparison for Hispanic students was seventy-three percent (charters) versus thirty-nine 
percent (traditionals) and for Asian students it was eighty-five percent versus thirty-seven percent. 
White students were also more likely to be in a segregated setting in charter schools—seventy-four 
percent of white charter students were in predominantly white schools compared to just fifty-seven 
percent of white students in traditional schools.165 
 
Until recently, the overwhelming majority of charter schools were in the cities of Minneapolis 
and St. Paul. However, the last decade has seen the spread of charters into suburban areas and these 
new charters are often predominantly white schools which have located in or near suburban 
neighborhoods where schools are in racial transition. Examples of predominantly white charters located 
in racially diverse suburban areas includes schools in Bloomington, Burnsville, Chaska, Eden Prairie, 
Coon Rapids, St. Paul Park, Maple Grove and New Hope.166 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (402 U.S. 1) that a number 
of single-race schools, particularly in a district with a history of discrimination, created a presumption 
of intentional discrimination, and that the district bore the burden of proving that its actions were not 
                                                            
161 See, for instance, T. Kolderie, Creating the Capacity for Change: How and Why Governors and Legislatures are Opening 
aNew-Schools Sector in Public Education. (Education Week Press, 2004); Chester E. Finn, B. V. Manno and G. Vanourek, 
Charter Schools in Action: Renewing Public Education. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jay P. Greene, 
“Why school choice can promote integration.” Education Week, 19:31 (2000), p. 72; Joe Nathan, Charter Schools: Creating 
Hope and Opportunity for American Education. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996). 
162 On charters, see “Failed Promises: Assessing Charter Schools in the Twin Cities,” Institute on Race and Poverty, 
November 2008, and “Update of IRP's 2008 Report on Charter Schools in the Twin Cities,” January, 2012, available at 
http:/www.law.umn.edu/metro. “Failed Promises…” includes a full review of other studies. See “Open Enrollment and 
Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities: 2000-2010,” Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity, January, 2013 for the most recent 
published work on the open enrollment program. 
163 It is also clear that there is no payoff in student performance to compensate for the costs of this added segregation. Every 
comprehensive study ever done on student performance in charter schools in Minnesota – and there have been at least seven 
of them – has concluded that, as a group, charters are outperformed by their traditional public school counterparts. 
164 “Update of IRP's 2008 Report on Charter Schools in the Twin Cities,” Jan. 2012, Table 1 at 3. 
165 Id. Chart 2 at 4. 
166  “Update of IRP's 2008 Report on Charter Schools in the Twin Cities,” Map 2 at 6. 
42 
 
the result of past or present discrimination.167 The current charter school system in Minnesota would 
clearly be very difficult to defend on this basis, given that it exempts charter schools from the state 
desegregation rule and has allowed the proliferation of single race white and non-white charter schools. 
 
The open enrollment law in Minnesota requires that all school districts allow applicants to 
attend district schools from anywhere in the state.168 Open enrollment allows parents a wider choice in 
matching a school’s programs to a child’s needs and creates clearer competition between schools that 
could encourage innovation or improvement. However, open enrollment also enables moves based on 
less noble motivations, including race. Research demonstrates that racial enrollment patterns can 
change rapidly even without open enrollment.169 If actual open enrollment patterns reinforce these 
trends then the program will have the effect of accelerating racial change in already unstable schools, 
neighborhoods and communities. 
 
The region’s two large central city districts – Minneapolis and St. Paul – are affected 
dramatically by open enrollment. Each loses a substantial number of students from open enrollment. 
The net loss (open enrollees leaving the district minus those coming in) in 2009-2010 was roughly 1200 
students in Minneapolis and nearly 700 in St. Paul. Net losses of white students account for nearly all 
of the change. Minneapolis and St. Cloud each lost roughly 1100 white students while St. Paul’s loss of 
white students (850 students) actually exceeded its total net loss. (Some of the net loss of white students 
was made up in other categories.) Losses like this in the region’s most diverse districts clearly increase 
segregation in the overall school system.  
 
Many racially diverse suburban districts, including Columbia Heights, Richfield, Anoka-
Hennepin, Osseo, Burnsville-Eagan-Savage and Robbinsdale, are affected in similar ways, losing large 
numbers of white students to nearby, less diverse districts. On the other side of this ledger is a group of 
predominantly white suburban districts which are the destinations for many of these flows. These 
districts are among the largest net “importers” of students from open enrollment and they each draw a 
pool of nearly all white students from nearby districts that are much more diverse. They include St. 
Anthony-New Brighton, which draws largely white students from nearby Minneapolis and Columbia 
Heights and Minnetonka and Mahtomedi which draw from Hopkins, Eden Prairie, East Carver and 
White Bear Lake. 
 
                                                            
167 402 U.S. at 25–26. 
168 The law also permits districts to refuse admissions in some circumstances, including some kinds of prior bad behavior by 
applicants and capacity limitations in schools. Districts may not limit or encourage open enrollments based on 
extracurricular activities (including athletics), disabilities, limited English, previous disciplinary issues, academic 
achievement or the student’s resident district. See Witte, John F., Deven E. Carlson and Leslie Lavery, Moving On: Why 
Students Move Between Districts Under Open Enrollment, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2008; Carlson, Deven E., Leslie Lavery and John F. Witte, The Determinants of Open Enrollment Flows: 
Evidence from Two States, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 33 No. 1, 76-94; and 124.D03 Minnesota 
State Statutes. 
169 For evidence and descriptions of these research literatures, see Orfield, Myron and Thomas Luce, “America’s Racially 
Diverse Suburbs: Opportunities and Challenges,” Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity, July 2012, 
http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/e0/65/ e065d82a1c1da0bfef7d86172ec5391e/Diverse_Suburbs_FINAL.pdf; Orfield, 
Myron and Thomas Luce, Region: Planning the Future of the Twin Cities, University of Minnesota Press, 2010, Chapter 3; 




The Supreme Court has ruled that transfer policies that systematically increase racial 
segregation could lead to ruling that a district was segregated by law.170 This would be the case whether 
the action was taken with the intent to discriminate, or if it was reasonably foreseeable that such an 
action would result in segregation.171 Minnesota’s open enrollment program would be hard to defend in 
light of these cases. 
 
Local School Attendance Boundary Policies :172 Racial diversity in neighborhood schools 
almost always precedes racial diversity in neighborhoods. As schools become increasingly diverse in 
either racially diverse or predominantly white neighborhoods, white parents frequently seek attendance-
boundary alterations, transfer policies, or new school buildings or additions allowing them to attend 
whiter schools. The U.S. Supreme Court has said when school districts draw boundaries in which racial 
segregation is a foreseeable consequence, it has engaged in de jure or intentional segregation. While 
these practices and policies can violate federal law, they are common and there is little oversight. 
 
Biased boundary practices can result in predominantly non-white or unstably integrated schools 
in racially integrated or even predominantly white neighborhoods. Such schools intensify steering and 
mortgage lending discrimination in relation to the school attendance area, accelerating re-segregation. 
Recent national research shows that local school boundaries currently create schools that are 
considerably more segregated than their neighborhoods. If school attendance boundaries more clearly 
reflected school capacity and neighborhood proximity, American schools would be fourteen to fifteen 
percent less segregated.173 
 
Minnesota’s current desegregation rules while certainly permitting districts to make pro-
integrative decisions, do not affirmatively support such decision-making. Nor do they explicitly 
prohibit districts from making decisions about school-attendance boundaries or school closings that, in 
effect, create racially isolated schools. Instead, Minnesota’s rules leave the desegregation of racially 
isolated schools up to the will of local school boards, which often face immense political pressure 
against pro-integrated boundary changes. The rules do not give the Minnesota Department of Education 
the tools to force school districts to desegregate schools unless the state can prove that the district 
intended to discriminate against students of color.174 
 
In fact, until recently, based on its reading of the rules, the Department “strongly discouraged” 
school districts from using racial measures in their desegregation plans and warned districts that “race-
                                                            
170 See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)  (Dayton v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II); 
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) reaff’d  426 U.S. 229. Other actions that could lead to this 
conclusion included the drawing or alteration of attendance zones that had racially segregative effects; the location of new 
school construction or expansion of existing schools that increased segregation, or the failure to relieve overcrowding at 
segregated sites in ways that could increase integration; hiring, promotion, or faculty placement decisions with racially 
disparate impacts; and perpetuation or exacerbation of district segregation by strict adherence to a neighborhood school 
policy; see also Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201–02, 234–35.  
171 443 U.S. at 536 n.9.  
172 The discussion of the state rule and Minneapolis relies heavily on Hobday, Finn, and Orfield,  “Missed Opportunity: 
Minnesota’s Failed Experiment to Choice Based Integration.” 35 Wm Mitch. L. Rev 936 (2009). 
173 See Meredith Paige Richards, “The Gerrymandering of Educational Boundaries and the Segregation of American 
Schools” (draft dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2012). 
174 MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1(2007).  
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based measures have been successfully challenged in several other states.”175 Without a state mandate 
to integrate, school districts have largely chosen to pay lip-service to integration, while maintaining 
separate schools.176   
 
The Minneapolis School District has been involved in two important court regarding 
segregation in the city’s schools. Suits brought by the NAACP have twice forced the district to 
implement programs to counteract the effects of attendance boundaries that encouraged or intensified 
racial separation. The Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1 in the 1970s led to a busing program and the 
settlement of the Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State of Minnesota case in the 1990s included 
the Choice is Yours Program, an extension of open enrollment that facilitates the transfer of low-
income Minneapolis students to suburban schools in several participating districts.  
 
Both suits and the court’s findings in Booker included extensive documentation of segregative 
actions by the Minneapolis district. The Booker decision used Bethune Elementary School and 
Washburn High School as examples, describing clear-cut behavior by the district that concentrated 
students of color in each school.177 After the of court supervision from the Booker case was lifted, the 
Minneapolis District began operating under the state “15 percent” rule, which required each school in a 
district to have minority enrollment within fifteen percentage points of the district average. However, 
by 1995 the state Board of Education had abandoned the “15 percent rule.”178 By then, over fourteen 
percent of the Minneapolis School District’s elementary schools were in violation of the rule.179 
Finally, in 1995 the district returned to neighborhoods, resulting in a return to deeply segregated 
schools. 
 
As a result, the Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP filed suit in state court on September 1995 
charging that the abandonment of the “15 percent rule,” among other actions, showed that the State had 
not taken effective action to desegregate Minneapolis schools.180  Additionally, they claimed the state 
reinforced racial and economic inequality through its school construction policies and its failure to 
promote integrated housing.181 In 2000, before the case was tried, the parties reach an agreement.182  
                                                            
175 Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Commissioner, to John Currie, Superintendant of District 196 (June 11, 2004); 
Letter from Cindy Lavatato, Assistant Commissioner, to L. Chris Richardson, superintendant of Osseo School District (Feb. 
4th, 2000);  Letter from Cindy Lavarato, Assistant Commissioner, to Carol Johnson, Superintendant of Minneapolis Public 
Schools (Jan 14, 200) (on file with the Minnesota Department of Education and the Institute on Race and Poverty). During 
the early years of the rules’ enforcement, Cindy Lavorato was at the helm of the Department and gave this advice, consistent 
with what she had explained in the SONAR. Lavorato left the Attorney General’s office just after the rules were 
implemented and served as the Assistant Commissioner of Education for one-and-a-half years. Interview with Cindy L. 
Lavorato, former Assistant Attorney General, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 13, 2007). 
176 See, e.g., Thandiwe Peebles, Minneapolis Public Schools, Comprehensive Desegregation/ Integration Plan and Budget 
(Dec. 15 2004) (stating that the district is committed to racial integration, but refusing to consider North-South bussing of 
students—even though the overwhelmingly majority Black and Latino schools on the Northside of the city could easily be 
integrated with the very White schools directly to their South). 
177 See Orfield, Myron, Choice, Equal Protection and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of the Minneapolis School 
Desegregation Settlement, 24 L. & INEQ. 269 (2006) for a full summary of the case. 
178 Monika Bauerlein, Separate but Equal, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis) Nov. 1, 1995, http://www.citypages.com/ 
databank/16/778/article2353.asp. 
179 Id. 
180 NAACP Compl. at 15; see also Xiong Compl. at 15–16. 
181 NAACP Compl. at 16; see also Xiong Compl. at 16–17 (noting, as example, failure of Metropolitan Council to ensure 
suburb of Maple Grove kept its fair housing obligations). 
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The settlement agreement established two key programs:  1) a program to allow low income 
Minneapolis students per year to attend suburban schools 2) a program to give low income Minneapolis 
students preferred access to magnet schools within the District.183 The suburban plan set aside 2000 
spaces for Minneapolis students from low income families to attend suburban schools which are part of 
the West Metro Education Program, a consortium of school districts in the western metropolitan 
area.184 Although the suburban program aspect was set to expire at the end of the 2004-05 school year, 
it has been extended voluntarily to the present day. 
 
Despite the settlement, Minneapolis’ schools remain highly segregated. In 2010-11, sixty-four 
percent of schools (75 of 117) in Minneapolis (including charter schools) had nonwhite enrollments 
exceeding eighty percent. Another six percent had enrollments that were more than eighty percent 
white. In 1995, when the NAACP case was brought, only twenty-three percent of schools were more 
than eighty percent nonwhite and only three percent were more than eighty percent white. 
 
Several suburban districts have also been involved in school boundary decisions that have 
significantly increased racial segregation in their schools. The Hopkins School District, for instance, 
provides a good example of a School Board that tried to draw integrative school attendance boundaries 
but after receiving very little support from the State Department of Education, eventually settled for 
much less pro-integrative boundaries. The case involved decisions about how to distribute the students 
from the district’s most diverse elementary school when it was closed.  
 
The school board first proposed distributing many of the children of color from the school to the 
district’s least diverse school. However, after very contentious public hearings and after receiving no 
clear guidance from the Minnesota Department of Education’s office of integration/desegregation, the 
least integrative of the four options studied by the district was selected. 
 
A case in Apple Valley actually included the use of a non-contiguous attendance area which 
resulted in the bussing of low-income minority students from manufactured housing park through less 
diverse, higher income areas to a lower-income school. In this case, although the Department of 
Education recognized that the attendance boundary was glaringly segregative and pushed the district to 
remedy the attendance boundary, the Department was unable to force the school district to act.185 
 
The Osseo School District is a large, diverse district northwest of Minneapolis which includes 
racially diverse areas in Brooklyn Park and Coon Rapids, as well as largely white areas in Maple 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
182 Settlement Agreement at 1, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State, (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2000) (95-14800) & Lee Xiong 
v. State (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2000) (98-2816) (on file with author). 
183 Settlement Agreement ex. B. 
184 Id.  
185 See E-mail from Marceline Dubose to Cindy Jackson and Morgan Brown, Nov. 17, 2004, (stating that the school districts 
were in the process of “thinking about” attendance boundaries and that “their [the school district’s] background analysis of 
the causes of the racial isolation is insufficient to say the least.”); Letter from Morgan Brown, the Minnesota Department of 
Education, to Don Brundage and Jane Berenz, Independent District 196, Nov. 18, 2004 (stating that the Minnesota 
Department of Education had “additional concerns” about the Cedar Grove attendance boundary); email from Sharon Peck 
to Cindy Jackson, May 18, 2005 (containing District 196’s unofficial school board update stating that the school district 
would begin the process of reviewing Cedar Park’s attendance boundary next year and stating that “[w]e rarely get this sort 
of ‘meaty’ information in this type of email. (i.e. review of attendance boundaries).”) 
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Grove. In recent years, the district has engaged in both boundary decisions and school location 
decisions that were highly controversial and which eventually contributed to racial disparities across 
the district’s schools. The first case was a boundary change for elementary schools in 1999; the second 
involved determining the attendance areas for the district’s high schools when a new building was 
opened in the least diverse part of the district; and the third arose when the closing of an elementary 
school building required that a magnet program serving a significant number of children of color be 
transferred to another building. 
 
In all cases, the district evaluated multiple options and the decision process was dominated by 
highly contentious testimony in public hearings (one of which ran from 7:30 p.m. one evening until 
4:30 a.m. the following morning). In the first two cases, the least integrative boundary options were 
chosen.186 In the third, the magnet program was eventually moved as planned but only after an intense 
backlash, expensive legal proceedings, and ethics complaints brought against the Superintendent 
(which were eventually ruled to be unfounded). 
 
In 2008, the Eastern Carver School District’s Boundary Task Force recommended against a plan 
to redraw its high school boundaries to reflect racial diversity in the district. The revised boundary 
would have extended the Chaska High School boundary very slightly beyond the city of Chaska border. 
The decision meant that Chaska High School would continue to have a free-reduced price lunch 
eligibility rate more than twice the rate in Chanhassen High School. (This gap has widened since the 
decision.) 
 
In 2010, the Bloomington School Board evaluated several alternative school boundary changes 
for its elementary schools. The options included two that would have decreased racial and income 
disparities across the ten elementary schools. The selected option was the one that did the least to 
decrease disparities. The selected option actually increased the free-reduced price eligibility rate in the 
district’s poorest school from seventy-three percent to seventy-five percent. (The second highest 
poverty rate was 24 points lower under the selected plan.) 
 
The Eden Prairie School District provides an example where racially integrated boundaries were 
successfully drawn (in 2010-11). However, the decision brought a great deal of racial controversy and, 
as in Osseo, the Superintendent was accused of ethics violations, cleared, but then pressured to resign 
anyway. 
 
The “Fully Developed Suburbs Housing Report” submitted to the Met Council on July 15, 2013 
argued that in order to effectively address these challenges. Housing and school policy are intimately 
linked and strategies must address both of these areas in order to succeed. Regrettably, the FHEA does 
not report or discuss the existing and readily available data regarding racial segregation, particularly 
rapidly growing racial segregation in public schools. 
For the following reasons, the undersigned encourage the Met Council to coordinate its housing 
policy with the State Department of Education and local school districts within the metropolitan area.  
                                                            
186 See Utley, Maximilia, “Inequality in Minnesota Public School Education: Osseo School District’s Boundary Decisions”, 
unpublished 2007 for a full description of the processes. 
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III. Incorporation by Reference of All My Other Comments  
 
 I incorporate by reference all of my comments to the State AI in 2011, to its Qualified 
Allocation plan and its modification, my letter to the Central Corridor Funders Collaborative, and my 
letter to the City of Minneapolis regarding its comprehensive plan.  They are attached as the following 
appendices: Appendix 1 – Comments on 2011 Minnesota Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing 
Choice (Draft Report for Public Review, December 14, 2011); Appendix 2 – Comments on the State of 
Minnesota Qualified Allocation Plan; Appendix 3 – Comments on the Possible Changes to the 2014 
Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP); Appendix 4 – Comments on the Minneapolis FY 2012 Consolidated 
Plan for Housing and Community Development; and Appendix 5 – Comments on the Central Corridor 
Affordable Housing Coordinated Plan: Recommended Policies and Strategies. 
 
 
IV. The Metro Area Cannot Legally Revert to Prior Segregative Practices 
 
From 1971 to 1983, the Met Council and the MHFA demonstrated that the state could operate a 
highly integrated regional housing program.  This effort establishes a minimum definition of what the 
requirement of affirmatively further fair housing requires of Met Council and MHFA.187 The State of 
Minnesota, Met Council, and MHFA could not in 1983 legally revert to racially segregative practices 










        Myron Orfield 
        Professor of Law 
        Director of the Institute on  
          Metropolitan Opportunity 
                                                            
187 See Letter from Robert F. Poffenberger, Director HUD Office of Community Planning and Development, Ind. State 
Office, to Gerry J. Sheub, President Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs (Apr. 18, 2000) (stating that when proven pro-integrative 
practices revert to segregative ones, the reversion constitutes a violation the Federal Fair Housing Act) (on file with the 

























































































Data Sources: HousingLink, U.S. Census Bureau.
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Map 1: City of MinneapolisNumber of Existing Affordable Units in AllSubsidized Housing Sites placed through 2007and Percentage Minority by Census Tract, 2010
























































































Data Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Census Bureau.
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Map 2: City of MinneapolisNumber of Low Income Units in LIHTCHousing Sites placed by the end of 2009and Percentage Minority by Census Tract, 2010









Total Population (2010)* 178,892 203,691 382,583
Total Housing Units (2006‐2010)** 83,240 83,901 167,141
Rental Housing Units (2006‐2010)** 32,791 49,484 82,275
LIHTC (placed through 2009)*** 593 2,791 3,384
Total Subsidized





Total Population (2010)* 46.8 53.2 100.0
Total Housing Units (2006‐2010)** 49.8 50.2 100.0
Rental Housing Units (2006‐2010)** 39.9 60.1 100.0
LIHTC (placed through 2009)*** 17.5 82.5 100.0
Total Subsidized







































































































































Scale:= 1,400   Students
Map 3: Minneapolis Public Elementary SchoolsRace and Ethnicity, 2010-2011and Percentage Minority by Census Tract, 2010
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Map 4: Minneapolis Public Elementary SchoolsLunch Status, 2010-2011and Census Tract Poverty Rate, 2006-2010
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Data Sources: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data, U.S. Census Bureau.
LegendMap 5: City of MinneapolisNumber of Subprime Loans, 2004-2006*and Percentage Minority by Census Tract, 2010
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Data Sources: Hennepin County Sherriff's Department, U.S. Census Bureau.
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Map 7: City of MinneapolisValue of Single Family Homes in Dollarsby City Neighborhood January, 2012
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Map 8: City of MinneapolisPercentage Change in the Value of Single FamilyHomes in Dollars by City NeighborhoodJanuary 2006 to January 2012
Legend
Note: Neighborhoods with "No data" did not havesufficient data available.  
City Value:-31.7%
-57.3     to
No data
-45.5     to
-35.4     to
-31.4     to
-26.1     to



























Ms. Libby Starling       February 28, 2014   
Director of Research 
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council 
 
Re: Comments on the Second Draft FHEA   
 
Dear Ms. Starling: 
 
The Second Draft Fair Housing Equity Assessment (“DFHEA”) did not analyze 
the HUD-provided data completely and seriously.  While it noted growing residential 
segregation and its harms, the DFHEA neither discussed how state and local housing 
policies caused this segregation nor described the effect of this housing policy on 
increasing school segregation—a reciprocal driver of housing segregation.  As such, the 
report is not a meaningful consideration of the data and its implications for the region.  
By excluding pro-integrative civil rights groups from its many relevant committees, the 
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (“Met Council”) did not seriously engage regional 
stakeholders. 
Because the document’s few action steps clearly intensify and perpetuate racial 
segregation—most notably by urging even more affordable housing in segregated and re-
segregating neighborhoods—it does not provide a clear pathway toward holding the 
region accountable for its Fair Housing Equity Assessment (“FHEA”) deliberations.  
FHEA activities will be meaningful and consequential to the region only in a negative 
sense because they will ignore or justify discriminatory behavior of public agencies and 
private parties.  To help provide a clearer pathway to regional accountability, my letter 
concludes by outlining important data and metrics for monitoring stable, metropolitan-
wide racial integration.    
 
I. Overview  
The Met Council is a recipient of federal housing funds.  It has a duty to refrain 
from perpetuating segregation and an obligation to affirmatively further fair housing.  It 
has a legal obligation to use its power to replace segregated neighborhoods with 
integrated neighborhoods.  Because its housing construction programs and land-use plans 
must increase racial integration, it clearly cannot operate or support programs and plans 
that perpetuate segregation.  The Met Council is clearly failing in all these duties, and this 
draft FHEA shows that it intends to move even further away from its legal obligations.  
An FHEA is based on the requirements of an Analysis of Impediments (“AI”).  




1. An extensive review of State or Entitlement jurisdiction’s laws, 
regulations, and administrative policies, procedures, and practices[;] 
2. An assessment of how those laws affect the location, availability, and 
accessibility of housing[;] 
3. An evaluation of the conditions, both public and private, affecting fair 
housing choice for all protected classes[; and] 
4. An assessment of the availability of affordable, accessible housing in a 
range of unit sizes.1 
HUD defines the Met Council’s obligation “to affirmatively further fair housing” as 
requiring it to:  
1. Conduct an analysis to identify impediments to fair housing choice within 
the jurisdiction[;] 
2. Take appropriate actions to overcome the effects of any impediments 
identified through the analysis[; and] 
3. Maintain records reflecting the analysis and actions taken in this regard.2 
HUD interprets those broad objectives to mean:  
1. Analyze and eliminate housing discrimination in the jurisdiction[;] 
2. Promote fair housing choice for all persons[;] 
3. Provide opportunities for inclusive patterns of housing occupancy 
regardless of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability and 
national origin[;] 
4. Promote housing that is structurally accessible to, and usable by, all 
persons, particularly persons with disabilities[; and] 
5. Foster compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of the Fair 
Housing Act.3 
 
II. The Draft Fails to Discuss the Abandonment of Met Council Policy 39 
The most conspicuous failure of the DFHEA is its failure to discuss the Met 
Council’s abandonment of its effective fair housing Policy 39, which was enforced from 
1971 to 1986.  The draft obliquely acknowledges that Project-based Section 8 units were 
placed in a much more pro-integrative manner than the low-income housing tax credit 
(“LIHTC”) units.4  However, the DFHEA does not relate this pro-integrative placement 
to Policy 39; it never even mentions that Policy 39 remains law, yet the Met Council does 
not enforce it.  I discussed this Policy 39’s history in my previous comments and also 
have published a law review article that outlines its effectiveness.   
 
                                                 
1 HUD, Fair Housing Planning Guide § 2-7, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf 
(numbering added). 
2 Id. § 1-2 (numbering original). 
3 Id. § 1-3 (numbering added). 
4 DFHEA IV, at 10–1, 15–8. 
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III. The Report Fails to Cite the Placement of Affordable Housing as a Discriminatory 
Driver of Racial Segregation 
The DFHEA notes in several places that particular affordable housing programs 
incent placement of affordable housing in poor neighborhoods.  It notes that suburban 
opposition makes it difficult to place LIHTC units in white neighborhoods, but does not 
note that the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (“MHFA”) frequently turns down 
requests for affordable housing in predominantly white neighborhoods.  Between 2005 
and 2011, the agency turned down $23 million of requests from these neighborhoods.  
The report does not note that the agency gives over 150 points to projects likely to be in 
racially segregated neighborhoods and only 10 points for projects likely to be in high-
opportunity white neighborhoods.  It does not mention the legislative creation of central 
city sub-allocators for the tax credit, the legislature’s decision to dedicate most of the 
units to the central cities, or the central cities’ extraordinarily segregated placement of 
these units.  By law the DFHEA must extensively review all of these “laws, regulations, 
and administrative policies, procedures, and practices” that create barriers to integrated 
housing.5  On the contrary, the first draft of the DFHEA shockingly concluded:  
The reality that the most logical places for affordable housing investment 
are more likely to be in an RCAP [Racially Concentrated Area of Poverty] 
than not exposes the complexity of the nature of the disparities reflected in 
this report – the very policies and investment decisions that are meant to 
provide housing opportunities for low and moderate income families also 
contribute to the geographic disparities and concentration of poverty the can 
perpetuate the lack of upward mobility.6 
Although this statement was removed in a subsequent draft, the fact that it made it into 
the initial draft is telling.  The initial assertion (that RCAPs are the “logical” place to put 
new subsidized housing) demonstrates how distorted views on this issue have become at 
the Met Council.  The rest of the statement implies that the segregative outcomes that one 
sees in the region are simply the result of this unfortunate “reality” (that RCAPs are the 
“logical” place to put subsidized housing), ignoring the purposeful behavior by the 
legislature and other public agencies that contributes greatly to the problem. 
This treatment also ignores evidence that developing low-income housing in the 
developing suburbs is much more cost-effective than building units in poor, segregated 
neighborhoods.  Recent analysis of comprehensive data shows that suburban subsidized 
housing units are thirty to forty percent cheaper per square foot and often have lower 
rents.7  
The DFHEA notes that only twelve percent of low-income households, and only 
eight percent of minority households, use transit to commute to work.  Despite this, Met 
Council policies and the DFHEA put a great deal of emphasis on transit availability when 
evaluating where to put affordable housing.  This emphasis inevitably concentrates low-
                                                 
5 Fair Housing Planning Guide, supra note 1, § 2-7. 
6 DFHEA VII, at 3 (emphasis added). 
7 Inst. on Metro. Opportunity, Reforming Subsidized Housing Policy in the Twin Cities to Cut Costs and 




income housing in segregated neighborhoods in the core of the region.  How does this 
benefit the vast majority of those living in subsidized housing who have cars, but must 
use them to go long distances to get to the entry-level jobs that are often in the 
developing suburbs where job growth is most robust? 
The DFHEA notes that while both subsidized housing and the urban non-white 
population are located closest to the largest clusters of employment, it makes clear that 
these same urban poor experience the highest levels of unemployment for those living in 
subsidized housing (and for non-whites generally).  The DFHEA suggests this reflects the 
fact that high concentrations of urban jobs in the central business district and city job 
centers have skill sets too high for the residents of poor segregated neighborhoods, areas 
with the region’s worst schools and graduation rates.   
Incredibly, the DFHEA uses the very small transit-dependent population and the 
proximity to jobs, for which low-income residents do not have the skills to acquire, to 
wrongly justify their blatantly segregative placement of affordable units in RCAPs.  The 
DFHEA never mentions the fact that most new, low-skilled jobs are located in an un-
clustered pattern in developing suburbs.   
Consistent with this, Met Council staff supported the idea that job growth should 
be excluded from the job access measure used in the opportunity analysis.  This decision 
guaranteed that the measure would overstate the scores for central locations near to the 
central business districts (where the analysis admits that most jobs are not well-matched 
to subsidized housing residents). 
 
IV. The Report Fails to Report that the Met Council Abandonment of its Oversight of 
Exclusionary Zoning as a Driver of Racial Segregation 
The DFHEA notes at several places that exclusionary zoning and “NIMBYism” 
are a problem,8 but fails to note that the Met Council has power under the Land Use 
Planning Act (“LUPA”) to require communities to eliminate exclusionary zoning in order 
to provide for their fair share of affordable housing.  It does not mention that from 1970 
to 1986 the Met Council effectively guided a huge amount of land to multifamily use9 
and then for no good reason allowed most of that land to revert to large, exclusionary 
single family lots.10  Professor Edward Goetz concluded that the Met Council stopped 
monitoring whether local zoning matched comprehensive plans and quietly allowed the 
communities he studied to rezone seventy-eight percent of the land designated as high-
density for affordable housing to other uses.  Overall, Goetz concluded that 
                                                 
8 DFHEA IV, at 18–9. 
9 Edward G. Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbara Lukermann, The Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and the 
Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in Suburbia, 22 L. & INEQ. 31, 31–72 (2004). 
10 Id.  According to Goetz, had this acreage remained high density, 104,733 housing units could have been 
built.  By 2001, these parcel of land would accommodate only 46,000 hundred fifty-two units a staggering 
fifty-six percent reduction in residential development potential. These calculations use the maximum 
possible units under zoning designations.  This means a potential 58,618 units were lost on these parcels.  
In particular some communities have changed their zoning plans or plan designation of this land quite 
extensively or perhaps never updated their zoning maps to conform to their comprehensive plans: just 
thirteen communities account for more than ninety-nine percent of the lost units.  Id. 
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approximately thirty-eight percent of the acreage designated for high-density 
development had been re-designated for low- or medium-density residential 
development.  An additional sixteen percent had been re-designated for planned unit 
developments (“PUDs”) at indeterminate densities, and seventeen percent was re-zoned 
for nonresidential use.  Only twenty-two percent of the acreage originally guided for 
inclusionary development remained in place.11  The Met Council has an unparalleled 
database concerning the zoning and comprehensive planning of local communities, but 
nowhere is this data analyzed in the DFHEA.   
 
V. The Draft Fails to Comment on the Segregative Effect of Housing Policies on 
Public Schools and on Growing School Segregation as a Driver of Housing 
Segregation 
School capital plans are under the Met Council’s supervision.  For purposes of the 
LUPA (which the Met Council administers) school districts are local governments.  And 
while the legislature has asked the Met Council to help the Department of Education 
implement the school desegregation rule by coordinating its housing policy therewith, the 
DFHEA nowhere discusses that metropolitan area schools have become rapidly 
segregated and that this school segregation is reciprocally related to the region’s 
increasing housing segregation.   
The Fair Housing Act requires HUD and its grantees to consider the racial 
balance of schools attended by government-supported housing recipients.  The clear 
implication of this legal requirement is that stably integrated schools are a central 
component of fair housing policy.   
On February 23, 2010, Secretary Shaun Donovan clarified HUD’s fair housing 
priorities before Congress, stating: 
[S]ustainability also means creating “geographies of opportunity,” places 
that effectively connect people to jobs, quality public schools, and other 
amenities.  Today, too many HUD-assisted families are stuck in 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and segregation, where one's zip 
code predicts poor educational, employment, and even health outcomes. 
These neighborhoods are not sustainable in their present state.12 
When the legislature authorized a metropolitan school desegregation rule, it required the 
Department of Education to “consult with the Metropolitan Council to coordinate school 
desegregation efforts with the housing, social, economic, and infrastructure needs of the 
metropolitan area.”13  The Minnesota Legislature has also facilitated the creation of three 
                                                 
11 Id.  
12 Press Release, HUD, Written Testimony of Shaun Donovan: FY2011 Budget Request for HUD (Feb. 23, 
2010) (emphasis added), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/testimonies/2010/2010-02-23 (emphasis added).  
13 MINN. R. 3535.  See also 1994 Minn. Laws, Ch. 647, Art. 8(2)(1)(c).  
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large city-suburban integration school districts to facilitate and coordinate, in consultation 
with the Met Council, more integrated schools on a metropolitan basis.14 
School data for the Twin Cities shows a dramatic increase in racial isolation.  In 
1995, there were only fifteen elementary schools and four middle/high schools with more 
than seventy-five percent of their students non-white.  By 2011, the number of 
elementary schools in this group had increased six times (to ninety schools) and by ten 
times for middle/high schools (to forty schools).15 
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related.  Segregated 
neighborhoods, of course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also 
feedback from school characteristics to neighborhoods.  Potential residents, especially 
families with children, evaluate local schools when deciding where to live.  This means 
that racial or social transition in schools—and the record shows that schools can change 
character very rapidly—can accelerate neighborhood transition.  Indeed, racial change in 
schools is very often the precursor to neighborhood change.  By the same token, stably 
integrated schools can stabilize neighborhoods. 
 According to statute, the Met Council “shall adopt a development guide” that 
“will encompass the physical, social and economic needs of the metropolitan area and 
those future developments which will have an impact on the entire area” including “the 
location of schools.”16  LUPA states that for purposes of Chapter 473 “local government 
unit” means “school district”17 and the Met Council is required to provide notice of rule 
changes and related hearings to all school districts in the metropolitan area.18  The law 
further requires the Met Council to “construct an inventory” of all schools in the 
metropolitan area and the unused space within each school.19  The Met Council may 
submit its comments to the commissioner of education on any school district facility that 
is proposed in the metropolitan area.   
 LUPA requires that a local government unit’s comprehensive plans contain a 
statement on “the effect of the plan on affected school districts”20 and these 
comprehensive plans must be submitted to the affected school district for review and 
comment six months prior to their submission to the Met Council.21  Finally, it suggests 
that these comprehensive plans contain an intergovernmental coordination process for 
                                                 
14 For information on the three integration school districts, see West Metro Education Program (WMEP), 
available at http://sites.google.com/a/wmep.k12.mn.us/wmep-k12-mn-us/; East Metro Integration District 
(EMID), available at  http://www.emid6067.net/; and Northwest Suburban Integration District (NWSDID), 
available at http://www.nws.k12.mn.us/About_NWSISD.html. 
15 All calculations include only traditional elementary and secondary schools (and not Area Learning 
Centers, for instance) with more than fifty students. 
16 MINN. STAT. § 473.145 (2013) (emphasis added). 
17 Id. § 473.121(6); MINN. STAT. § 473.852(11) (2012) (stating that “school district” has the meaning given 
by MINN. STAT § 120A.05). 
18 MINN. STAT. § 473.174(5) (2012).  
19 Id. § 473.23(1).  
20 Id. § 473.859(1). 
21 Id. § 473.858(2). 
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cooperation with school districts generally and the siting of public schools in particular.22  
LUPA contains four additional references to schools.23 
The Met Council ignores the implications of the education data, even though it is 
clearly part of their duty under the Fair Housing Act and even though all of the FHEA 
material and webinars state this analysis of school segregation must be part of the FHEA.  
The DFHEA spends several pages detailing poor outcomes in the schools in the RCAPs24 
and the negative life-long effects of exposure to these schools, yet (the first draft of 
Section VIII) tellingly concludes that “affordable housing in proximity to excellent 
schools but not to transit or jobs is not a smart investment of limited resources.”25 Neither 
draft cites evidence to support this proposition.   
The Met Council’s own data notes that only twelve percent of the residents of 
subsidized housing use transit.  Moreover, the DFHEA fails to note that residents of 
subsidized housing in high-opportunity areas are much more likely to be employed and 
have higher wages because of the proximity to suitable, unfilled jobs.  The report fails to 
note that good schools and freedom from crime were the most important issues cited by 
residents of low-income housing in a state government survey of preferences;26 that 
RCAPs have the lowest-performing schools and highest levels of crime; or that 
predominantly white, high-opportunity suburbs have the highest-performing schools and 
the lowest crime.  The report fails to note that subsidized housing in high-opportunity 
suburbs have the longest waiting lists of any subsidized housing.  And finally, it fails to 
note evidence that building new subsidized housing actually costs less in suburbs than 
comparable units in the central cities. 
Thankfully, the statement that affordable housing near excellent schools is a bad 
investment was edited out of the second draft of Section VIII of the DFHEA.  However, 
it is also true that the very short and wholly inadequate sub-section on schools that was 
included in the first draft was removed entirely from the second draft, showing a 
continuing lack of concern about this issue. 
 
VI. The Draft Recommends No Steps to Counter Mortgage Lending Discrimination 
The DFHEA details evidence of mortgage lending discrimination that ranks 
among the most severe in the nation, but it has no clear action steps to respond to this 
discrimination. 
 
                                                 
22 Id.  
23 MINN. STAT. § 473.3875 prioritizes transit for livable communities grants to evaluate projects 
coordinating school and public transportation.  MINN. STAT. §473.625 discusses the process of detaching 
airport land from school districts, MINN. STAT. §473.629 addresses proper valuation of property for bond 
issues by school districts, and MINN. STAT. §473.661 covers airport noise mitigation resources for school 
districts. 
24 DFHEA VI, at 15–20. 
25 DFHEA VII, at 3.  




VII. The Draft Recommends No Steps to Counter Illegal Racial Steering 
The DFHEA reports that steering is a problem and causes schools and 
neighborhoods in the region to become more segregated, but it lists no clear action steps 
in response.   
 
VIII. The Draft Gives So-Called Neutral Racial Preferences Too Large a Role in 
Creating Residential Segregation 
The DFHEA gives undue weight to the different residential preferences of whites 
and non-whites as causes of segregation. While both whites and non-whites desire to live 
in integrated neighborhoods, an ideal integrated neighborhood for whites has a larger 
percentage of whites than the ideal neighborhood for non-whites.27  Yet, it is critical to 
understand that these preferences, for both whites and non-whites, have been shaped by 
existing and past discrimination.  It is likely that whites and non-whites may feel 
uncomfortable living with each other because our segregated society has given us little 
experience of doing so.  Moreover, non-whites may not prefer to live in very white 
neighborhoods because they anticipate that discrimination of some kind by whites will 
lower their quality of life.28  Because of both steering and segregated living patterns, 
there is asymmetry between whites and non-whites in terms of information about 
neighborhoods.  Non-whites might seek whiter neighborhoods if they had better 
information on school quality and the stability and equity growth of residential property 
values in whiter neighborhoods.  
Whites may have low tolerance for diversity simply because of invidious racial 
bias that should not be sanctioned.  Alternatively, practices like steering, mortgage-
lending discrimination, unfair subsidized-housing placement, and discriminatory school-
boundary drawing often place diverse neighborhoods in the midst of racial transition and 
disinvestment, which may also reduce whites’ tolerance for racial diversity.  
In the end, if discrimination were eliminated—or reduced—and integration could 
become both more common and more stable, it is likely that preferences would change 
and become more compatible.  
 
IX. The Draft Fails to Note the Undue Influence of the Community Development 
Corporations in Shaping its Segregative Corridor Plans and the DFHEA 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & Benjamin Scafidi, Whites’ Neighborhood Racial Preferences and 
Neighborhood Racial Composition in the United States: Evidence from the Multi-City Study of Inequality, 
19 HOUS. STUD. 325–59 (2004); Mary Pattillo, Black Middle Class Neighborhoods, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 321 
(2005); Lincoln Quillian, Why is Black-White Residential Segregation So Persistent?: Evidence on Three 
Theories from Migration Data, 31 SOC. SCI. RES. 31 197–229 (2002); Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Can We 
Live Together? Racial Preferences and Neighborhood Outcomes, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY; 
Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 167–207 
(2003). 




The report fails to note the disproportionate influence of housing developers who 
have dominated the Corridor Planning and DFHEA process and the Met Council’s 
decision-making.  In 2011, the last year for which data is available, the Metropolitan 
Consortium for Community Developers (“MCCD”) members had combined expenses of 
$178,111,075.  They have many lobbyists bolstered by hundreds of employees and 
advocates whose very livelihood depends on the continuation of current housing 
development patterns (which are so highly segregative).  These groups dominate Met 
Council advisory committees while traditional civil rights groups advocating for 
integrated housing are absent or badly under-represented.  A majority of the Corridor of 
Opportunity Board, and its successor the Partnership for Regional Opportunity, which is 
shaping metropolitan housing policy, is composed largely of developers of affordable 
housing who do almost all of their work in the central cities in a racially segregated 
context and no one with a civil rights perspective.  LISC is the principle consultant for 
the Central and Southwest Corridor housing plan.  LISC focuses overwhelmingly on 
central cities and operates a large number charter schools nationally (with over 78,000 
students) that are nearly all segregated.  This pattern is hardly representative of a region 
where more than half of the people of color live in suburbs and the overwhelming 
majority desire to live in integrated neighborhoods.  
 
X. Stable Metropolitan Racial Integration: The Goal of Regional Fair Housing 
Planning  
 
A. Requirement to Map Stable Metropolitan Racial Integration (“SMRI”) 
Community Types 
The Metropolitan Housing Plan must map SMRI community types, namely (1) 
areas of minority concentration, (2) racially-mixed areas, and (3) high-opportunity 
communities.  The Met Council must in turn require fair housing plans from all covered 
communities that reflect SMRI category types. 
 
B.   Data and Metrics 
The state is required to maintain consolidated plans monitoring trends by 
collecting data on and mapping (where possible) the characteristics of the aforementioned 
SMRI community types.  The SMRI categories roughly correspond to the DFHEA’s 
green, yellow, and blue regions. 
The Met Council should in turn require fair housing plans from all housing 
allocators and entities, and these housing plans should monitor characteristics consistent 
with SMRI community types.  These should include metrics and data for schools and 
neighborhoods regarding racial mix, income, student performance, housing 
characteristics, housing finance, crime, health, local fiscal capacity, jobs, and job growth. 
The monitoring should include the following metrics, data and mapping (where 
applicable): 
1. Data and maps showing the distribution of the community types: 
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a. Areas of Minority Concentration – Census tracts with more than 
fifty percent non-white residents. 
b.  Racially Mixed Area – Areas with no minority group exceeding 
fifty percent of the population and a white share of at least thirty 
percent. 
c. High-Opportunity Communities – Communities with higher-than-
average values for income, jobs per resident in the community or 
nearby, job growth in the community or nearby, tax base per 
capita, and stable racial and income mixes. 
2. Data and maps showing the regional distribution of: 
a.  School data showing the racial mix, economic composition, and 
test results of all elementary schools and their catchment areas. 
This data is available from the National Center for Education 
Statistics and State Departments of Education.  
b. The placement of subsidized housing under HUD Section 8 and 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit programs, broken out by the 
community types. 
c. Basic health data, including at a minimum the incidence of asthma 
and other income-related diseases. 
d. Municipal tax base data showing the ability of local governments 
to finance local public services from the legally available local 
taxes (which vary from state to state). 
e. Jobs per capita and job growth, available in most states from the 
Local Employment Dynamics Database. 
f. Location of luxury housing, defined, for example, as housing 
valued in the top twenty percentiles in the region. 
g. Credit availability, defined, for example, as areas with the greater 
than average use of high quality credit (from HMDA data). 
3. Maps showing the region’s framework of stable integration and 
how they relate to information in Sections 1 and 2. 
 
C.  AI Requirements Based on SMRI Community Type 
1.  Category 1 Communities – Areas of Minority Concentration (Green Area) 
In areas of minority concentration, housing plans must include a presumption 
against siting additional low-income family housing in these areas.  In this light, housing 
preservation classifications should not be used to evade this presumption.  For example, a 
preservation expenditure on a low-income family unit would constitute an additional unit 
if the cost of preservation were more than one half of the cost of a new unit in a high-
opportunity community.  This presumption could be overcome if the school population in 




To benefit existing residents and attract newcomers, Category 1 housing plans 
should have targeting objectives to attract middle-income residents, particularly those 
with school-aged children.  These plans should also attract property tax paying businesses 
that will increase local fiscal capacity, services, and the number of jobs.  Such housing 
plans should include: 
a. Plans for the creation or maintenance of stably integrated 
neighborhoods; 
b. Plans for the creation or maintenance of stably integrated public or 
charter schools that are either neighborhood or cluster-magnet 
schools. See Magnet Appendix.  Such schools must meet NCLB 
standards and make adequate yearly progress; 
c.  Plans to increase local government fiscal capacity by attracting 
higher income individuals and property or sales tax paying 
businesses that create jobs; 
d.  Plans to improve local public health through medical care, healthy 
food, and local recreation opportunities; 
e.  Plans to improve public transit;  
f.  Plans for basic maintenance of necessary public infrastructure, 
including streets, sewers, public buildings, parks, etc.; and 
g.  Plans to include the use of federal or state general revenue sharing 
grants for any purpose coherent with stable racial integration, 
including targeted property tax incentives to encourage increased 
fiscal capacity, the creation of new jobs, or reducing local tax rates 
for improved business and residential climate. HUD and other 
federal funds should support the implement of these types of plans. 
 
 2.   Category 2 Communities – Racially Mixed Communities (Yellow Area)  
 These are communities that are presently racially integrated or on a path to 
becoming integrated within the next ten years.  Generally, these are fully developed, 
relatively dense suburban areas with either low or declining local fiscal capacity or share 
of jobs.  They are often subject to very severe racial steering and mortgage lending 
discrimination.  The goal in such communities should be to the preserve stable racial 
integration. 
 Housing plans for Category 2 communities must include fully funded stable 
integration plans.  These plans must include periodic paired racial testing of both renters 
and homeowners, at a variety of income levels, to detect discrimination that would 
intensify local or metropolitan segregation.  Increasing evidence demonstrates that 
minority home purchasers are often steered to racially integrated schools in these 
suburbs, whereas whites of similar income and qualifications are steered toward whiter 
schools.  Paired testing must include data about the racial composition of local 
neighborhood schools. 
  Category 2 housing plans must include HMDA data that is frequently and 
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geographically updated to measure disparities both between individuals and communities.  
These plans should also require and/or encourage stable integration boards with racially 
inclusive membership of local officials and important community stakeholders.  These 
boards should have the ability to require local real estate and banking entities to 
cooperate by appearing before them and responding to reasonable data requests. 
  Stable integration boards or locally appropriate governmental entities should be 
encouraged to provide pro-integrative loans or mortgage insurance programs, document 
claims of housing market discrimination, and create and operate pro-integration 
marketing plans.  
 Housing plans in Category 2 communities could include the following policies and 
community-based strategies to encourage and maintain stably integrated communities:29 
a. Expect government leaders and agencies to proactively promote 
diverse neighborhoods. 
b. Encourage consciousness on the part of urban planners “to 
examine the consequences of their actions. . . that may either 
destabilize existing neighborhoods or thwart the development of 
new diverse neighborhoods.” 
c. Maintain and strengthen fair housing laws. 
d. Encourage public and private funding and programs that promote 
mixed-income, racially diverse communities. 
e. Develop and disseminate information on strategies to strengthen 
community-based organizations. 
f. Establish city-wide and regional networks of diverse community 
organizations. 
g. Develop “[l]eadership training institutes for residents of diverse 
communities.” 
h. Maintain quality schools and community safety programs in 
diverse neighborhoods. 
i. Encourage the creation of programs that support mixed-income 
development. 
j. Encourage local chambers of commerce and other business 
associations to view diverse communities “as potentially strong 
markets.” 
k. Encourage the media to tell “the positive stories of diverse 
community successes.”30 
l. Encourage “[l]ocal community organizations, existing institutions, 
and local governments . . . to be receptive to new groups and be 
                                                 
29  See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial 




willing to work with them on common community issues.” 
m. Develop programs to create jobs and improve access to jobs in 
surrounding communities. 
n. Conduct public discussions about whether “maintaining ethnic- 
and race-based political constituencies undermines efforts to 
develop and sustain diverse communities.” 
 
 3. Category 3 – High-Opportunity Communities (Blue Area) 
  The Met Council should target High-Opportunity Communities as priority 
communities for the expenditure of scarce low-income family housing funds and limited 
enforcement dollars.  Moreover, such communities should not receive federal or state 
housing funds, other federal funds, or state or metropolitan subsidies unless they 
demonstrate that they are taking steps to diversify.  Plans for such communities should 
include: 
a. Reduction of barriers to affordable housing in zoning codes, 
development agreement and development practices;  
b. Inclusionary housing;  
c. Pledges to take advantage of existing low-income housing tax 
credits and other funds to meet their metropolitan share of low-
income family housing; 
d. Paired testing to make sure the existing family and rental housing 
is equally available on the basis of race; and 
e. Pro-integrative mortgage programs. 
 
XI. Conclusion 
  The foregoing clearly shows that the DFHEA did not analyze the HUD-provided 
data completely and seriously.  It seems to suggest that housing segregation is caused by 
neutral preferences and private discrimination that it has no obligation to counter.   It fails 
to note the clear fact that government housing policy, including its own, has caused 
segregation in both neighborhoods and the region’s schools.  It fails to consider the rapid 
increase in school segregation or analyses provided repeatedly in other comments made 
during the FHEA process.  The DFHEA does not reflect full consideration of the data on 
these issues and the implications for the region.  By effectively excluding pro-integrative 
civil rights groups from the process and by allowing the process to be dominated by 
housing developers, whose history has been only of building housing and operating 
schools that deepen and perpetuate segregation, the Met Council did not allow serious 
engagement of regional stakeholders.  Because the document’s proposed action steps 
clearly intensify and perpetuate racial segregation, it does not provide a clear pathway 
toward holding the regional region accountable for its FHEA deliberations.  FHEA 
activities will be meaningful and consequential to the region only in the negative sense—
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Magnet School Appendix  
A Magnet School Strategy to Integrate Schools and Strengthen Neighborhoods in 
the 
Central and Southwest Light Rail Transit Corridors 
Introduction. On-going and planned investments in light rail transit (LRT) in the 
Twin Cities provide the region with a great opportunity for a new and innovative approach to 
reduce segregation in the region’s schools, narrow the achievement gap, and strengthen and 
revitalize housing markets in the LRT corridors. This project will provide the research 
needed to support the design and implementation of a program and bring the most important 
public and neighborhood actors together to evaluate alternative plans and design one which 
best meets the needs of all stakeholders. 
Minnesota’s long-term commitment to inter-district open enrollment and magnet 
schools can be used to leverage the state’s major transit investments by developing new 
magnet schools directly linked to the new LRT infrastructure and to the job development it 
encourages. The new LRT lines expand the potential attendance areas for schools in the 
corridors in two ways: by providing safe, rapid, and reliable transportation to students who 
live along the entire corridor; and by linking any school location on the corridor to the 
workforce commuting to existing and new jobs supported by LRT. The resulting pool of 
prospective students creates the potential for stably integrated magnet schools which would 
enhance educational opportunities for students of all races and boost the long-term prospects 
of corridor neighborhoods by enhancing their attraction for middle-income households with 
children. 
The multi-disciplinary project would produce a report which highlights best practices 
in this policy area and analyzes the characteristics of businesses, commuters, commuting 
patterns, residents, and public schools in the two corridors. It would also organize the forums 
needed to bring together the important public actors and representatives from the 
neighborhoods along the corridors (residents and businesses) for initial planning and program 
design. 
Background. School segregation is a serious and increasing problem in the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area. Racial segregation in schools is important because experience 
shows us that it creates drastically different education experiences for children of color than 
for white children. Non-white segregated schools are virtually always also high-poverty 
schools. In 1995, less than two percent of elementary schools in the Twin Cities (or 11 
schools) were more than 90 percent students of color. By 2010, this had increased to 83 
schools (or more than eight percent region-wide). More than 91 percent of the students in 
these schools are poor, compared to roughly 30 percent in all other schools. The numbers are 
even starker for Minneapolis and St. Paul. By 2010 fully one-fourth of public schools 
operated by the public school districts in the two cities were more than 90 percent non-white 
(44 schools), and 93 percent of the students in those schools were poor. 
An extensive research literature documents that racial and economic segregation hurts 
the kids who attend these schools. The potential effects of creating more integrated schools 
are broad and long-lasting. The research shows that integrated schools boost academic 
achievement, attainment, and expectations; improve opportunities for students of color; and 
generate valuable social and economic benefits. Integrated schools also enhance the cultural 
competence of white students and prepare them for a more diverse workplace and society. 
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Attending racially integrated schools and classrooms improves the academic 
achievement of minority students measured by test scores.i Since the research also shows that 
integrated schools do not lower test scores for white students, they represent one of the very 
few strategies demonstrated to ease one of the most difficult public policy problems of our 
time—the racial achievement gap. Other academic benefits for minority students include 
completing more years of education and higher college attendance rates. Long term economic 
benefits include a tendency to choose more lucrative occupations in which minorities are 
historically underrepresented and higher lifetime incomes.ii 
Integrated schools also generate long-term social benefits for students. Students who 
experience interracial contact in integrated school settings are more likely to live, work, and 
attend college in more integrated settings.iii Integrated classrooms improve the stability of 
interracial friendships and increase the likelihood of interracial friendships as adults.iv Both 
white and non-white students tend to have higher educational aspirations if they have cross-
race friendships.v Interracial contact in desegregated settings decreases racial prejudice 
among students and facilitates more positive interracial relations.vi Students who attend 
integrated schools report an increased sense of civic engagement compared to their 
segregated peers.vii 
Integrated schools also make sense from an economic point of view. Giving all 
children a fair start with the choice to attend opportunity-rich middle-class schools helps 
create the skilled workforce metropolitan regions need to replace impending baby-boom 
retirees. Today’s students are the next generation of workers who will replace these retirees. 
People of color will represent an increasing share of the nation’s next generations of workers. 
Segregated schools and a wide gap between white and non-white graduation rates will not 
yield the skilled workers needed for the region’s economy.viii 
A metropolitan area also jeopardizes its competitive edge and long-term quality of 
life by permitting segregation to damage educational opportunity and neighborhood stability 
in its central cities and adjacent suburbs. A region’s central cities and its suburbs tend to 
grow or decline together.ix Vibrant central cities can be engines of growth for metropolitan 
areas.x Population growth and economic growth correlate for cities and regions.xi In addition, 
economic growth in a large central city can have positive spillover effects of one to two 
percent on its suburbs for every one percent increase in the central city.xii Recent ecological 
studies also show associations between segregation and a wide variety of health outcomes 
including infant and adult mortality rates, homicide rates, teenage childbearing, tuberculosis, 
cardiovascular disease, and exposure to air pollutants.xiii 
Major transit investments in LRT in the Twin Cities now occurring in the Central 
Corridor along University Avenue and in the planning stages in the Southwest Corridor 
provide an enormous opportunity for new, innovative policies to reduce segregation in the 
region’s schools. Minnesota’s long-term commitment to school choice—magnet schools in 
particular—can be used to leverage the state’s substantial transit investments by developing 
new magnet schools directly linked to the new transportation infrastructure and the job 
development it encourages. 
LRT expands the potential attendance areas of schools in the corridors in two ways. 
First, by providing safe, regular and rapid transportation that students can use, it expands a 
school’s practical service area as a neighborhood school, creating the potential to serve 
resident students along an entire corridor. Second, LRT (and accompanying economic 
development initiatives) will encourage high-density job development near stops. School-age 
children of the workers commuting to these jobs represent another potential pool of enrollees 
for a school with easy access to the corridor’s LRT. Enrolling their children in schools near 
to the LRT which serves their work locations creates significant advantages for parents. 
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Because most workers now commute so far to their jobs, schools near their job site are often 
much more convenient than those near home, making it possible for parents who might not 
otherwise be able to, to attend parent-teacher meetings and school events during the school 
day or immediately after school. A brand-new LRT line with safe, reliable and frequent 
service extends the potential service area to job sites along the entire line, and from those 
sites into the entire commuter-sheds from which workers are drawn. 
The significance of the extending the effective attendance areas of schools is 
enormous in a metropolitan area like the Twin Cities, where so many of the region’s low-
income residents and people of color reside in just a few neighborhoods in the region’s core 
areas (including parts of some fully-developed suburbs). Wider attendance areas mean more 
balanced potential student populations, economically and racially. Prior Institute on Race and 
Poverty (IRP) research identified nine job centers in the Central nd Southwest LRT 
corridors.xiv Map 1 shows the outer boundaries of the combined areas within 20 minutes 
commuting time of the nine job centers. The contrast between the workers commuting from 
these larger potential attendance areas and existing schools along the corridors is clear. The 
workers commuting to the nine job centers on the corridors are markedly more racially 
balanced. For instance, workers commuting to the nine job centers in 2009 were 85 percent 
white—a racial make-up very similar to the region as a whole. In contrast, the white share of 
students in the central city public schools was roughly 30 percent.xv Even many of the 
suburban school districts in the Southwest Corridor could benefit from the wider potential 
attendance areas. Many schools along the corridor have become very racially diverse and 
show clear signs of racial transition (Map 2).  
Map 1 
 
An excellent potential model to exploit these larger potential enrollment zones—
magnet schools—already exists and has been in use for a long time in many school districts, 
including those most directly affected by the new LRT lines. Minneapolis, St. Paul and the 
West Metro Education Program (WMEP) each have good examples.xvi In Minneapolis, South 
Senior High and Barton Open Elementary School are the best known examples of the 
18 
 
district’s use of magnet programs to draw students from a wide area. Central Senior High and 
Capitol Hill Magnet/Rondo Elementary are prominent examples in St. Paul. And WMEP, 
which includes most of the districts along the Southwest Corridor, runs two very successful 
arts magnets—FAIR Crystal and FAIR Downtown.  
As a group, these magnets out-perform the rest of the state virtually across the board. 
White students’ reading test scores are better than the statewide average in all six schools and 
in five of six for math. Black students also perform better—in five of six for reading and four 
of six for math. This is true despite the fact that poverty rates are quite high in four of the six 
schools—at roughly 60 percent in 
Map 2 
 
FAIR Downtown and Central Senior High and at about 40 percent in South Senior High and 
Capitol High Magnet/Rondo. Recent research in other parts of the country also highlights the 
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One of the most severe obstacles for the Twin Cities in the 21
st
 century is the 
concentration of poverty and segregation, and the divisions they are creating across the 
metropolitan region. Unfortunately, the Metropolitan Council’s draft Housing Policy 
Plan, which perpetuates the region’s segregation while failing to affirmatively further fair 
housing, is insufficient to overcome these obstacles.1 
The Plan itself clearly acknowledges many of the challenges it faces. Its first and 
second parts – “Housing for a Growing, Thriving Region” and “Outcomes,” respectively 
– discuss the disparities that afflict the Twin Cities. However, the substantive policies 
described in the third part, “Council Policies and Roles to Expand Viable Housing 
Options,” barely attempt to reduce those disparities. Rather than proposing any sort of 
aggressive measures to remedy the problems it had described, Part III in many cases 
“adopts” policies that the Council already follows – policies which, with the benefit of 
hindsight, we can confidently say have actively contributed to the region’s disparities. A 
change of direction is needed, but the current Plan manifests nothing so much as a desire 
to stay the course.  
This is wholly inadequate. In order to reverse current trends, major adjustments 
need to be made to the Council’s housing policy – adjustments which the Housing Policy 
Plan does not require, or even consider. Most strikingly, the Plan is almost completely 
bereft of strong incentives to encourage local governments to address housing disparities, 
and in particular, appears to envision no consequences for cities which ignore the 
Council’s housing guidance. Moreover, the Plan makes no attempt to reinstitute the more 
effective approach of previous years, where bold and easily-understood policies attacking 
segregation and income disparity were supported with penalties for areas that refused to 
meet their housing obligations. The Plan as it currently exists is not only unlikely to 
reverse the deplorable regional trend toward greater poverty and segregation, but is in 
violation of the Metropolitan Council’s legal obligations to combat racial and economic 
inequality in housing. 
The comments below first briefly discuss the extent of racial disparities in the 
Twin Cities and the Council’s legal obligations, then summarize the Plan’s description of 
housing issues and subsequent failure to address those issues. They propose a number of 
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 Metropolitan Council, Housing Policy Plan (2014) [hereinafter Housing Policy Plan]. 
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specific policy changes that would dramatically improve the Plan’s ability to accomplish 
its goals. 
I. Growing Segregation in the Twin Cities 
Housing and schools in the Twin Cities were not always segregated. In the early 
1990s, only 3 percent of the region’s population lived in majority nonwhite, high poverty 
areas; only about 2,000 (or 2.5 percent) of the region’s nonwhite students were in schools 
that were more than 90 percent nonwhite.2    
Over the previous two decades, this has all changed. By 2010, the percentage of 
the regional population in majority nonwhite, high-poverty areas rose by three times to 9 
percent.3  Today, the two central cities together only contain 23 percent of regional 
population, but 55 percent of the region’s nonwhite residents.4 They also contain over 
half the region’s subsidized affordable housing: 37 percent in Minneapolis and 21.7 
percent in Saint Paul. The number of schools with more than 90 percent nonwhite 
students had increased more than seven-fold (from 11 to 83); the number of nonwhite 
students in those schools had risen by more than 10 times (from 2,000 to 25,400), 
representing an increase in the percentage of nonwhite students in highly segregated 
environments from 2.5 percent to 16 percent.  
Some of these changes simply reflect the fact that the region became more 
racially diverse during the period. However, other metropolitan areas of roughly the same 
size and with similar demographic histories have not shown the same pattern of 
deterioration. For instance, the number of schools in the Portland region with more than 
90 percent nonwhite students was just 2 in 2009 (up from 0 in 2000); in Seattle it was 
only 25 (up from 14); and in Pittsburgh it was 25 (down from 27).5  The neighborhood 
comparisons are no better. In 2012, 19 percent of low-income black residents of the Twin 
Cities lived in high-poverty census tracts (up from 13 percent in 2000) compared to just 
3.4 percent of low-income black residents in Seattle (down from 3.5 percent in 2000) and 
1.6 percent in Portland (down from 1.9 percent in 2000).6  
Not surprisingly, the Twin Cities region now shows some of the widest racial 
disparities in the country. Recent data show alarming gaps between whites and nonwhites 
in income, unemployment, health, and education. Poverty rates for black Minnesotans are 
more than four times those for whites; while household incomes for blacks are less than 
half of those for whites; reading proficiency rates for black students are less than half 
those for whites in most school grades and years; incarceration rates for blacks are 20-25 
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 National school data are from the National Center for Education Statistics. The equivalent numbers for the 
Twin Cities from this source are even worse than those generated using local data sources: 112 schools 
with more than 90 percent non-white students in 2009, compared to 37 such schools in 2000. 
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 National residential statistics are derived from Census data compiled and provided by Paul Jargowsky and 
the Center for Urban Research and Education at Rutgers University. 
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times greater than for whites; and black unemployment rates are two to three times those 
for whites. All of these disparities put the region and the state near the bottom of national 
rankings.7 
II. The Metropolitan Council’s Legal Obligations 
 There are at least three independent, though related, sources of law that obligate 
the Met Council to reduce segregation and pursue fair housing goals: § 3604 of the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA)8,  § 3608 of the FHA9,  and the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act 
(MLUPA)10.  
Section 3604 
All entities, public or private, are forbidden from taking actions which 
discriminate in the provision of housing on the basis of race.  This proscription is 
explicitly extended to the implementation of “land-use rules, ordinances, policies or 
procedures” with a racially discriminatory impact.11  For the purposes of § 3604, 
discrimination includes actions which perpetuate segregated living patterns – for 
instance, actions which prevent the construction of racially integrative housing or 
concentrate segregative housing in a single neighborhood or municipality. Because 
affordable housing is typically disproportionately occupied by nonwhite populations, the 
placement of affordable housing has been frequently treated by the courts as a proxy for 
the placement of segregated housing. The perpetuation of segregation can be established 
by evidence of disparate impact on a protected racial group or pattern of segregated 
housing placement and/or occupancy. 
Section 3608  
Governmental recipients of federal housing funds have an obligation under § 
3608(d) of the FHA to “affirmatively further” fair housing, which requires them to use 
their “immense leverage” to create “integrated and balanced living patterns.”12  
In a recently proposed rule, designed to provide guidance for recipients of fair 
housing funding, HUD defines “[a]ffirmatively furthering fair housing” as “taking 
proactive steps beyond simply combating discrimination to foster more inclusive 
communities.”13 Specifically, the proposed rule states that affirmatively furthering fair 
housing “means taking steps to overcome segregated living patterns and support and 
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promote integrated communities, to end racially and ethnically concentrated areas of 
poverty, and to foster and maintain compliance with civil rights and fair housing laws.”14  
The rule’s commentary further notes: 
[R]acially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty are of particular 
concern because they couple fair housing issues with other significant 
local and regional policy challenges. These areas clearly fall in the domain 
of fair housing, as they often reflect legacies of segregated housing 
patterns. Of the nearly 3,800 census tracts in this country where more than 
40 percent of the population is below the poverty line, about 3,000 (78 
percent) are also predominantly minority. . . Consequently, interventions 
that result in reducing racially and ethnically concentrated areas of 
poverty hold the promise of providing benefits that assist both residents 
and their communities.15   
With HUD issuing new guidance on the issue, the outer limits of the obligation to 
affirmatively further fair housing have not yet been tested, and may still expand. 
Unquestionably, however, the provision requires affirmative steps above and beyond 
merely avoiding the activities proscribed by § 3604 and § 3605. Case law has illuminated 
some of these requirements.   
First, and minimally, government agencies must analyze the impact of new 
housing on racial concentration. This obligation was most thoroughly discussed in the 
foundational case Shannon v. HUD, cited at length in the new HUD rule.16  According to 
Shannon and its progeny, § 3608 does not merely prevent government agencies from 
building low-income housing in areas of minority concentration, which would already be 
unlawful under § 3604(a)’s perpetuation-of-segregation cause of action. It also obligates 
governments to undertake the analysis required to demonstrate that they are not creating 
segregation, in advance of the siting of low-income housing. In other words, while § 
3604 disallows certain discriminatory outcomes, § 3608 places on public agencies an 
additional requirement that they use particular methods. In one notable case, HUD was 
found to have violated § 3608 for administering grants to the City of Boston without 
ensuring that the grants were not creating discriminatory effects – even though 
subsequent analysis showed that no discrimination was occurring.17 Governments are not 
permitted to “fly blind”, so to speak, when it comes to housing.  
 Another consequence of § 3608 is that local agencies with discriminatory 
practices, or whose practices create a discriminatory effect, can potentially be stripped of 
their federal housing funds by HUD. In the past, private plaintiffs have successfully 
sought relief from HUD through fair housing complaints directed at local and state 
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governments.18 And under § 3608(e)(5), a claim can be brought against HUD itself “if it 
is aware of a grantee’s discriminatory practices but has made no efforts to force it to 
comply with the Fair Housing Act by cutting off existing federal financial assistance.”19 
This standard can place many tens of millions of dollars in local funding at risk, even in 
cases where a local entity is not itself subject to lawsuit or discrimination claim.   
Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act 
As acknowledged by the proposed Plan, the Met Council is obligated by MLUPA, 
which created the Council and governs its activities, to help communities coordinate their 
housing efforts. The Act requires local governments to adopt regional “fair share” 
housing requirements and means of enforcing those requirements: comprehensive plans 
must incorporate “a housing implementation program . . . which will provide sufficient 
existing and new housing to meet the local unit’s share of the metropolitan area need for 
low and moderate income housing.”20 The law envisions for the Met Council a key 
coordinating role in this process: the Act requires it to “prepare and adopt guidelines and 
procedures . . . which provide assistance to local governmental units” in fulfilling the fair 
share provisions.21 As a result, the Met Council is not only subject to § 3604’s duty to not 
perpetuate segregation, and § 3608’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing, but, 
through state law, a duty to implement a true fair share system which pursues an even 
distribution of housing among local units of government. 
III.    The Plan’s Discussion of Concentrations of Poverty and Racial Segregation 
The Plan does not shy away from identifying many disparities sufficient to trigger 
these legal obligations, discussing at length the problems that plague housing in the Twin 
Cities. In a discussion of concentrations of poverty and racial concentrations of poverty, 
it bluntly acknowledges that “[l]iving in areas of concentrated poverty hurts people in 
many ways,” and alluding to the high crime, underperforming schools, poor health, and 
lack of economic mobility that plague residents of these regions.22 A later section 
cogently lays out the ways which concentrated poverty can self-perpetuate:  
The social and supportive services that often arise to address the problems 
of the community (jobs programs, public assistance offices, supportive 
housing) only strengthen the perception that investment is a losing 
proposition. Thus a destructive cycle perpetuates. Public and non-profit 
investments—in both development and services—become concentrated in 
neighborhoods where the need now exists. Market-rate investment in 
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neighborhoods with concentrations of low-income households becomes 
risky for both the private and public sectors.23 
Admirably, the Plan also recognizes the importance of housing choice. For 
instance, on page 28, it states that “perhaps above all, people need real choice in 
determining where, in what style, and with what amenities both inside and out their home 
might be.”24 It continues in the same vein, stating that “[a] region with truly viable 
housing choice is one that allows households to secure housing affordable to them, in 
communities where they would like to live . . .”25 On page 10, it explicitly connects 
housing choice and segregation, noting that “[b]arriers that limit residential choices – 
such as racial discrimination and a lack of affordable housing in a variety of locations – 
hinder the ability of residents to move out of areas of concentrated poverty and contribute 
to the creation of Racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty.”26 Behind the cautious policy 
language is a straightforward idea: because there isn’t enough affordable housing in 
desirable neighborhoods, the Twin Cities are becoming more segregated. 
The Plan admits that excessive alarm over gentrification is an obstacle to an 
equitable housing distribution. Although it does briefly fret over the possibility of 
distressed neighborhoods receiving too much investment – “improvements to an 
impoverished neighborhood, such as transit investment, may inflate the cost of housing 
and displace residents . . . just as conditions are improving” – it also concedes that, in 
some cases, “[t]he scale of these concerns may be only resident perceptions.”27 
Ultimately, the Plan seems to assert that fear of gentrification primarily serves as an 
obstacle to housing equity: “[l]ow-income neighborhoods may be as wary of market-rate 
development as so-called higher-income neighborhoods are of affordable housing.”28 The 
discussion concludes by prescribing more housing to higher-income regions, and more 
private investment to low-income neighborhoods: “[i]n addition to attracting a mix of 
investment to Areas of Concentrated Poverty, creating a more equitable region requires 
simultaneously increasing housing choices for low- and moderate-income households 
outside of Areas of Concentrated Poverty.”29  
Finally, on page 44, the Plan briefly discusses the well-known interaction of 
housing and education. The language in this section is needlessly timid. For instance, 
rather than provide readily-available statistics on school performance and poverty, it only 
notes that “[a]reas of concentrated poverty have – or are believed to have – poorer 
performing schools.”30 But ultimately, the Plan does identify the corrosive downward 
spiral that can bind together poverty and education:  
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Children living in neighborhoods with concentrated poverty may be less 
prepared for school and may receive an education inferior to children in 
neighborhoods with less poverty, limiting their ability to stop the cycle of 
poverty. Families with enough income to live where they choose are less 
likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty, in part due to expectations 
that schools elsewhere are better.31  
Notably absent from these passages is any substantive discussion of intentional 
discrimination. However, while intentional discrimination undoubtedly occurs in the 
Twin Cities housing market, it is not a necessary precursor to any of the legal obligations 
faced by the Council. 
Throughout Part II, the Plan assigns the Council a concrete – if nonspecific and 
sometimes noncommittal – set of roles in response to the maldistribution of housing and 
opportunity. It envisions direct investment in affordable housing in higher-income areas 
(e.g., “[s]trategically invest Council resources to assist community efforts to increase . . . 
housing types and costs [and] create and preserve mixed-income neighborhoods,” 
“[i]nvest in and encourage new affordable housing in higher-income areas of the 
region”32). It also anticipates close work in collaboration with local municipalities to 
expand affordable housing options, “especially in areas underserved by affordable 
housing and to house extremely-low-income households earning less than 30% of the 
area media income.”  
These broad recommendations, however, are not reflected in the Plan’s more 
specific policy initiatives. 
IV. Critique of Proposed Council Policies 
Starting on page 49, the Plan discusses a so-called “triumvirate” of quantitative 
affordable housing measures, which “inform the regional understanding of affordable 
housing needs.” While there is much benefit in adopting quantitative measures of housing 
progress, and using such measures to award funding, each of the proposed measures is 
severely flawed in design or implementation. 
Housing Need Allocations 
 The Council’s first measure, the Allocation of Housing Need, is derived from its 
obligations under MLUPA, which require that local units of governments design a 
housing implementation program to “provide sufficient existing and new housing to meet 
the local unit’s share of the metropolitan area need for low and moderate income 
housing.”33 MLUPA also requires the Met Council to coordinate local activity in this 
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regard.34 The Housing Policy Plan recognizes that these provisions of MLUPA require a 
“fair share” approach to housing. 
 In the past, the council has assigned each municipality a base “fair share” target 
arising out of projected growth, and then adjusted that figure on the basis of three factors: 
the regional distribution of low-wage jobs and workers, transit access, and the availability 
of existing affordable housing in a municipality. The Plan proposes using the same three 
adjustment factors, and recent materials distributed to the Needs Allocation Subgroup of 
the Housing Policy Plan – the workgroup formed to advise the Council on its fair share 
calculations for 2020-2030 – outline a similar overall approach for the new plan. All of 
the proposed methods continue to calculate local “fair share” based on the Council’s 
growth projections for the period. Proposed adjustments to a basic fair share target 
included: 
• Adjusting the fair share proportionately with the ratio of low-wages jobs within five 
miles of the town’s centroid and low-wage workers within five miles. For instance, if this 
ratio is 1.2, the fair share allocation would be increased by 20 percent. 
• Increasing the fair share by 20 percent in municipalities in the two highest categories of a 
four-level measure of transit access and decreasing it by 20 percent in areas in the lowest-
access category. 
• Adjusting the fair share for existing affordable housing in one of two ways: 
o Proportional adjustments based on the difference between the locality’s current 
share of affordable housing and the regional average.   
o Lowering the localities target to 10 percent of projected growth if the local share 
of affordable housing is higher than the 2030 regional target. However, IMO 
simulations show that this method would not produce region-wide fair targets 
anywhere close to the calculated need of 54,600. It will therefore not be a factor 
in the following discussion. 
Although this process is incomplete, a number of fundamental problems unite all 
the methods under discussion. 
Housing Need Allocations: Growth Share 
First, the proposed methodologies all rely on the Council’s household growth 
projections. This procedure creates a serious risk of artificially inflated targets in the 
central cities and inner suburbs while reducing them in middle and outer suburbs. 
Historically, the Council’s growth projections have always overstated expected growth in 
core areas. There is significant institutional pressure to project growth in the core of the 
                                                 
34
 Minn. Stat. 473.854. 
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region, as it is politically unpalatable to forecast stable or declining population in the core 
of the region, where the Council’s policies are often designed to enhance growth.  
The effects of this can be clearly seen in Maps 1 and 2, below.35 These maps 
compare earlier Council forecasts for the years 2000 and 2010 to actual population 
growth over the same periods. In both maps, core areas grew consistently less than 
predicted, while the outer suburbs received more growth than expected. There is no 
reason to assume that current projections will not suffer from the same biases.36 Whatever 
else might be drawn from this, it is important that the Council’s housing policy not be 
based on faulty indicators. 
Second, even if the Council’s growth projections were reliable, the use of 
projected growth in this manner is problematic. MLUPA requires each community in the 
metropolitan area to contribute “the local unit’s share” of affordable housing; the Council 
itself reads this as a “fair share” obligation.37 However, relying on growth to set the base 
share can potentially insulate communities with stable population growth from any need 
to contribute additional affordable housing, regardless of whether low- and moderate-












                                                 
35
 These maps are replicated from MYRON ORFIELD AND TOM LUCE, REGION: PLANNING THE FUTURE OF 
THE TWIN CITIES (2010). 
36
 Despite the fact that the central cities (especially Minneapolis) have had many housing starts/permits in 
recent years, the most recent data show the old growth pattern re-emerging (as people adjust to higher gas 
prices, the economy recovers, and the financial/foreclosure crisis eases in the outer suburbs). 
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Regional Value:  -8.5%
Legend
-80.0 (19)
-36.4 to 16.5% (40)
-15.5 to -1.1% (46)
0.0 to 24.3% (37)
26.9 to 90.8% (31)
95.2% or more (14)
to 38.1%
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Map 1: Percentage Difference Between theActual Population in 2000 and the 2000 Forecasted Population from 1975

























































































































































































































Regional Value:  -2.5%
Legend
-65.7 (19)
-15.0 to -5.0% (41)
-4.6 to -0.5% (34)
0.0 to 5.9% (38)
6.0 to 17.5% (38)
18.1% or more (18)
to -16.7%
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Map 2: Percentage Difference Between the2005 Population Estimate and the 2005 Forecasted Population from 2000
Data Source:  Metropolitan Council.
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Housing Need Allocations: Existing Affordable Housing 
 The way that the proposed methods adjust for existing affordable housing stocks 
is also seriously flawed. The targets are given in absolute numbers of housing units, and 
surpluses or shortfalls in affordable housing are also calculated in numbers of housing 
units.38 However, under the current method, adjustments to the base share for the existing 
affordable housing factor are proportional, not absolute.39 In other words, a community 
with a 20 percent oversupply of housing has its base share adjusted downwards by 20 
percent. This is mathematically nonsensical, especially since the adjustment is applied to 
the growth share, not the community’s overall housing. There is simply no reason to 
expect that an area that has over- or under-provided affordable housing by a certain 
proportion in the past can be restored to its fair share by over- or under-providing that 
same proportion of new affordable housing growth. Proportional adjustments – increasing 
or decreasing a fair share target by a percentage – also guarantee that all places will be 
required to add affordable housing even if they already have much greater affordable 
housing shares than other parts of the region – indeed, even if their existing housing stock 
is already 100 percent affordable. This directly contradicts MLUPA’s description of local 
fair share obligations, which explicitly allows for communities to meet their obligation by 
“providing sufficient existing or new housing.”40  
 For instance, using the Met Council’s estimate of the percentage of current 
housing (inside the MUSA) affordable at 80 percent or less of regional median income 
(53 percent according to Council data used to support the Subgroup), Minneapolis had 
15,296 more affordable units in 2010 than its “fair share” of 53 percent. Using the current 
methodology, however, Minneapolis’s affordable need allocation is still approximately 
10,700 units from 2020 to 2030 – or 82 percent of total projected growth. What sense 
would it make to require Minneapolis to build more affordable housing in future years, 
given that the model already acknowledges that the city’s current share of affordable 
housing exceeds the regional average by an even larger number of units?  St. Paul and 
many inner suburbs are in similar situations.  
This flaw is particularly egregious because a fairer and more intuitive method is 
easily available. Instead of using a proportional approach, the Plan should use absolute 
figures. Surpluses (or shortages) of affordable units should simply be subtracted from (or 
added to) fair share targets.41   
Maps 3 and 4 demonstrate the enormous practical implications of this flaw. They 
show how fair share obligations would be distributed around the region using a 
proportional affordable housing adjustment (Map 3) versus an adjustment that adds or 
subtracts units (Map 4). A city’s fair share obligation was capped at 65 percent of 
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 Minn. Stat. 473.859 subd. 4 (emphasis added). 
41
 Low-wage jobs and workers and transit access are measured in fundamentally different units than 
housing counts, so it is reasonable to use proportional adjustments in those cases. 
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projected growth in both simulations, an adjustment suggested in materials submitted to 
the Needs Allocation Subgroup. 
Both of the calculations underlying the maps make proportional adjustments for 
low-wage workers and jobs and transit access like those used in the past (and outlined in 
materials distributed by Met Council staff to the Subgroup).42  Map 3 shows each city’s 
fair share as a percentage of projected growth, if fair shares were increased or decreased 
by the percentage that the place’s current affordable housing rate differs from the 
regional average. For instance, in this case the number of additional affordable units 
required of Minneapolis would be reduced by 9.2 percent because its current affordable 
housing share is estimated to be 62.2 percent and the regional average is 53 percent. 
Map 4 shows each city’s fair share as a percentage of projected growth, if current 
shortages or surpluses are added or subtracted to need allocations in absolute numbers, 
after adjusting for low wage jobs/workers and transit. 
The differences between the two methods are dramatic. Fair share obligations are 
concentrated in the central cities, inner suburbs and a few middle suburbs west of 
Minneapolis using the proportional adjustment (Map 3). Using this method, Minneapolis 
and almost all inner suburbs would be at the maximum percentage fair share (65 percent 
of projected growth in housing units) while most middle and outer suburbs would have 
much lower obligations. In this scenario, Minneapolis would be expected to add 8,515 
new affordable units during the decade out of total growth of 13,100 units – the 65 
percent maximum. Many inner ring suburbs that already have greater than average 
affordable housing shares – such as Richfield, Hopkins, and West St. Paul – are also at 
the cap. At the same time, many relatively affluent middle and outer suburbs get 
relatively low fair shares – like Apple Valley where the fair share would be only 26 
percent of projected growth (whether capped or not). 
Map 4 shows the results of the alternative affordable housing adjustment. A band 
of areas along the I-94 corridor with large current surpluses of affordable housing, from 
Oakdale to Anoka, show much lower obligations, while higher-income middle and outer 
suburbs with little affordable housing show larger fair share targets. 
Overall, the fair share targets in Map 4 correlate much more strongly (negatively) 
with current affordable housing distributions.43  In other words, the proportional method 
used in the first simulation (Map 3) would further concentrate poverty in the central cities 
and some inner suburbs while the additive method (Map 4) would help to spread low-
income households more evenly across the region. 
                                                 
42
 Each method produces a regional total of fair share obligations reasonably close to the estimated need of 
54,600. The proportional adjustment runs produces regional totals of about 65,500 units (uncapped) and 
57,000 units while the additive adjustment models give totals of about 62,000 and 45,100. The formulas 
could be easily fine-tuned to produce the exact amount needed. 
43
 The correlation between the fair share percentages in Map 3 and current affordable housing percentages 
is -.34 while it is -.84 for the percentages in Map 4. 
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The Map 4 distributions would also be much more likely to direct new affordable 
housing to areas near higher-performing schools. The percentages in Map 4 are strongly 
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 The correlation coefficients are +.55 for the Map 4 percentages and -.01 for the Map 3 percentages. Local 
school performance scores were drawn from the data in Metropolitan Council, Choice, Place and 
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IMO calculation using data from the Metropolitan Council.
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Housing Need Allocations: Affordability Threshold 
 The current Housing Need Allocation uses a single affordability threshold, at 60 
percent of Area Median Income (AMI).45 The Plan states that the 2020-2030 Need 
Allocation will use an upper threshold of 80 percent of AMI, an annual income of 
$63,900.46 It also says the allocation will be broken into three bands, at 30 percent, 50 
percent, and 80 percent of AMI.47  
 At present, however, the materials provided by the Need Allocation Subgroup do 
not indicate that the banding has been applied. The Plan’s proposed income banding is an 
important and laudable addition to the Need Allocations; it is essential that the Council 
follow through with the Plan’s instructions in this regard. MLUPA requires local units to 
provide their fair share of low- and moderate-income housing; a single income band 
cannot simultaneously capture both categories, particularly when the band is as high as 
80 percent of AMI.  
Goals for Affordable and Lifecycle Housing 
 The second measure of the “triumvirate” is negotiated affordable and lifecycle 
housing goals. The goals are a statutorily mandated component of the Livable 
Communities Act of 1995 (LCA). As the goals are individually negotiated with 
participating cities, the Plan does not include specific instructions for determining a city’s 
goal. However, in the past, the negotiated goals have exhibited extremely worrying 
trends. 
 These trends can be seen in Maps 5, 6, 7, and 8. Map 5 shows LCA Goals for the 
period of 1996 to 2010. Map 6 shows LCA Goals in the most recent period, 2011 to 
2020. Comparing Maps 5 and 6 immediately reveals a pattern: the suburban goals 
dropped significantly between the two periods, while the goals of the central cities 
increased. Map 7 shows the progress each community made towards its goals in the first 
period. Map 8 shows the progress each community made towards it rental housing goal 
in the first period. The two central cities both met rental housing goals, with Minneapolis 
only failing to provide the owner-occupied housing it had promised. Meanwhile, many of 
the suburban goals were missed by 80 percent or more. 
 As the Plan acknowledges, the Housing Need Allocations are the base for 
negotiating LCA Goals, after which adjustments are made for other factors, including, 
ostensibly, concentrations of poverty.48 However, only two communities in the entire 
metropolitan area maintain goals of 100 percent of their Need Allocation – Minneapolis 
and Saint Paul. The vast majority of participating communities have had their goals 
adjusted downwards from the Need Allocation by 30 percent or more. 
                                                 
45
 See Metropolitan Council, Allocation of Housing Needs 2010-2020. 
46




 Id. at 52. 
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 These maps and figures suggest that the LCA Goals have been misused by the 
Council. The Goals are part of a larger scheme wherein cities are incentivized to develop 
affordable housing, in order to maintain their eligibility for LCA funding. However, 
when cities have failed to meet their commitments, the Council has appeared to respond 
by reducing their commitments. By contrast, the cities that met their commitments were 
only rewarded with increased future goals. This undermines the incentives envisioned by 
the LCA, and, from a fair housing perspective, is simply backwards. Furthermore, the 
Council’s supposed willingness to account for concentrations of poverty is undermined 
by the fact that the two central cities, with the most severe concentrations of poverty, 
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Map 5:  MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONAffordable Housing Goals for the Livable Communities Act, 1996-2010
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Map 6:  MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONAffordable Housing Goals for the Livable Communities Act, 2011 to 2020
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Map 7:  MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONAffordable Housing Production and Shortfall from LCA Goals, 1996-2010
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Map 8:  MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONAffordable Rental Housing Production and Shortfall from LCA Goals, 1996-2010
Legend
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Housing Performance Scores 
The third measure in the “triumvirate” is the Housing Performance Scores, a 
system in which the availability of funding is dependent upon an annual score, generated 
using quantitative measures of housing progress. This system is already used by the 
Council with regards to LCA funding, although the Plan suggests that it may be extended 
to additional sources of funding. The Plan also suggests the score criteria may be revised.  
The scoring criteria (both current and proposed) heavily emphasize preexisting 
affordable housing and recent progress towards creating affordable housing.49 The 
ultimate effect of this system is to give the highest priority scores to municipalities which 
already contain heavy concentrations of housing – and frequently, high concentrations of 
poverty and segregation. In 2013, the two highest-ranked communities, with scores of 98 
and 97 out of 100, respectively, were Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Of the 179 additional 
communities also ranked, most of the diverse inner-ranked suburbs fell in the first 
quartile, while larger white suburbs like Wayzata, Stillwater, or Golden Valley frequently 
fell in the second quartile or below.50 There is a very strong statistical correlation between 
a city’s Housing Performance Score and nonwhite population – stronger than the 
correlation between a city’s score and poverty rate, or a city’s score and population.51 
The Housing Performance Scores have great potential to reduce concentrations of 
poverty and promote fair housing. They appear to be a vestige of the Council’s Policy 39, 
which was created in 1985 by the Council’s previous housing policy plan.52 Policy 39 
required the agency to “use its review authority to recommend funding priorities for 
communities based on their housing performance,” and in particular, to provide or 
withhold state and federal funding to communities on the basis of their efforts to provide 
low- and moderate-income housing.53 
However, the Housing Performance Scores in their current iteration do not 
replicate Policy 39’s carrot-and-stick approach. Instead, the current approach effectively 
removes the stick, and as a consequence, the Performance Scores are likely to worsen the 
problems Policy 39 sought to ameliorate. This is because, rather than being used to help 
prioritize all funding, the scores are only used to prioritize a limited selection of LCA 
funding, much of which is used to conduct affordable development. (For instance, 
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 Housing Policy Plan 53-54. 
50
 Metropolitan Council, Housing Performance Scores 2013, available at 
http://www.metrocouncil.org/getattachment/20eb2650-9d34-4773-a27d-14d0114a07c0/.aspx. 
51
 The correlation for nonwhite population was +.62 in 2012 and 2013. For poverty rate, the figures are 
+.32 and +.31, respectively. For population, the correlations are +.54 and +.56. However, a multivariate 
regression run with all three factors confirms that racial composition is the most important of the three, as 
poverty loses its statistical significance altogether, and population, while remaining statistically significant, 
accounts for less than a 1-point swing in most cities. By contrast, each additional percentage of nonwhite 
population in a city tends to increase its Performance Score by over one point. 
52




between 2011 and 2013, LCA funds contributed to the construction 4,338 affordable 
units within the metropolitan area.)54 
As a result, rather than facing a financial incentive to think and plan integratively, 
communities resistant to change are under little pressure to alter their policies. The cost 
of maintaining economically or racially segregated living patterns is reduced access to 
Council funds for affordable housing – funds segregated communities never wanted in 
the first place. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the central cities and racially 
transitioning suburbs, where nonprofit developers and housing agencies have 
concentrated most of the region’s subsidized housing stock, are heavily prioritized for 
Council funding.  
To ensure the Performance Scores reduce, rather than exacerbate, the region’s 
disparities, the Plan must apply them to a wider range of funding, including funding for 
non-housing metropolitan systems. 
Education and Concentrations of Poverty 
 Despite identifying, in an earlier section, the manner in which concentrated 
poverty can diminish school performance and, in a vicious cycle, further accelerate the 
concentration of poverty, Part III of the Plan contains no substantive mention of 
education whatsoever.55 Indeed, the role assigned to the Council in that earlier section 
suggests that it would rather wash its hands of the matter entirely. Rather than take any 
direct action itself, it only promises to bring together other groups for unspecified 
“collaboration” and “empowerment,” agreeing to “[c]onvene housing policy 
stakeholders,” “[e]xplore how to empower school districts to more effectively comment 
on local comprehensive plans,” and “[e]ncourage school district planners and local 
planners to communicate and collaborate.”56 This omission is unacceptable and could 
potentially undermine the Council’s other efforts. 
 Economically and racially integrative housing could dramatically transform the 
region’s schools, partially eliminating the low-performing, segregated schools which tend 
to confound attempts to equitably allocate housing. The Institute on Metropolitan 
Opportunity has run a simulation of the racial make-up of the region’s schools, after more 
evenly distributing housing subsidies across the region.57 The simulation shows that if 
Section 8 voucher usage was distributed evenly across the region and the distribution of 
households was race-neutral, a total of 5,531 nonwhite students currently in 
predominantly nonwhite schools would instead be attending a racially balanced school. 
Adding the effects of equalizing the distribution of LIHTC and Section 8 project-based 
units increases the total number of nonwhite students in racially balanced schools to 
9,729.  
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 Housing Policy Plan 55. 
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 This simulation will be described in greater detail in an upcoming report. Institute on Metropolitan 
Opportunity, Why Are the Twin Cities So Segregated? (forthcoming 2014). 
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 This represents a very substantial share of the total number of student moves that 
would be needed to completely eliminate racially segregated schools (predominantly 
white as well as predominantly nonwhite) in the region. In fact, it represents between 
two-third and four-fifths of the number of students who would need to change schools to 
reach that objective.   
 The Council already plays an important role in the administration of the region’s 
schools. According to MLUPA, the Met Council “shall adopt a development guide” that 
“will encompass the physical, social and economic needs of the metropolitan area and 
those future developments which will have an impact on the entire area” including “the 
location of schools.”58 The Council’s authority to coordinate land use in metropolitan area 
municipalities extends to education: MLUPA requires that local government unit’s 
comprehensive plans, subject to review by the Council, shall contain a statement on “the 
effect of the plan on affected school districts,” and that these comprehensive plans must 
be submitted to the affected school district for review and comment six months prior to 
their submission to the Council.59   Additionally, it suggests that these comprehensive 
plans contain an intergovernmental coordination process for cooperation with school 
districts generally and the siting of public schools in particular.60   
MLUPA also states that for purposes of the statute “local government unit” means 
“school district,” and the Met Council is required to provide notice of rule changes and 
related hearings to all school districts in the metropolitan area.61  The law further requires 
the Council to “construct an inventory” of all schools in the metropolitan area and the 
unused space within each school; it may then submit comments to the commissioner of 
education on any school district facility that is proposed in the metropolitan area.62 
 Given its considerable statutory authority over the subject, and the interwoven 
nature of housing and education, it cannot ignore the Plan’s effects on schools – 
particularly because educational trends will, in turn, affect the Council’s housing policy. 
Ironically, the Plan itself notes the importance of a forthright discussion of the 
interactions of land use and education: “Often these situations involve discussions that 
are extremely sensitive; acknowledging the relationship between land use and school 
districts up front can minimize the potential controversy.”63 The Council must take its 
own advice, and rather than glossing over education as component of housing policy, 
incorporate it fully into the Plan.   
Transit-Oriented Development 
 While the Plan implicitly downplays the importance of education, it seems to 
consider transit a primary – if not the primary – consideration in the siting of housing. It 
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 Minn. Stat. 473.145 (emphasis added). 
59
 Minn. Stat. 473.858 (2); Minn. Stat. 473.859 (1). 
60
 Minn. Stat. 473.858 (2). 
61
 Minn. Stat. 473.121 (6); Minn Stat. 473.852 (11); Minn. Stat. 473.174 (5). 
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 Minn. Stat. 473.23 (1). 
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 Housing Policy Plan 44. 
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commits to “focus[ing] housing around emerging transit investments,” and envisions a 
Council role with a large number of well-specified responsibilities.64 The Plan describes 
the Council’s intention to “[p]rovide technical assistance for station area planning,” 
“[d]efine density expectations for new housing and mixed-used development and 
redevelopment around transit stations,” “[p]romote transit-oriented development,” and 
“[d]evelop guidance based on existing best practices, to aid local cities . . . in the 
identification of high opportunity sites, districts, or areas.”65 Where the Council only 
expressed a limp willingness to play a secondary role in the field of housing and 
education, it enthusiastically commits to integrating housing policy and transportation 
policy. 
In Part III, the Plan discusses the importance of transit-oriented development 
(TOD), and expresses a desire to maintain the affordability of housing near “transitways 
and high-frequency bus routes.”66 While transit undoubtedly plays a role in the region’s 
future housing distribution, the Plan fails to acknowledge the potentially harmful effects 
of concentrating affordable housing on transit lines. Many of the region’s transit lines in 
the region are situated in the urban core, particularly in the central cities of Minneapolis 
and Saint Paul. These same areas often suffer from concentrations of poverty and 
segregation. As a result, the desire to build affordable housing on transitways must be 
tempered with policies designed to avoid creating or worsening existing housing 
disparities. 
 The problem is particularly severe with regards to the high-frequency (e.g., LRT 
and BRT) lines that are the focus of most transit-oriented policies. Map 9, below, shows 
the geographic extent of existing high-frequency lines within the region. The network is 
entirely situated within the center of the region; only one route, the 515 bus line, does not 
primarily serve Minneapolis and Saint Paul. (It instead primarily serves Richfield, a 
rapidly segregating first-ring suburb.) As Chart 1 illustrates, high-frequency station stops 
tend to be much more nonwhite than the region as a whole. But the problem grows even 
worse when housing, transit, and schools are all considered together. As can been seen in 
Chart 2, over 90 percent of elementary school areas at high-frequency station stops have 
large nonwhite populations; housing sited at these stops is much more likely to be within 
a segregated school area than housing elsewhere.   
 TOD is not necessarily incompatible with fair housing. Transitways frequently 
pass through high-income as well as low-income areas. But without proactive efforts to 
ensure that affordable development is well-sited, affordable TOD is often located in low-
income neighborhoods, where it generates the least political resistance. In these cases, the 
benefits of TOD are sometimes used as justification for problematic outcomes. TOD 
must coexist with integrative fair housing policies; it cannot be allowed to trump them.  
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The Plan does not exhibit any awareness of the complexities of this issue. It 















































































































































































































































Mounds ViewNew BrightonNorth Saint PaulPine SpringsRobinsdaleSaint AnthonySaint BonifaciusSunfish LakeSpring Lake ParkSpring ParkSouth Saint PaulShoreviewShorewoodTonka BayVadnais HeightsWoodlandWhite Bear LakeWest Saint Paul
------------------
Arden HillsBrooklyn CenterBirchwood VillageColumbia HeightsDeephavenExcelsiorFalcon HeightsGreenwoodGem LakeGray Cloud IslandLittle CanadaLauderdaleLexingtonLilydaleMahtomediMinnetonka BeachMendotaMedicine Lake
AHBCBVCHDpExFHGGLGCILCLdLxLyMahMBMndtML
------------------






Review of Local Comprehensive Plans 
 Under MLUPA, the Council is required to review local comprehensive plans for 
conformity with its own systems plans, compatibility with other communities, and 
consistency with Council policies.67 The Plan accurately recognizes that this review must 
include a review of the local units’ “fair share” low- and moderate-income housing 
obligations and implementation plan.68 This review, however, must be strengthened if the 
Council is to fulfill its statutory role as regional coordinator. 
 The review of local comprehensive plans may be the most fundamental of the 
Council’s many powers. MLUPA imposes on imposes on municipalities a number of 
requirements and responsibilities, including the aforementioned “fair share” requirement. 
But as the Minnesota legislature recognizes in the preamble of the statute’s Land Use 
Planning subsection, “local governmental units within the metropolitan area are 
interdependent . . . [and] developments in one local governmental unit may affect the 
provision of regional capital improvements.”69  In the statute’s own words, “there is a 
need for the adoption of coordinated plans, programs and controls by all local 
governmental units in order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of 
the metropolitan area and to ensure coordinated, orderly, and economic development.”70  
The statute seeks to address this need by creating a regional authority – the Council – 
tasked with aligning local development activity.  
 As the preamble suggests, the coordination of local comprehensive plans, in order 
to ensure that each city can meet its MLUPA obligations, is perhaps the Council’s 
primary responsibility. It is therefore extremely problematic that the Plan does not 
include any specific measures to ensure that plans are compatible with each other or 
consistent with Council policies. Instead, the only Council actions recommended by the 
Plan are “[w]ork[ing] with local governments and other appropriate stakeholders . . . to 
determine how to more effectively review . . . local comprehensive plans” and then 
“[i]ncorporate [the] new review criteria into . . . the Local Planning Handbook.”71 
Whatever criteria the review uses, it is meaningless unless the Council is willing to take 
action upon finding that a local unit’s comprehensive plan is incompatible with the 
policies of other communities or of the Council itself. As MLUPA requires, or at the very 
least, allows that Council policy plans be incorporated into systems plans to the extent 
they are rationally related, actions could include the direct revision of the comprehensive 
plan as “having a substantial impact on . . . a metropolitan systems plan.” 72 Alternatively, 
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 Housing Policy Plan 58. 
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the Council could withhold financial support from the local government in question, a 
practice it has adopted in the past.73      
Reduce Impediments to Fair Housing 
 The Plan contains a section discussing the expansive requirements of the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA), but downplays both the law’s reach and the Council’s own 
authority.74 Section 3608 of the FHA requires entities receiving housing funding from 
HUD and other federal agencies to “affirmatively further” fair housing.75 (In the years 
2012 and 2013, the Council received $58,300,363 and $57,705,185 from HUD, 
respectively.) As previously discussed, there is a great deal of legal precedent on the 
applicability of § 3608 and HUD has released a draft rule clarifying the requirements of 
the provision. 
 The Plan, however, does not even mention § 3608, and dismisses the HUD rule, 
stating that it is “facing political challenges in the U.S. House of Representatives.”76 This 
is legally unsupportable, and appears to be premised on a bizarre constitutional theory of 
unicameral executive power. The obligations of § 3608 are enshrined in federal law and 
exist regardless of HUD guidance or “political challenges.” Moreover, the agency’s 
interpretation of the rule is binding, despite political opposition in one house of Congress. 
The only means through which Congress can alter the requirements of the FHA, and 
HUD’s interpretations of those requirements, is to pass a bill with the approval of both 
houses of Congress and the President. Any other interpretation would violate the 
Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.77 
 The Plan further dodges the issue by stating that “[t]he Council and the Council’s 
Housing Policy Plan have a role to play in the larger regional fair housing conversation 
but lack the authority to tackle this issue alone.”78 It goes on to assign the Council a role 
characterized by timid commitments: “[p]rovide financial support to regional research,” 
“[c]ollaborate in regional initiatives,” “[p]artner with HousingLink to connect renter 
households with opportunities,” “[r]ecognize local efforts to further Fair Housing.”79 The 
tone is dissembling: “[T]here is no clear agreement who is responsible for ending 
[discriminatory] practices.”80 The Plan does promise to “includ[e] Fair Housing elements 
in the Housing Performance Scores,” but as discussed above, this would accomplish little 
unless the scores themselves are put to broader use.81 The section concludes with 
minimalistic, noncommittal policy recommendations, centered around a vague promise of 
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further discussion: “The Council hopes to engage in a larger regional conversation to 
develop strategies, roles, and responsibilities to expand fair housing in the Twin Cities.”82 
 This passage, pitifully weak on its own, is nearly unbelievable when viewed in 
context of the rest of the Plan. The measures discussed above – the Housing Need 
Allocations, the LCA Goals, the Housing Performance Scores, and the ability to review 
comprehensive plans – together and separately represent powerful sources of authority to 
promote fair housing. Not only does the Council have the power to affirmatively further 
fair housing by leveraging these policy instruments, it is required to do so by federal law. 
After spending dozens of pages describing housing disparities in the metropolitan area 
and delineating its plans to promote its own housing priorities, the Council simply cannot 
credibly reverse course and claim to be powerless over the issue. While some fair 
housing problems – in particular, private market discrimination – may be out of the 
Council’s direct control, it has the resources to institute protective measures. And other 
fair housing problems – namely, the distribution and maldistribution of affordable and 
subsidized housing units – are in fact under the Council’s direct authority. 
 Without major revisions, the Plan’s cursory dismissal of fair housing almost 
certainly places it in direct violation of the FHA. 
V.  Eliminated Policies 
 The striking weakness of the Plan’s policy section is particularly conspicuous 
when compared to the strong policies the Plan formally abandons. The 1985 Housing 
Development Guide, which served as the Council’s previous housing policy, contained 
aggressive measures designed to combat segregation, reduce disparities, and promote fair 
housing. (Curiously, the new Plan claims that “Council actions in 1998 and 1999 
eliminated [the previous plan] from the metropolitan development guide,” but neither 
independent research nor multiple information requests have been able to identify the 
Council actions in question.83 The Council’s own response suggested that the policies 
were eliminated by implication through nonenforcement, apparently relying on a legal 
theory in which regulated entities can assume a law has simply evaporated if it goes 
unmentioned for a few years. None of this inspires much confidence that the Council will 
pursue its new Plan with vigor, especially because the new Plan is incomparably more 
vague.)  
The most noticeable absence is the previous policy’s strong enforcement power, 
which leveraged the Council’s role as funder of regional systems in order to promote 
better housing outcomes. This was contained in Policy 39, which states: 
In reviewing applications for funds the Metropolitan Council will 
recommend priority in  funding based on the local government’s current 
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provision of housing opportunities for people low and moderate incomes, 
and its plans and programs to provide such opportunities in the future.84  
The commentary to Policy 39 states: 
Many communities have demonstrated a commitment to expanding their 
supply of low income and modest cost housing. They take justifiable pride 
in their efforts to provide housing for their citizens and to help solve 
regional housing problems. To encourage and support such local efforts, 
the Council uses review authority to recommend funding priorities for 
communities based on their housing performance. The priorities reward 
communities that have provided a full range of housing opportunities. 
They also help communities compensate for any additional costs for 
services that might be incurred by subsidized lower income units. 
This policy applies to all local applications for state and federal funding. 
These funds include community development block grants, and 
transportation, parks open space and aging grants among others.85  
 This powerful policy, whose enforcement has long been ignored by the Council 
on dubious legal grounds, reveals the fundamental weakness of the current Housing 
Performance Scores and other ostensible attempts to promote a more equal distribution of 
housing. By applying the policy to all local applications for funding, Policy 39 created 
the strong incentives that are absent from the proposed Plan. Policy 39 also demonstrates 
how flimsy the Plan’s protestations about fair housing truly are – the Council does not 
lack the authority to affirmatively further fair housing, it only refuses to consider 
measures which had worked towards that end in the past. 
 In addition to Policy 39, the Housing Development Guide included Policy 19, 
which stated that “subsidized housing should not be excessively concentrated, or 
developed in inferior locations.”86 The commentary to this policy notes: 
Another problem with the concentration of assisted housing is that they 
increase the proportion of neighborhood residents who depend on public 
services, thereby undermining the market for retail businesses that help 
support neighborhood vitality.  Subsidized housing for families with 
children should be provided in scattered site single-family homes, 
townhouses, duplexes, or garden apartments.87 
In similar fashion, Policy 23 declared that “a major objective [in the central cities] should 
be to retain and attract individuals and families with middle and upper incomes to achieve 
a more balanced income distribution,” and “[s]ubsidized new construction should be used 
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only in economically integrated, scattered site or small-scale developments, and should 
be located in neighborhoods with limited amounts of lower income housing.”88 
These policies and their commentaries stand in stark contrast to the current Plan’s 
approach to same issue. While acknowledging the harms of concentrated poverty, it never 
once directly warns of the dangers of concentrated subsidized housing, despite the clear 
logical link between the two phenomena. Rather than adopting policies to avoid this 
problem, it proposes campaigns to encourage investors to keep an open mind about areas 
of concentrated poverty: “Public interventions should address educational opportunities, 
crime, and the quality of the housing stock as well as spread the message that many 
wonderful, desirable opportunities exist in these neighborhoods…”89  
 The Plan also abandons Policy 35, which gives priority to family housing and 
economic integration. It declares that “priority will be given to proposals designed to 
serve families and proposals to further economic integration.”90 Once again, 
concentration in low-income neighborhoods is attacked: “[D]evelopments [in] which the 
majority of units will be subsidized proposed in predominantly low-income 
neighborhoods are neighborhoods are strongly discouraged.”91 
 The Housing Development Guide included direct instructions to local 
governments to fight discrimination, such as in Policy 43, which stated: 
Local governments should adopt plans, policies and strategies for ensuring 
nondiscrimination in the sale and rental of housing in their communities. 
These should include affirmative marketing programs and relocation 
services in areas of low income minority concentration to broaden housing 
choice for people who have been discriminated against in the sale and 
rental housing.92 
 In Policy 44, it anticipated discriminatory lending and suggested a direct remedy: 
“[The Council will] monitor the Twin Cities home mortgage financing market [and if] 
adequate information for consumers about new mortgage types is not available, the 
Council will try to provide this information.”93 
The proposed Plan only mentions discrimination in passing, primarily in the 
previously discussed section on fair housing, which is devoted to explaining the 
Council’s lack of powers to address fair housing. In place of the previous strong 
instruction for cities to fight discrimination, the Plan now feebly suggests “financial 
support to regional research . . . to determine if discriminatory practices are occurring 
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and limiting housing choices.”94 Rather than laying out specific remedies in advance, the 
Council promises to “[c]ollaborate in regional initiatives to address . . . discriminatory 
practices.”95 The regional initiatives in question are left unspecified. 
VI.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons described above, the Housing Policy Plan is insufficient to meet 
the challenges it faces and in dire need of amendment. The Plan also suffers from a 
critical lack of focus – it appears to pursue every conceivable policy priority at once. It 
would benefit from cleaner and more comprehensible organizational structure, and a 
greater willingness to clearly set out priorities and specific policies that achieve them. 
 Its greatest defect, however, remains its unwillingness to reconsider policies that 
have failed in the past, even when faced with evidence of severe continuing problems in 
the Twin Cities housing market. Until it does, the Council will remain out of compliance 
with MLUPA and with the FHA, will be perpetuating segregation and failing to 
affirmatively further fair housing, and will be failing in its duty to make the Twin Cities a 
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Appendix V: IMO Comments on 2011 Minnesota 
Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice 
1 
M E M O R A N D U M 
To:   Gloria Stiehl 
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development 
 
From: Myron Orfield 
Executive Director, Institute on Race & Poverty, University of Minnesota Law School, 
Mondale Hall Room 150N, 229 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455 
  
Re: Comments on 2011 Minnesota Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice (Draft Report 
for Public Review, December 14, 2011) 
Date: December 31, 2011 
 
 These comments are intended to address the draft Analysis of Impediments (AI) in the context 
of the jurisdiction’s greater Consolidated Plan.  Given that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(the Fair Housing Act) and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, among others, 
require state and local governments to certify that they are affirmatively furthering fair housing, the 
validity of a Consolidated Plan is dependent on the validity of a substantively accurate AI.
1
 
 It is noteworthy that the draft AI was released on December 14, 2011, with a deadline of 
December 31, 2011.  Due to the unusually short deadline, concerned parties had only eleven (11) 
business days—interrupted by the holidays—to comment on this important document.  This brief 
comment period is insufficient and necessitates reopening the public comment period. 
 Although federal regulations do not explicitly require jurisdictions to follow the same formal 
public participation process for revising AIs as Consolidated Plans, HUD “does expect [a] jurisdiction 
to develop an AI that involves and addresses concerns of the entire community.” 2  Moreover, HUD 
“encourages State and Entitlement jurisdictions to follow the citizen participation and consultation 
procedures identified in Subpart B of the Consolidated Plan regulation for communicating with the 
public on [Fair Housing Planning].”3  Affirming that “communication with the general public is 
essential,” HUD also urges jurisdictions to “encourage the participation of diverse population groups 
and take steps to ensure that communications and activities are accessible to persons with disabilities.”4  
Unfortunately, the process employed in the development of the draft AI is noticeably inadequate. 
 For example, in its Citizen Participation Plan, Minnesota has committed to a minimum public 
comment period of 30 days for its Consolidated Plans, pursuant to federal regulations.
5
  It is therefore 
reasonable that Minnesota would also provide a minimum 30-day period for public comment on AIs. 
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Absent reopening the comment period, surrounding evidence suggests this draft AI process was 




1) The AI fails to collect and report data required by HUD regarding racial 
discrimination and racial segregation or to reference readily available current, 
relevant local studies on impediments to fair housing choice. 
2) The AI fails to identify the most obvious and significant impediments to fair housing 
choice, most notably: 
a. The abandonment of Met Council Policy 13/39, one of the nation’s most 
effective and pro-integrative regional fair housing systems, in favor of an  
uncoordinated series of racially segregative programs; 
b. The 1986 state creation of segregative central city sub-allocators of the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) which unnecessarily intensify segregation 
in housing and schools; 
c. A state Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) that incents racial segregation by 
awarding more points to racially segregative projects than racially integrated 
projects; 
d. Failure by relevant state agencies, including Minnesota Housing, the Met 
Council and the Minnesota Department of Education, to coordinate racial 
integration of housing and schools as authorized by the state legislature in 1994; 
and 
e. Active state support of a highly fragmented community housing development 
structure that only builds and advocates for affordable housing development in 
segregated neighborhoods 
 
3) Based on the foregoing, the draft AI, if submitted in its present form, would amount to 
a boilerplate or “false” certification to obtain federal funding.  
 
4) Recommendations 
a. The state must redraft the AI to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Fair 
Housing Act 
b. The state and its agencies in the metropolitan areas must return to an effective 
region-wide fair share housing policy. This policy must more clearly link 
housing choice and school choice to maximize the integrative impact of housing 
and school integration programs. 
c. The state should support the creation of a Regional Fair Housing Center 
 
 
II. The draft AI fails to report on the rapid increase in the racial segregation of local 
public schools facilitated by the segregative placement of government-supported low-
income housing, and neglects to adequately discuss available data on mortgage lending 
discrimination and racial steering 
 
3 
a. Schools and Housing 
Under the Fair Housing Act, in areas of minority concentration, “color blindness is not 
permissible.”6  The “increase … of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and 
is thus prima facie at variance with the national housing policy.”7  The Fair Housing Act requires HUD 
and its grantees to consider the racial balance of schools attended by government-supported housing 
recipients.  The clear implication of this legal requirement is that stably racially integrated schools are a 
central component of fair housing policy.  In this light, HUD’s Fair Housing Equity Assessment Grant 
Applications require grant recipients, such as the Met Council’s Corridors of Opportunity Program, not 
only to monitor the racial balance of local schools but their academic performance as well.
8
 
On February 23, 2010, Secretary Shaun Donovan clarified HUD’s Fair Housing priorities before 
Congress, stating: 
[S]ustainability also means creating “geographies of opportunity,” places that effectively connect 
people to jobs, quality public schools, and other amenities.  Today, too many HUD-assisted 
families are stuck in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and segregation, where one's zip 
code predicts poor educational, employment, and even health outcomes.  These neighborhoods 




 Regrettably, the AI does not report or discuss the existing and readily available data regarding 
racial segregation, particularly rapidly growing racial segregation in public schools.   
For example, Orfield and Luce have collected and summarized the relevant data in chapter 3 of 
Region: Planning the Future of the Twin Cities (attached as an APPENDIX A).  The data was also 
published in a peer-reviewed book by the University of Minnesota Press in 2010.
10
  The Region chapter 
documents the intertwined growth of segregated schools and neighborhoods and the abandonment of 
the enforcement of progressive pro-integrative law at all levels of state government. It also clearly 
documents the segregative placement of all forms of government-supported low-income housing and its 
segregative effect on schools and neighborhoods. The chapter and all of its recommendations are 
included by reference in this comment.  
 
Although much of the data in the chapter is from the mid-2000s, the subsequent patterns have 
been consistent with the trends highlighted in the book.  In particular, the number of non-white 
segregated schools in the region continues to climb, and the distribution of housing from low-income 
housing programs (LIHTC and Section 8) largely remains the same. 
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According to Minnesota Department of Education data, the number of elementary schools in the 
region with very high non-white student percentages (above 80 percent) went from 11 percent in 1995 
to 55 percent in 2002.  Since 2002, this number has increased further to 83 percent.  Put another way, 
the number of non-white students in highly segregated schools increased dramatically from just 3,419 
in 1995 (or 8 percent of all students of color in the region) to 20,074 in 2002 (32 percent) and 31,535 in 
2010 (36 percent). 
 
Despite the State of Minnesota’s clear fair housing obligations, state fair share law, and a record 
of pro-integrative location decisions in earlier years, only 17 percent of subsidized units were located in 
a pro-integrative manner.  Eighty-three percent of units were located in a way that contributed to 
segregation or resegregation rather than promoting integration.  
 
Region reports that, in 2002, roughly 50 percent of LIHTC units and 55 percent of Section 8 
project units were located in the region’s two central cities. Although exact comparisons are not 
possible with the data available for later years, the percentage of LIHTC credits awarded to suburbs, 
measured in dollars rather than in units, hovered near 60 percent from 2005 to 2009 (Chart 1).
11
  Thus, 
the central cities with only a quarter of the region’s population and deeply racially segregated schools 





Moreover, subsidized housing units in the suburbs continue to be located primarily in areas 
where schools are predominantly non-white or resegregating.  Map 1 shows the location of elementary 
schools in the region, divided into three categories—predominantly white (schools with non-white 
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shares between 0 and 30 percent), integrated (non-white shares between 30 and 50 percent), and 
predominantly non-white (non-white shares greater than 50 percent).  The map also shows contours for 
the areas where schools of each category predominate.  In 2007, nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of all 
subsidized housing units in the region were inside the red contour where nearly all schools were 
predominantly non-white.  Only 17 percent were in the non-shaded area where schools were 
predominantly white. This part of the region is where opportunity structures were strongest—where 
jobs were growing most quickly and where low-poverty, high-quality schools predominated. 
 
This pattern is very similar to neighborhood characteristics (as opposed to schools).  Despite multiple 
levels of law and regulation to the contrary, subsidized units are still disproportionately located in 
neighborhoods of minority concentration (as defined by HUD) in the Twin Cities.  In 2007, 57 percent 
of subsidized units (LIHTC and Section 8 project units) were located in census tracts with more than 30 
percent minority residents, more than twice the percentage of the region’s population living in those 






A simulation by the Institute on Race and Poverty (IRP) shows that the proactive placement of 
existing LIHTC units in attendance areas for low-poverty schools would have significantly increased 
school integration.
12
  For instance, if LIHTC and project-based Section 8 units were assigned randomly 
by race and placed across the region in the same proportions as the overall population, then the region 
could have been brought nearly one-third of the way to the goal of integrated schools in 2005.
13
  It is 
conceivable that pro-integrative placement of new units in low-poverty school attendance areas could 
do most of the work necessary to racially integrate the regional school system.
14
  Indeed, in the long 
run, if housing policy returned to the more pro-integrative strategies of earlier decades, it might be 
possible to integrate schools with less pro-integrative busing than exists today.   
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b. Mortgage Lending Discrimination  
 
While the AI briefly notes an IRP study of mortgage lending,
15
 this readily available data should 
have been a more substantial part of its analysis.  One of the study’s recommendations is a regional fair 
housing center.  The mortgage lending report and its recommendations are included by reference in 
these comments and are attached as APPENDIX B. 
 
c. Racial Steering  
 
At a public meeting at the Institute on Race and Poverty in 2008, the superintendents of the 
Robbinsdale, Hopkins, Eden Prairie, Burnsville and Rosemount, and Richfield suburban school 
districts publicly disclosed that racial steering of black, Latino, and white homebuyers in their school 
districts and across the metropolitan areas was rampant.
16
  Their statements have been recorded and are 
publicly available.  Each superintendent stated that he or she had repeatedly scheduled meeting with 
offending agents, but the practice was so ubiquitous that unredressed illegal conduct nevertheless 
undermined efforts to promote and maintain local school integration.
17 
 
Specifically, these superintendents described the following pattern: As middle-income non-
white families seek neighborhoods of greater opportunity, their housing choices are exceptionally 
constrained compared to whites of similar income, credit history, and education.  This is consistent with 
the mortgage data cited in IRP’s mortgage study incorporated by reference in these comments.18  
Middle-income non-white households have more residential choice than low-income non-whites, but 
less than comparable white households.  They are seriously affected by steering and mortgage lending 
discrimination by white sellers and renting agents.  Because middle-income minority families often 
become the first to integrate white neighborhoods, the local elementary schools often become diverse 
long before the neighborhood does.  After a beachhead of diversity is established, realtors steer 
minority families seeking better schools toward these newly diverse schools, and steer white families 
away from them.  Fair housing studies have detected similar patterns in Teaneck, New Jersey and 
Grosse Pointe, Michigan. 
 
 Another example of this conduct occurred as the Eden Prairie school district attempted to draw 
integrated school boundaries.  The Minnesota ABC television news affiliate, KSTP-TV, aired a local 
real estate agent arguing that, as a real estate professional, he believed that integrated schools would 
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III. The AI prima facie fails its obligation to identify the most significant impediments to 
fair housing choice 
The draft AI should have included “a comprehensive review of a State or Entitlement 
jurisdiction’s laws, regulations, and administrative policies, procedures and practices,” and “an 
assessment of how those laws, etc. affect the location, availability, and accessibility of housing.”20  By 
failing to mention several of the most important state agencies and local governments with duties and 
powers to affirmatively further fair housing, the AI prima facie fails in this obligation. 
 
a. The AI fails to report on the abandonment of Met Council Policy 13/39, one of the 
nation’s most effective and pro-integrative regional fair housing systems, in favor 
of an uncoordinated series of racially segregative programs 
From 1970–86, the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (Met Council), together with the state 
housing finance agency, implemented a regional fair share housing program through coordination of its 
land use and housing policies.
21
  In direct response to the passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act and 
the promulgation of its siting rules, the first school desegregation lawsuit against the state of 
Minnesota,
22
 and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Mount Laurel,23 the Met Council 
(pursuant to its statutory and constitutional duty to achieve a fair share distribution of affordable 
housing) and the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (now Minnesota Housing) created and operated 
the most effective suburban affordable housing plan with the greatest pro-integrative civil rights effect 
in the nation’s history.24  This program, known as Policy 13/39, operated under both the fair share 
requirement of the Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and federal A-95 review power with clear 
guidance from HUD.
25
  Both state and federal law provided an independent statutory basis to support 
the program.  
 
Through Housing Policy 13 (later renumbered Policy 39), the Met Council used its authority 
and the withholding of a wide variety of federal and state funds to encourage affordable housing 




Starting in 1974, the Met Council received a large influx of federal housing funds under the 
Section 8 New Construction Program.
27
  The Met Council’s progressive housing policies were further 
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26
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supported by HUD’s national fair housing initiative. In 1976, HUD initiated its Area-wide Housing 
Opportunity Program (AHOP) to encourage fair-share housing across regions.
28
 The Met Council was 
particularly well positioned to take advantage of this program and immediately received additional 
funds from HUD to support its fair housing efforts.
29
 As a result, the Met Council’s fair share housing 
program increased the region’s suburban share of affordable housing units from 18 percent in 1975 to 
41 percent in 1983.
30
  During the same years, the number of low-income family housing units in the 
suburbs rose from 1,878 to 14,712.
31
  Virtually all of these units were built within the attendance areas 
of predominantly white, middle-class, and high-achieving schools.  No community in the United States 




 The Met Council is the largest and most powerful metropolitan government in the United 
States.
33
  It implements the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act, which gives it the power to review 
local comprehensive land use plans and invalidate plans that are inconsistent with Metropolitan systems 
plans and other policy plans with similar legal status.
34




The Met Council also has a state statutory duty
36—and as an agency of the state, a constitutional 
duty
37—to set fair share goals for each community in the Twin Cities metropolitan area to provide for 
its fair share of the region’s affordable housing needs.  For almost twenty years, the Met Council and 
Minnesota Housing together have set and achieved the fair share goals.
38
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Both the Met Council and Minnesota Housing are subject to the Federal Fair Housing Act duty 
to affirmatively further fair housing.  This law requires them to use their “immense leverage” to create 
“integrated and balanced living patterns.”39  In the process of siting housing, the Fair Housing Act 
requires all entities subject to the law to consider the racial balance of the schools attended by those 
living in government-supported housing.
40
  It is presumptively improper to site affordable housing in a 
way that does not increase school integration on a metropolitan level.    
 
Although never repealed, in the mid-1980s, the Minnesota Legislature effectively ended the 
program at the behest of central city politicians, housing officials, and city-based developers—not the 
suburbs. This coalition sponsored successful legislation that mandated that a disproportionate share of 
units be built in poor central city neighborhoods through the creation of central city sub-allocators and 
Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) guidelines that incent segregation rather than integration.  The 





As a result, ten years after Policy 13/39 was abandoned in the early 1980s, Minneapolis, HUD, 
and the Met Council were sued for violating fair housing siting principles (the Hollman case) and 
agreed to settle with the plaintiffs.
42
  In 1995, the legislature reaffirmed the council’s authority over 
suburban affordable housing, and in so doing encouraged the Met Council to again negotiate fair share 
housing goals with the region’s municipalities.43 
 
Although the Met Council increased its support of suburban affordable housing under the 
Livable Communities Act,
44
 the Met Council and Minnesota Housing have never again fully and 
coordinated their activities in order to fulfill their joint federal civil rights duties. Shortly after the 
Hollman litigation was settled, the state of Minnesota, HUD, and the Met Council were sued for 
segregation in the state’s school system, and the state again settled the case.45 
 
The Met Council’s most recent housing plan does not mention race and gives the greatest 
affordable housing goals to Minneapolis and St. Paul, which have the most segregated neighborhoods 
and schools.  Although it has a statutory duty to review school capital plans for their racially 
segregative impact, the Met Council’s plan fails to do so and makes no effort to coordinate its activities 
with the Department of Education to facilitate school integration under Minnesota Rule number 3535 
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(discussed below).  The 2009 Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice submitted by the Fair 
Housing Council of the Twin Cities Region (not the Met Council) was prepared by the same consultant 
that prepared the state plan, and it has all the same flaws.   
 
 
b. The AI fails to report the 1986 state creation of segregative central city sub-
allocators of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit which unnecessarily intensifies 
segregation in housing and schools  
 
In 1986, LIHTC became the dominant form of federal subsidy for low-income housing.  Rather 
than continuing Policy 13/39 and fully coordinating the award of tax credits to support the Met 
Council’s pro-integrative fair share  goals, the State of Minnesota created a sub-regional allocation 
system that encourages racial segregation rather than promotes racial integration.
46
  Almost all of the 
housing allocated to sub-allocators has been sited in concentrated minority areas in which the public 
schools are completely racially and economically segregated and academically low-performing. 
 
c. The AI fails to report that the state Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) incents racial 
segregation by awarding more points to racially segregative projects than racially 
integrated projects  
 
The Federal Fair Housing Act applies to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.  As such, State 
agencies must collect racial data on the location and occupancy of tax credit units.
47
  The draft AI fails 
to report this information, and the QAP does not mention either race or the Fair Housing Act.  Contrary 
to law, the QAP creates a scoring system that encourages racial segregation and the placement of 
housing projects in areas of minority concentration, rather than fulfilling its clear obligation to 
affirmatively further fair housing and integrate housing. 
 
For example, Minnesota awards no points for racial integration at all.  It awards only 1 or 2 
points for projects in low-poverty areas.  In contrast, virtually all of the other criteria—well over 100 
points—appear to promote the placement of units in areas of minority concentration or resegregation.  
For example, “readiness to proceed” favors areas with less community opposition (24 points).  
Moreover, “rehabilitation of existing structures” (10 points), “being part of community revitalization 
plan” (2 points), “using existing water or sewer”(10 points), “foreclosed properties”(10 points), 
“preservation of existing credits”(10 points), “permanent housing for the homeless”(110 points), 
“minimizing transportation costs”(3 points), “serves lowest income tenants”(13 points), and “local 
philanthropic contribution”(which favors local Community Development Corporations operating in 
segregated neighborhoods) (10 points) seem to favor core city projects over areas with high-performing 
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Furthermore, even housing growth (10 points), which would generally appear to be pro-
integrative, actually prioritizes housing in Minneapolis and St. Paul that have recently lead new housing 
starts.  
 
Most recently, in 2010, the state agency added criteria for “transit oriented development” (3 
points),
49
 which, if given effect, could promote and dramatically increase school segregation, 
particularly along the Central Corridor between Minneapolis and St. Paul.   
 
1. Areas of Concern along the Central Corridor and Sustainable Communities 
Initiative 
 
The Central Corridor includes a highly diverse set of neighborhoods and schools. However, 
there is a sharp divide along the Corridor, evident in both general population and school data. The 
divisions are sharpest among schools.  Schools in the eastern half of the corridor serve very few white 
students, where  students of color constitute  overwhelming majorities in all elementary schools east of 
(and including) Hancock Elementary, located at the center of the Corridor.  In contrast, the two schools 
immediately west of Hancock, are both racially diverse and racially integrated.  
There is a large public advocacy effort lead by Community Development Corporations(CDCs) 
employing a Sustainable Communities Framework to advocate for increased development of low-
income family housing in neighborhoods already saturated with the government-subsidized low-income 
housing and dominated by segregated low-performing schools.  Nonetheless, this effort relies on 
questionable data regarding gentrification and its negative impacts and does not address fair housing 
issues.  
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Map 3 shows the saturation of existing government-supported, low-income housing along the 
Central Corridor.  Maps 4 and 5 show that most of the schools on the Central Corridor are both 













2. Racially integrated magnet schools—proposed by central city school districts, the 
East Metropolitan Integration District, and the state Commissioner of Education—
could ameliorate segregation along the Central Corridor 
The Fair Housing Planning Guide declares the importance of racially integrated magnet schools 
for this type of development.
50
  It specifically states: “To encourage a greater racial/ethnic and 
economic mix of residents in lower-income neighborhoods, jurisdictions might design a strategy that 
combines a magnet school program with enhanced services and facilities in neighborhoods surrounding 
magnet schools.”51 
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One optimal location for a magnet school is the University of Minnesota, located on the west 
side of the Corridor.  More than 50,000 workers commute to the University and the University has 
already committed to support a magnet school if it were created.  A second optimal location is the State 
Capitol complex on the east side of the Corridor.  Together with the St. Paul Central Business District 
(CBD), the Capitol complex also has a significant commuter base that might be attracted to an 
appropriately themed, racially integrated magnet school.  
 
There has been support for magnet schools along the Central Corridor from both central city 
school districts, the East Metropolitan Integration District, and the Commissioner of Education.  As yet, 
magnet schools are not a part of Corridor planning, although the author of this comment has repeatedly 
raised the possibility and does so now formally. 
 
Regrettably, the AI fails to mention magnet schools as an option for promoting racially 
integrated, high-performing schools along the Corridor.  Absent racially integrated magnet schools, any 
additional affordable housing on the Corridor will likely only provide access to existing low-
performing, racially segregated public schools—the exact opposite of Secretary Donovan’s intent.   
 
The following maps and charts demonstrate that St. Paul’s CBD and the University of 
Minnesota are two of the largest job centers in the Twin Cities. The maps detail the size and shape of 
their commuter sheds.  The IRP’s Comprehensive Strategy argues that these job centers are optimal 
places for magnet schools and that such magnet schools. Magnet schools along the Central Corridor 
could provide high-quality, integrated education instead of the segregated, low-quality education now 
available, and could revitalize the existing housing market along the transit way.
52
 The preferences of 
the commuter shed residents should be surveyed in the process of creating these magnet schools. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the St. Paul public schools are currently moving toward a 
neighborhood school district plan that is already rapidly increasing the racial segregation in the St. Paul 
school system that serves the Corridor. Many of the schools on the Corridor’s eastern side of are 
becoming increasingly isolated and low-performing.  
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d. The AI does not document the failure of relevant state agencies, including 
Minnesota Housing, the Met Council, and the State Department of Education, to 
coordinate racial integration of housing and schools 
 
In 1994, the Minnesota legislature provided authority to relevant state agencies to coordinate 
housing and school integration.  State and local governments have created three unique city-suburban 
racial integration districts capable of administering racially integrated schools on a metropolitan level.
53
   
This effort to coordinate integrated schools and housing was undermined by later developments, 
including the 1999 desegregation rule
54
 and the failure of the Met Council and Minnesota Housing to 
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coordinate their efforts with the State Department of Education and the Metropolitan Integration 
Districts. 
 
Both federal and Minnesota law require (or at the very least authorize) housing and education 
agencies to coordinate their integration efforts.
55
  The Federal Fair Housing Act requires that HUD and 
public housing authority grantees (such as Minnesota Housing, the Met Council, Minneapolis, St. Paul, 
and their public housing authorities) consider the racial composition of neighborhoods and schools 
when siting low-income family housing.
56
  The Fair Housing Act mandates that these entities, together 
with HUD, use their “immense leverage” to “further integrated and balanced living patterns.”57  As a 
part of this obligation, federal law presumptively prohibits building new low-income family housing in 
racially segregated or unstably integrated neighborhoods.
58
  Minnesota law gives the Met Council 
power to approve or deny local school district siting decisions
59
 and the desegregation rule 
authorization simultaneously requires the Department of Education to “consult with the Metropolitan 
Council to coordinate school desegregation efforts with the housing, social, economic, and 
infrastructure needs of the metropolitan area.”60  The state legislature has also facilitated the creation of 
three large city-suburban integration school districts to facilitate and coordinate more integrated schools 




While the state did not require the agencies to coordinated state housing and school integration 
efforts, it authorized them to do so. In this context, this failure to act must be interpreted as a failure to 
affirmatively further fair housing.    
 
e. The AI fails to note the active state support of a highly fragmented community 
housing development structure that only builds and promotes the placement of 
housing in segregated contexts 
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 There are strongly vested private, status quo interests among local government agencies and 
housing producers that have only operated in a segregated context. Because they have no experience 
working in a pro-integrative context, they fervently resist efforts by the state to move in this direction.   
Although many metropolitan areas have growing inequality that particularly hurts low-income 
residents of color, advocacy by and for low-income residents of color is even more fragmented than 
local government structures, usually operating at neighborhood scale. Hyper-fragmented advocacy 
actually makes a region even more fragmented and dysfunctional. 
 
Instead of promoting a regional identity and assisting citizens to define and advocate for 
regional reforms, these fragmented advocacy organizations do the opposite. They encourage citizens to 
think in terms of changing one neighborhood, one block, or one school at a time.  
 
Hyper-fragmented advocacy efforts are often portrayed as the less controversial alternative to vital, 
comprehensive regional reforms. In many cases, these organizations try to preserve their fragile status 
in fragmented, unequal regions. This often means that their self-interest causes them to oppose the very 
region-scale reforms needed to expand opportunities for low-income households beyond the segregated 
areas most often targeted for subsidized housing. Hyper-fragmented advocacy undermines regional 
reform by monopolizing the conversation, usurping philanthropic resources, and, in the end, failing to 
bring about substantial change for the communities they represent.  
 
Regionally-focused advocacy groups can overcome this fragmentation by articulating the needs 
of individual communities and schools in the context of the regional trends that shape their well-being.  
Metropolitan areas need regional advocates to promote the regional reforms that benefit all 
communities, rather than pitting communities against one another. 
 
Currently, CDC operation is highly localized.  CDCs often use strategies that are far narrower in 
scope than the regional strategies required to revitalize all impacted communities in a metropolitan 
area. Since they are mainly focused on serving individual areas or municipalities, CDCs destructively 
compete for funds and conspicuously lack coordination. 
 
In 2006, there were 37 CDCs operating in St. Paul and Minneapolis.
62
 Collectively, these 
organizations raised and spent more than $83 million on economic development and affordable 
housing.  For example, in 2006, CDCs outspent the $77.5 million the Met Council spent for the same 
purpose in 2007.  Moreover, all CDCs operating in the region are located in the two central cities, and 
very few operate in the opportunity-rich suburbs of the region (Map 8). 
 
CDCs struggle to bring in economic development to their neighborhoods mostly because the 
high-poverty neighborhoods in which they work struggle to compete with developing suburbs.  These 
suburbs attract businesses by offering middle-class customers, discounted land, room for parking and 
expansion, low taxes, new highways, and relative freedom from crime and environmental problems.
63
  
Frequently, CDCs lack the organizational capacity to make a significant impact on their neighborhoods, 
especially when the regional forces that undermine the neighborhoods in the urban core negate their 
efforts. 
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In addition to their ineffectiveness in curbing regional inequalities, CDCs inadvertently 
contribute to these very same inequalities. Many CDCs work to bring affordable housing into their 
communities as part of their economic development efforts.  However, by concentrating affordable 
housing in already poor neighborhoods, these CDCs end up locating low-income persons and people of 
color in areas with relatively few opportunities.  
 
This place-based strategy undermines regional strategies, which aim to enhance opportunity for 
low-income persons and people of color by placing affordable housing in opportunity-rich suburbs. It 
also undercuts regional strategies that aim to stabilize urban communities by creating mixed-income 
housing along transit nodes. 
 
The State, its agencies, and local governments—together with foundations and philanthropic 
organizations—could expand economic opportunity to low-income communities by promoting and 
supporting regional CDCs that focus on regional issues. Providing incentives to regional CDCs would 
advance pro-integrative distributions of affordable housing in the region. Regional CDCs could also 
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reduce harmful competition and foster collaboration among CDCs to attain comprehensively defined 
regional goals. When CDCs work together to reach broader regional goals, local planning has a greater 
likelihood of achieving economic growth and equity. Building the organizational capacity of regional 
CDCs is an essential strategy to addressing regional inequality. 
 
While most metropolitan areas lack the regional CDCs capable of doing the job, many have 
regional CDC prototypes.  Pro-integrative, race-conscious CDCs at often at the center of successful, 
pro-integrative housing strategies.  For example, at the center of the Montgomery County plan is in the 
Innovative Housing Institute.  Making the Mount Laurel system work better are Fair Share and Isles. In 
Chicago, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities has been effective.  In Dallas, it 
is the Inclusive Communities Project.  In the Twin Cities, Common Bond and Twin Cities Habitat for 
Humanity have the potential to fill this role.  
Regional CDCs could effectively orchestrate and lead a coalition of local CDCs and build 
much-needed organizational capacity for community groups across the region. They could also educate 
individual community groups on the benefits of regionalism and provide organizational resources for 
groups that otherwise lack such resources. 
 
The state should prioritize pro-integrative metropolitan CDCs that have the capacity to 
coordinate complex finances, lawyers and planners to make exclusionary communities, state and 
federal agencies, real estate agents, and banks obey the law and be racially fair, and the capacity to 
build large projects.  Alternatively, the state should at least support neighborhood CDCs with explicit 
pro-integrative goals. 
 
Metropolitan CDCs should interact and support three different types of neighborhood CDCs, 
each suited for different type of metropolitan neighborhood.  
 
1. CDCs in Non-white, segregated high-poverty neighborhoods   
 
CDCs in non-white, segregated high-poverty neighborhoods should advocate and support stably 
integrated, racially inclusive magnet schools, substantially improved transit service, higher density 
mixed-use transit-oriented redevelopment, and significant public reinvestment in every major form of 
public infrastructure.  They should work on improved health care, early childhood education, tutoring 
for children, and daycare and after school activities. They should do everything consistent with helping 
these neighborhoods that does not intensify metropolitan segregation.  They should build and maintain 
low-income housing, just not a disproportionate share of the subsidized housing in the metropolitan 
area.  
In Wake County, North Carolina, and Louisville/Jefferson County, Kentucky, high-performing 
magnet schools located in previously poor, non-white neighborhood are the centerpiece of a 
metropolitan strategy that has maintained racially integrated schools on a metropolitan basis for four 
decades.  These policies have increased residential integration and decreased resegregation.   
 2.    CDCs in racially integrated communities   
Nearly forty percent of the population in America’s 50 largest metropolitan areas lives in 
racially integrated urban and suburban neighborhoods (census tracks with non-white population shares 
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between 20–60 percent).  In America, integrated communities do not remain integrated unless they 
have community organizations that help them do it.  
           
CDCs in these communities should form the core of stable integration organizations with 
racially inclusive membership of local officials and important community stakeholders. Integrated 
communities are often subject to severe racial steering and mortgage lending discrimination.  Stable 
integration CDCs should administer pro-integrative loans or mortgage insurance programs, document 
claims of housing market discrimination, and establish and operate pro-integrative marketing plans. 
They should be charge of building and maintaining all the housing that promotes stable integration. 
CDCs in these neighborhoods should also promote better race relations, more interracial contact 
communication and understanding in school and neighborhood contexts. 
 
 
3.  CDCs in high-opportunity communities  
 
          High-opportunity communities constitute the last third of metropolitan America.  These are the 
communities with the “best” schools, services, health, lowest taxes, and most parks and open space.  
Here, CDCs should advocate (and, if necessary, litigate) for the reduction of barriers to affordable 
housing in zoning codes, development agreements, and development practices. They should spearhead 
efforts to dramatically increase the amount of affordable housing for low-income families. They should 
develop this housing and ensure it is operated on a non-discriminatory basis.    
 
f. The AI does not note the need to change the public perception of fair housing in the 
fully developed suburbs 
The largest barrier to fair housing is public perception.  Broad sectors of the public—
particularly the politically pivotal fully developed suburbs—do not understand the clear benefits of fair 
housing to their own self-interests.  Public education of the fully developed suburbs about fair housing 
enforcement will strengthen their residential market, increase prime low-cost credit, stabilize their 
schools, and provide stronger potential for redevelopment.  These benefits are not currently well 
understood within suburban communities. 
These communities are presently integrated or on the path to being racially integrated in the 
next decade.  However, as they move through racial transition, they experience steering, loss of prime 
credit, and rapid racial and economic school changes caused by steering.  Fair housing means the white 
families will continue to be shown housing in these communities, that banks will lend fairly to keep the 
lifeblood of prime credit flowing to these communities, their schools will remain strong and repopulate 
naturally, and they will be targets of reinvestment rather than disinvestment.  They need fair housing 
more than any other policy.  They do not know this and the state housing agency should provide this 
necessary education to suburban communities. 
 
IV. Submitted in its present form, the draft AI would amount to a boilerplate or “false” 
certification to obtain federal funding 
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The AI fails to collect and report data required by HUD regarding racial discrimination and 
racial segregation, or to reference readily available current, relevant local studies on impediments to 
fair housing choice.  It fails to identify the most obvious and significant impediments to fair housing 
choice, most notably:  
1) The abandonment of Met Council Policy 13/39, one of the nation’s most effective and pro-
integrative regional fair housing systems in favor of an uncoordinated series of racially segregative 
programs;  
2) The 1986 state creation of segregative central city sub-allocators of the Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit (LIHTC), which unnecessarily intensify segregation in housing and schools;  
3) A state QAP that incents racial segregation by awarding more points to racially segregative 
projects than racially integrated projects;   
4) Failure by relevant state agencies, including Minnesota Housing, the Met Council and the 
State Department of Education, to coordinate racial integration of housing and school as authorized by 
the legislature in 1994; and  
5) Active state support of a highly fragmented community housing development structure that 
only builds and advocates for affordable housing development in segregated neighborhoods.  
Moreover, the AI fails to outline actions likely to have a substantive impact on reducing impediments 
to fair housing choice. 
For these reasons, if submitted in its present form, the draft AI would amount to a boilerplate or 




a. The State must redraft the AI to satisfy to the requirements of the Federal Fair 
Housing Act 
 
1. Overview of State Obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing 
Minnesota Housing and all recipients of federal housing funds have obligation under the to 
“affirmatively further” fair housing,65 requiring them to use their “immense leverage” to create 
“integrated and balanced living patterns.”66  The most direct way for HUD to use this leverage is 
through a meaningful Analysis of Impediments (AI) framework. Such a framework conditions HUD 
(and potentially other federal) funding on clear state and local government fair housing plans.  
Adequate plans have measureable goals for stable metropolitan racial integration (SMRI).  To date, 
Minnesota’s AI framework is unacceptably boilerplate, lacking clear standards for SMRI.   The first 
step to strengthen the AI process is to take the existing fair housing framework for SMRI, developed 
under HUD’s site and neighborhood standards, and make it central to the AI process at all levels.  The 
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 NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J., holding that Title VIII imposed 
a duty on HUD beyond simply refraining from discrimination).  
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state must assure compliance with all allocators. The metrics required to do this are relatively 
straightforward and the data is readily available at the necessary scales without undue expense or 
complexity. 
2.  The Existing Federal Fair Housing SMRI Framework 
The federal fair housing framework for SMRI is articulated in the site and neighborhood 
standards developed under the authority of 1) the Federal Fair Housing Act, 2) the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and 3) the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
67
  These site and neighborhood 
standards are also codified at 24 C.F.R. section 941.202.
68
 
For purposes of stable metropolitan racial integration, the Fair Housing Act creates three types 
of metropolitan neighborhoods or communities: 
1) “Areas of minority concentration,”69 or neighborhoods or communities with more than 30 
percent non-white population in housing and/or neighborhood schools. These are neighborhoods or 
communities that are largely non-white and poor, or on a clear path toward racial and social segregation 
and disinvestment caused by housing discrimination. Under the Fair Housing Act, in areas of minority 
concentration “color blindness is not permissible” and the “increase of racial concentration is prima 
facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with national housing policy.”70 
2) “Racially mixed areas”71 or neighborhoods or communities that are presently integrated, but 
where integration is fragile and subject to resegregation.  These are neighborhoods or communities with 
a white and middle income majority, whose racial and economic stability is threatened by illegal and 
unredressed housing discrimination including, but not limited to, 1) steering by real estate agents, 2) 
individual and geographic credit discrimination, 3) discriminatory placement of government-sponsored 
low-income family housing, 4) discriminatory drawing of sub-district school district attendance area 
boundaries or catchment areas,
72
 and 5) other discriminatory housing or education practices by state 
governments or by surrounding local governments. The Fair Housing Act requires HUD to consider the 
racial balance of schools attended by government-supported housing recipients.
73
  The clear implication 




3) All other neighborhoods or communities that are predominantly white and middle or upper 
income and under no threat of resegregation caused by housing discrimination.   
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 See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV 1747, 1763–1776 (2005). 
68
 See also Shannon v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); see also 24 C.F.R. § 
941.202 (2010) (requiring public housing sites to be accessible to “educational, commercial, and health facilities and 
services” that are “at least equivalent to those typically found in neighborhoods consisting largely of similar unassisted 
standard housing” (emphasis added)). 
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 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i). 
70
Shannon, 436 F.2d at 821. 
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 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(ii).   
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 See Keyes v. Denver School District, 413 US 189 (1973)(outlined standards for fair drawing of school catchment areas 
and declaring that housing and school segregation are reciprocally related). 
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 See 436 F.2d at 822  
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Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973) (segregated school boundary drawing and 
segregated housing patterns have reciprocal effects).  
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a) High Opportunity Communities — A subset of these neighborhoods includes “high 
opportunity neighborhoods or communities” (HOC).  HOCs are defined to include a region’s: 1) best 
performing and best funded local public schools (which must also be either predominantly white and 
low poverty or stably racial and economically integrated); 2) best health facilities, services and 
outcomes; 3) best municipal facilities and services at a given tax rate; 4) highest growth of entry level 
employment; 5) highest concentration of luxury housing; and 6) strongest, federally guaranteed, low-
cost prime credit market for housing and businesses redevelopment.
75
  SMRI policy requires that these 
types of communities be prioritized for the placement of new government-subsidized family housing.  
Subsequent research not only shows that this approach is necessary for SMRI, but also shows that 
placement of housing in HOCs provide the best result for advances in educations and employment 
success. 
The preponderance of past and present social science evidence affirms the basic soundness of 
this approach.  Then and now, neighborhoods or communities that are approximately one-third or less 
non-white tend to be both economically stable and to remain either white or racially integrated for 
decades without any special intervention.  Neighborhoods or communities that are more the 30 percent 
non-white overwhelmingly tend to be both resegregating and in economic and fiscal decline because of 
unredressed housing. There are exceptions, most often in neighborhoods or communities using stable 
integration techniques or in places that are part of powerful countervailing gentrification.  However, 
these exceptions are rare.  It is important to note that gentrification as cause of harmful minority 
displacement is rare and that strengthening urban gentrification, combined with a regional fair share 
housing approach, is an absolutely essential component of revitalizing distressed city neighborhoods.     
The underlying legal and factual process that created the Fair Housing Act’s SMRI remains 
compelling. The political forces that created the SMRI legal framework—urban riots, the Kerner 
Commission, a relatively strong pro-integration civil right movement, more supportive courts, Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson’s presidential leadership, among other 
factors—are currently present.  Hence the preservation of the SMRI framework and a more clear 
integration of it into the AI process should be a clear objective of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal 
Opportunity’s agenda.   
This memo argues the Fair Housing Act’s SMRI framework, as articulated under the site and 
neighborhood standards, is effective and can be improved in straightforward and elegant ways that can 
make it easier to understand and enforce.  The SMRI framework is central to an improved AI process. 
Map 9 shows the current distribution of non-white population in the Twin Cities. It illustrates 
how centralized the region’s non-white segregated and integrated neighborhoods are and how they are 
spreading into inner suburban areas. 
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3.  Stable Metropolitan Racial Integration and Minnesota’s Consolidated Plans and 
AI. 
A. Requirement to map SMRI community types 
Minnesota’s State consolidated plans must map 1) areas of minority concentration, 2) racially 
mixed areas, and 3) high opportunity communities.  The state must in turn require fair housing plans 
from all covered communities and those fair housing plans must reflect SMRI category types. 
B.  Data and Metrics 
The state is required to maintain consolidated plans that monitor trends by collecting data on 
and mapping (where possible) the characteristics of the SMRI community types: 1) areas of minority 
concentration, 2) racially mixed areas, and 3) high opportunity communities. 
The state must in turn require fair housing plans from all covered communities and the housing 
plans should monitor characteristics consistent with the SMRI community types.  These should include 
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metrics and data for schools and neighborhoods regarding racial integration, income, student 
performance, housing characteristics, housing finance, crime, health, local fiscal capacity, jobs, and job 
growth. 
The monitoring should include the following metrics, data, and mapping (where applicable): 
1) Data and maps showing the distribution of the community types: 
a.  Areas of Minority Concentration – Census tracts with more than 50 percent non-
white residents. 
b.  Racially Mixed Areas – Areas with no minority group exceeding 50 percent of 
the population and a white population of at least 30 percent. 
c.  High Opportunity Communities – Communities with higher-than-average  
income, jobs per resident in the community or nearby, job growth in the 
community or nearby, tax base per capita, and stable racial and income mixes. 
2) Data and maps showing the regional distribution of: 
a.  School data showing the racial mix, economic composition, and test results of all 
elementary schools and their catchment areas.  This data is available from the 
National Center for Education Statistics and State Departments of Education.  
b.  The placement of subsidized housing under HUD Section 8 and Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit programs, broken out by the community types. 
c.  Basic health data, including, at a minimum, the incidence of asthma and other 
income-related diseases. 
d.  Municipal tax base data showing the ability of local governments to finance local 
public services from the legally available local taxes (which vary from state to 
state). 
e.  Jobs per capita and job growth, available in most states from the Local 
Employment Dynamics database. 
f.  Location of luxury housing, defined, for example, as housing valued in the top 
20 percentile in the region. 
g.  Credit availability defined for example as areas with the greater than average use 
of high-quality credit (from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data). 
3) Maps showing the framework of stable integration plans in the region and how they 
relate to information in sections 1 and 2 above. 
 
C.  AI Requirements Based on SMRI Community Type  
i. Category 1 Communities – Areas of Minority Concentration   
In areas of minority concentration, the AI must include a presumption against siting additional 
low-income family housing in those areas.  In this light, housing preservation classifications should not 
be used to evade this presumption.  For example, a preservation expenditure on a low-income family 
would constitute an additional unit if the cost of preservation were more than one-half of the cost of a 
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new unit in a high-opportunity community. This presumption could be overcome if the school 
population in the neighborhood is stably integrated or the neighborhood is served by a stably integrated 
magnet or charter school.  
Category 1 AIs should have targeting objectives to attract middle-income residents, particularly 
those with school-aged children, and property tax paying businesses to increase local fiscal capacity 
and services and jobs both for existing residents and to attract new residents.   
Such AIs should include: 
a)  Plans for the creation or maintenance of stably integrated neighborhoods 
b)  Plans for the creation or maintenance of stably integrated public or charter schools 
that are either neighborhood or cluster-magnet schools.  Such schools must meet No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) standards and make adequate yearly progress.  
c)  Plans to increase local government fiscal capacity by attracting higher-income 
individuals and property or sales tax paying businesses that create jobs 
d)  Plans to improve local public health through medical care, healthy food, and local 
recreation opportunities 
e)  Plans to improve public transit  
f)  Plans for basic maintenance of necessary public infrastructure, including streets, 
sewers, public buildings, parks, etc. 
g)  Plans to include the use of federal or state general revenue sharing grants for any 
purpose consistent with stable racial integration, including targeted property tax 
incentives to encourage increased fiscal capacity, the creation of new jobs, or 
reducing local tax rates for improved business and residential climate.  HUD and 
other federal funds should support the implementation of these types of plans. 
ii. Category 2 Communities – Racially Mixed Communities  
 These are communities that are presently racially integrated or on a path to becoming integrated 
within the next ten years.  Generally these are fully developed, relatively dense suburban areas with 
either a low or declining local fiscal capacity or share of jobs. They are often subject to very severe 
racial steering and mortgage lending discrimination.  The goal of an AI in such communities is to the 
preserve stable racial integration. 
 
 AIs for such communities must include fully funded, stable integration plans.  These plans must 
include periodic paired racial testing of both renters and homeowners at a variety of income levels to 
detect housing discrimination, which would intensify local or metropolitan segregation.  Evidence 
increasingly demonstrates that minority home purchasers are often steered toward racially integrated 
school in these suburbs, whereas white families of similar income and qualifications are steered toward 




 Category 2 AIs must include HMDA data that is frequently and geographically updated to 
measure disparities between both individuals and communities. 
 
 Category 2 AIs must also require and/or encourage stable integration boards with racially 
inclusive membership of local officials and important community stakeholders. These boards should 
have the ability to require local real estate and banking entities to cooperate by appearing before them 
and responding to reasonable requests for data. 
 
  Stable integration boards or appropriate local governmental entities should be encouraged to 
provide pro-integrative loans or mortgage insurance programs, document claims of housing market 
discrimination, and create and operate pro-integration marketing plans.  
 
  AIs in Category 2 communities could include the following policies and community-based 
strategies to encourage and maintain stably integrated communities:
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 Expect government leaders and agencies to proactively promote diverse neighborhoods. 
 Encourage consciousness on the part of urban planners “to examine the consequences of their 
actions . . . that may either destabilize existing neighborhoods or thwart the development of 
new diverse neighborhoods.” 
 Maintain and strengthen fair housing laws. 
 Encourage public and private funding and programs that promote mixed-income, racially 
diverse communities. 
 Develop and disseminate information on strategies to strengthen community-based 
organizations. 
 Establish citywide and regional networks of diverse community organizations. 
 Develop “[l]eadership training institutes for residents of diverse communities.” 
 Maintain quality schools and community safety programs in diverse neighborhoods. 
 Encourage the creation of programs that support mixed-income development. 
 Encourage local chambers of commerce and other business associations to view diverse 
communities “as potentially strong markets.” 
 Encourage the media to tell “the positive stories of diverse community successes.” 
 Encourage ““[l]ocal community organizations, existing institutions, and local 
governments . . . to be receptive to new groups and be willing to work with them on common 
community issues.” 
 Develop programs to create jobs and improve access to jobs in surrounding communities. 
 Conduct public discussions about whether “maintaining ethnic- and race-based political 
constituencies undermines efforts to develop and sustain diverse communities.” 
 
iii.  Category 3 – High Opportunity Communities 
 
  State AIs should target High Opportunity Communities as priorities for the expenditure of scarce 
low-income family housing funds and limited enforcement dollars.   Moreover, such communities 
should not receive federal housing funds or other federal funds or state or metropolitan subsidies unless 
                                                          
76
 For an in-depth discussion of the following policies and strategies, see Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to 
Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 929–30 (2006).  
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they demonstrate that they are taking steps to diversify.  AIs for such communities should include: 
 
a. Reduction of barriers to affordable housing in zoning codes, development 
agreements, and development practices 
b. Inclusionary housing  
c. Pledges to take advantage of existing low-income housing tax credits and other 
funds to meet their metropolitan share of low-income family housing 
d. Paired testing to ensure that existing family and rental housing is equally available 
on the basis of race 
e. Pro-integrative mortgage programs 
   
 
4. Best Practices for Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice 
 
My research has identified a few places whose AI effectively considers links between housing 
location and opportunity.  These reports included three important similarities.  First, the AIs include 
racial makeup of public schools in the discussion of impediments to fair housing.  Second, the AIs 
compare actual racial composition by census tract to the projected racial composition of the census tract 
if no housing discrimination has occurred.  Third, the AIs recommend paired testing of rental and real 
estate agents to determine whether racial steering is occurring in the community.  Murfreesboro, 
Tennessee, and Naperville, Illinois, are two cities that include these important issues in their recent AIs. 
 
Racial Makeup of Public Schools 
 
The Murfreesboro and Naperville AIs both include public school data, namely the racial composition of 
some public schools located in the respective cities.  Both AIs note the “pivotal role public schools 
have in establishing and maintaining stable, racially-integrated communities.”   
 
The AIs also incorporate statistics on racial change in public schools because in previously racially 
segregated, racially integrated schools, re-segregation is a serious  concern.  Research shows that 
changes in school racial composition can foreshadow changes in racial composition of the surrounding 
community, resulting in a serious impediment to fair housing.  The Murfreesboro AI states that “a 
student body that is ‘minority-majority’ can lead to the neighborhoods the public school serves re-
segregating from predominantly white to predominantly African American.  This change is brought 
about by the major role that the racial composition of a public school plays for home seekers in 
determining the desirability of a neighborhood and city in which to live.”  Given increases in minority 
student populations in some Murfreesboro schools, the AI recommends that the city continue to 
monitor racial composition of the neighborhoods surrounding those schools to quickly identify shifts in 
racial composition that may indicate decreased white housing demand. 
 
The Murfreesboro AI also quotes the Murfreesboro Comprehensive Land Use Plan regarding the 
connection between residential single family developments and public schools: “a consideration in 
residential zonings will be to provide housing that a ‘neighborhood’ school philosophy can be 
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maintained.  An achievement of social / racial / economic heterogeneous grouping of children in each 
elementary school zone will be a goal and it will be recognized that residential zoning classifications to 
some extent serve to meet this goal.” 
 
Actual Racial Composition Versus Projected Racial Composition Without Housing Discrimination 
 
The Murfreesboro and Naperville AIs analyze the racial composition in each of the cities’ census tracts 
and compare the actual racial composition with the projected racial composition expected in a free 
housing market without housing discrimination (determined solely by household income, and not 
considering race).  These AIs flag those tracts with high racial minority concentrations that were 
determined to be at a greater risk of future resegregation than expected in a free housing market.  The 





As stated in the previous section, both the Murfreesboro and Naperville AIs conclude that in some 
census tracts discrepancies exist between actual racial composition and the racial composition that 
would be expected in a free housing market.  This conclusion leads to the presumption that some type 
of housing discrimination is occurring.  Neither the Murfreesboro nor Naperville AIs include paired 
testing of rental or real estate agents to determine if illegal racial steering in the housing market is 
occurring in the respective cities.  Both AIs strongly recommend that paired testing would be an 
effective means of discerning whether racial steering is occurring.  Only after identifying instances of 






b. The state and its metropolitan-area agencies must return to an effective region-
wide fair share housing policy. This policy must more clearly link housing choice 
and school choice to maximize the integrative impact of housing and school 
integration programs. 
 
Regional fair housing policies must reduce school segregation, thereby enhancing educational 
opportunities for low-income persons and people of color.  By promoting housing desegregation, such 
policies could bring about school desegregation and augment the integrative impact of existing school 
choice programs. A neighborhood that is racially integrated has a better chance of having schools that 
are also integrated. Most families of color whose children currently participate in school choice 
programs tend to traveler greater distances to attend higher-quality schools.  If these kids were given 
the first choice to live in affordable housing near those higher-quality schools, the need for student 
transportation could be significantly reduced.  
 
Thus, linking housing and school choice could facilitate school integration and enhance the 
educational opportunities of low-income students and students of color.  Examples from across the 
country illustrate that greater housing choice can be an effective strategy for improving opportunities 
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for low-income persons and people of color when linked with school integration efforts. For instance, 
Louisville, Kentucky, and Yonkers, New York, have successfully fought school segregation by linking 
school choice with housing choice.  In these places, the respective regional housing agencies made 




IRP conducted a simulation to demonstrate the potential integration impact of existing housing 
programs on schools in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.  This simulation attempted to quantify the 
impact of integrative changes to the LIHTC and Section 8 programs in the region.  It also examined 
how a more integrative redistribution of low-income housing in the region would impact students who 
participate in an existing public school choice program, The Choice is Yours.  The results of the 
simulation show that choice-driven housing programs currently in operation in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area have the potential to cut school segregation in half with relatively gradual changes. 
 
IRP has also drafted a plan, in collaboration with the Department of Education, the Metropolitan 
Integration Districts, and the Association of Metropolitan School Districts, to coordinate housing and 
school integration which is attached as APPENDIX C with all its recommendation incorporated 
herewith. 
 
c. The State Should Support the Creation of a Regional Fair Housing Center 
 
Private markets provide most of the housing stock in the United States, and discrimination by 
private actors play a very significant role in segregating metropolitan areas.  Reversing economic and 
racial segregation requires periodic monitoring of discriminatory practices and vigilant enforcement of 
fair housing laws.  Monitoring and enforcement have been at best sporadic at the federal level and non-
existent at the state or regional level.  
 
In the absence of sustained federal or state commitment to fair housing, the Twin Cities region 
needs state-led efforts to enforce fair housing in the region.  For instance, one effective mechanism for 
enforcing fair housing would be a state-funded Regional Fair Housing Center that periodically conducts 




The State of Minnesota has obligations to comply with the Fair Housing Act, and its state 
agencies with fair housing obligations must coordinate their activities to fulfill their joint fair housing 
obligations in a manner that collectively affirmatively furthers fair housing.  In terms of compliance 
with federal law, the Supreme Court has held “the powers of several state officers must be treated as 
merged into a single officer.” 78  This is particularly true in the case of racial discrimination fostered by 
the cumulative acts of separate state entities, whether discrimination is accomplished “ingeniously or 
ingenuously.”79  
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The state’s comprehensive housing plan and AI represent a colorblind approach to affordable 
housing policy.  If this were a single-race state without stunning racial segregation and blatant and 
continuing housing discrimination, this might be acceptable.  However, racial discrimination in housing 
markets is a more fundamental factor determining individual opportunity and neighborhood 
revitalization than any policy of mere bricks and mortar.  Non-white, racially segregated 
neighborhoods, with few exceptions, have long continued unabated economic and educational decline 
for forty years.  They have not only been starved of private capital, but recently have also been 
subjected to a saturated pattern of racially discriminatory predatory lending practices.  Regrettably, 
today these neighborhoods have relatively poorer schools, higher unemployment, and more 
incarceration than ever. 
A colorblind policy like Minnesota’s—in which most family affordable housing is built in 
segregated or resegregating low-opportunity neighborhoods—means that, given the background reality 
of multi-level discrimination, the problems of segregation and the associated harms will continue and 
affordable housing policy will itself reinforce inequality and urban disinvestment that has characterized 
American cities. 
Furthermore, the colorblind approach is technically illegal.  The Fair Housing Act commands 
that our housing policy be race-conscious and pro-integrative on a metropolitan level.  In this context, 
the federal courts have declared that a colorblind housing policy is “impermissible.”  This (unenforced) 
law requires the federal government and all entities receiving federal housing support to use whatever 
“leverage” they have to foster racially integrated schools and communities.  Federal law creates a 
presumption that building new units in segregated areas with failing schools is a racially discriminatory 
practice, particularly when it is possible to build these units in higher opportunity white areas. 
There is a near perfect correlation between minority and economic segregation in schools and 
academic failure.  Segregated high schools are “drop out factories” that are much more connected to 
prison than college.  This is true whether they are public or charter schools, whether they are in states 
where the central city schools are broke or where they spend much more than the suburban average in 
segregated schools.  Separate but equal—and even separate and more money than the suburbs—has 
never worked.  Similarly, high-intensity approaches like Geoffrey Canada’s efforts in Harlem are very 
hard to reproduce and unsustainable in most contexts.  These approaches are more anecdote than viable 
as systematic policy. 
In contrast, the benefits of racially and socially integrated schools have been documented in 
innumerable studies over decades and include improved academic achievement by minority students; 
enhanced critical thinking skills for all students; better graduation rates, higher future incomes, higher 
college attendance rates and greater access to social networks associated with opportunity for minority 
students; and better interracial relations in future living and employment environments for students of 
all races.  Integration is not a one-step panacea, but it is a necessary part of any real effort to improve 
education. 
There is and should be a strong preference for siting new family units in areas with the best 
schools and against placing new units in areas that only have failing schools.  While the federal 
government and state governments can and should build part of its housing in segregated areas, its 
overall balance sheet must be pro-integrative on a metropolitan basis.  The laws and facts require state 
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agencies to take into account the racial and economic composition of schools and their performance 









Appendix VI: IMO Comments on State of Minnesota 
Qualified Allocation Plan 
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February 20, 2012 
 
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency 
Multifamily Underwriting 
Housing Tax Credit Program 
400 Sibley Street, Suite 300 
St. Paul, MN  55101-4451 
 
Re: Orfield Comments on State Qualified Allocation Plan. 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
The Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) has a duty to “affirmatively further 
fair housing.”1 This affirmative duty is “more than an obligation not to discriminate,” it is an 
obligation for MHFA to use its “immense leverage” to further “integrated and balanced living 
patterns.”2 Minnesota’s proposed Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) does just the opposite. It 
encourages racial segregation by encouraging the placement of projects in segregated or unstably 
integrated areas and discouraging projects in high opportunity white or stably integrated areas. 
The QAP must be amended to conform to the requirements of the Fair Housing Act and strongly 
encourage the location of the majority of units in pro-integrative locations. Between, 2005-2011, 
the QAP resulted in the building of 1,200 units in the central cities, areas with segregated, low 
performing elementary schools. At the same time the state rejected $32,000,000 worth of 
projects in the suburbs where schools are more likely to be low poverty, high performing 
schools. Moreover, these suburban projects may actually have been less expensive to build with 
lower rents than the new projects built in the segregated neighborhoods of the central cities. 
 
MFHA is not just a disinterested banker. It must comply with the Tax Credit statute and 
the Fair Housing Act.3 To the extent that the State has opted to have a single entity administer 
both the LIHTC and CDBG/HOME block grant programs, its obligations to affirmatively further 
fair housing come into play with even greater legal force.4  The State may be exceptionally 
                                                          
1  42 U.S.C. §3608 (d). 
2 NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149,156 (1st Cir. 1987). (citing NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 
637, 644 (D. Mass. 1983)).  
3 See Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Dep’t of Housing and Community Affairs, 749 F.Supp. 2d 486 (N.D. 
Texas 2010).  
4 The certification that the State of Minnesota signs, as a precondition of receiving roughly $30 million/year in 
Community Development Block Grants and other funds says that the State is promising HUD that all of its 
programs (not just those supported by CDBG and other funds, but the entire housing and community development 
function) will be operated consistent with affirmatively further fair housing (AFFH) requirements. See Fair Housing 
Planning Guide, vol.1, 1-3 (1993) available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf. Although a 
grantee’s AFFH obligation arises in connection with the receipt of federal funding, its AFFH obligation is not 
restricted to the design and operation of HUD-funded programs at the state or local level. The AFFH obligation 
extends to all housing and housing-related activities in the grantee’s jurisdictional area whether publicly or privately 
funded. The Guide echoes the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988 (CRRA), which overruled the Supreme Court’s 
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efficient at producing affordable housing units—whether with LIHTC or otherwise—but the 
focus on the State as “banker only” and on raw numbers of units ignores one of the most 
important requirements Judge Cote underscored in her Westchester summary judgment opinion: 
 
The HUD Guide explains that while it is often the case that minorities are disproportionately 
represented among the low-income population, simply providing affordable housing for the 
low-income population “is not in and of itself sufficient to affirmatively further fair housing.” 
This unsurprising statement is grounded in the statutory and regulatory framework behind the 
obligation to AFFH, which as already discussed, is concerned with addressing whether there 
are independent barriers to protected classes exercising fair housing choice. As a matter of 
logic, providing more affordable housing for a low-income racial minority will improve its 
housing stock but may do little to change any pattern of discrimination or segregation. 
Addressing that pattern would at a minimum necessitate an analysis of where the additional 
housing is placed.5 
 
  The Fair Housing Act forbids building a disproportionate share of low-income housing in 
poor and segregated, or integrated but resegregating, neighborhoods, when it is possible to build 
that same housing in low-poverty, high-opportunity white or stably integrated neighborhoods.  
Under the Fair Housing Act “color blindness is not permissible” in the decision to add low-
income housing units to poor segregated neighborhoods or unstably integrated neighborhoods.6  
Courts in these circumstance have held that the “increase … of racial concentration is prima 
facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with the national housing 
policy.”7 Moreover the courts have made abundantly clear that “increasing or maintaining 
racially segregated housing patterns merely because minority groups will gain an immediate 
benefit would render such persons willing, and perhaps unwitting, partners in the trend toward 
ghettoization of our urban centers.”8   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Grove City case, and re-established the principle that recipients of federal funds must comply with civil rights laws 
in all areas, not just in the particular program or activity that received federal funding.  See, e.g .Congress Overrides 
the President’s Veto of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, The Civil Rights Monitor, vol. 1, no.1 (Mar 1988), available 
at http://www.civilrights.org/ monitor/march1988 /art1p1.html . Since the language of the AFFH provision of the 
Fair Housing Act (42 USC §3608, and implementing regulations at 24 CFR Parts 91 and 570) are structurally 
similar to the civil rights statutes involved in the CRRA the principle is the same: Congress exercised its power 
under the Spending Clause to say, effectively: “If you take this federal money, then the entire housing and 
community development function of the state/municipality will be governed by these civil rights principles.” If that 
is the case, then the State has an obligation to govern its own state programs in a manner that complies with AFFH. 
That includes the LIHTC program, whether operated by the state or legislatively delegated to sub-allocators. The 
obligation to run an AFFH-compliant program cannot be avoided by handing it off to another agency. The State will 
have obligations to monitor the entities to whom functions are delegated, and will retain respondent superior liability 
on top of the statutory, regulatory and contractual AFFH obligations. 
5 See United States of America ex rel Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York v. Westchester County, 668 F. 
Supp. 2d 548, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) . 
6 Shannon v. United States Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding that “increase 
or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance 
with the national housing policy” and therefore concluding that housing authorities should not site new housing in 
racially concentrated areas if there are viable alternatives); see also 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (g) (2010) (requiring public 
housing sites to be accessible to “educational, commercial, and health facilities and services” that are “at least 
equivalent to those typically found in neighborhoods consisting largely of similar unassisted standard housing” 
(emphasis added)). 
7 436 F.2d at 821; 24 C.F.R. § 941.202. 
8 Otero v. New York Hous. Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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The Fair Housing Act requires Minnesota Housing and all of the state sub-allocators to 
consider the racial balance of schools attended by government-supported housing recipients 9 
The clear implication of this legal requirement is that stably racially integrated schools are a 
central component of fair housing policy. Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
school and housing segregation are reciprocally related and the patterns of illegal housing 
segregation causes school segregation and, similarly, that illegal school segregation causes 
segregation in housing.10 
 
Moreover, HUD’s Fair Housing Equity Assessment Grant Applications require grant 
recipients, such as the Met Council’s Corridors of Opportunity Program, not merely to monitor 
the racial balance of local schools but their academic performance as well.11 
On February 23, 2010, Secretary Shaun Donovan clarified HUD’s Fair Housing 
requirements for its state grantees before Congress, stating: 
[S]ustainability also means creating “geographies of opportunity,” places that effectively 
connect people to jobs, quality public schools, and other amenities.  Today, too many 
HUD-assisted families are stuck in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and segregation, 
where one's zip code predicts poor educational, employment, and even health outcomes.  
These neighborhoods are not sustainable in their present state.12 
 
Contrary to law, the proposed QAP is not only impermissibly colorblind but goes beyond 
to create a system of scoring that encourages the placement of housing projects in areas of 
minority concentration near deeply racially segregated and low-performing schools, or in 
unstably integrated areas. This system of point scoring ignores Minnesota Housing’s clear 
obligations to affirmatively further fair housing and to use its leverage to create balanced and 
integrated housing. Indeed, data described below indicate that, despite clear fair housing 
obligations, the state’s fair share law, and a record of pro-integrative location decisions in earlier 
years, only 17 percent of subsidized units since 1986 are now located in a pro-integrative 
manner. Eighty-three percent of units are located in ways that now contribute to segregation or 
resegregation. This outcome is particularly suspect in contrast to MHFA’s pro-integrative siting 
of affordable housing in the period from 1970 to 1986. 
 
The need for more pro-integrative siting incentives in the Twin Cities is clear. According 
to Minnesota Department of Education data, the number of elementary schools in the region with 
very high non-white student percentages (above 80 percent) went from 11 schools in 1995 to 55 
in 2002. Since 2002, this number has increased still further to 83 schools. Put another way, the 
number of non-white students in highly segregated schools increased dramatically from just 
                                                          
9 Shannon v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 822 (3d Cir. 1970); 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 
(c)(2)(g);  The Fair Housing Acts requires that HUD must consider 1) the racial balance of schools attended by 
government supported housing recipients, 2)  the location of middle income and luxury housing, and 3) the 
availability of federally guaranteed low cost loans.   
10 See, e.g. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971);  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 202-203 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974). 
11 See Addressing Equity and Opportunity: The Regional Fair Housing and Equity Assessment (FHEA) Grant 
Obligation (August 2011), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/Regional_FH_Equity_Assessment_HUD_Aug_2011.pdf. 
12 Press Release, HUD, Written Testimony of Shaun Donovan: FY2011 Budget Request for HUD (Feb. 23, 2010) 
(emphasis added), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/testimonies/2010/2010-02-23. 
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3,419 in 1995 (or 8 percent of all students of color in the region) to 20,074 in 2002 (32 percent) 
and 31,535 in 2010 (36 percent). 
  
Recent trends in the LIHTC Program 
 
Recent research by the Institute on Race and Poverty (IRP), reported in Region: Planning 
the Future of the Twin Cities showed that, in 2002, roughly 50 percent of LIHTC units and 55 
percent Section 8 project units were located in the region’s two central cities.13  IRP analysis of 
more recent tax credit allocation data in MHFA’s annual publication of “Housing Tax Credit 
Awards and Applicants” shows that the percentage of LIHTC awards going to suburbs, measured 
in dollars, hovered near 60 percent from 2005 to 2009, then dropping to 50 percent in 2010 and 
2011 (reflected in the chart below). Thus the central cities with only a quarter of the region’s 
population and deeply racially segregated schools have received roughly 50 percent of the tax 





Moreover subsidized housing units in the suburbs since 1986 continue to be located 
primarily in areas with schools which are predominantly non-white or resegregating. The map 
below shows the location of elementary schools in the region, divided into three categories—
predominantly white (schools with non-white shares between 0 and 30 percent), integrated (non-
white shares between 30 and 50 percent), and predominantly non-white (non-white shares 
                                                          
13 Orfield, Myron and Thomas Luce, Region: Planning the Future of the Twin Cities, University of Minnesota Press, 
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greater than 50 percent). The map also shows contours for the parts of the region where schools 
of each sort predominate. In 2007, nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of all subsidized housing units 
in the region were inside the red contour where nearly all schools were predominantly non-white. 
Only 17 percent were in the non-shaded area where schools were predominantly white. This part 
of the region, of course, is where opportunity structures are strongest—where jobs are growing 
most quickly and where low-poverty, high quality schools predominate. 
 
This pattern is very similar to neighborhood characteristics (as opposed to schools). 
Despite multiple levels of law and regulation to the contrary, subsidized units are also still 
disproportionately in neighborhoods of minority concentration (as defined by HUD) in the Twin 
Cities. IRP analysis of Housing Link data shows that in 2007, 57 percent of subsidized units 
(including LIHTC and Section 8 project units) were in census tracts with more than 30 percent 
minority residents, more than twice the percentage of the region’s population living in those 
tracts.  
 
A simulation by IRP of the potential effects of the placement of subsidized units in 2005 
showed that more proactive placement of existing LIHTC units in attendance areas for low 
poverty schools could have significantly increased school integration at that time.14 For instance, 
                                                          
14 See Institute on Race and Poverty,  A Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Twin Cities Schools and 
Neighborhoods,  38, available at http://www.irpumn.org. 
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if LIHTC and project-based Section 8 units had been assigned randomly by race and located 
across the region in the same proportions as overall population, then the region could have been 
brought nearly one-third of the way to the goal of integrated schools in 2005.15 It is thus 
conceivable that pro-integrative placement of new units in low poverty school attendance areas 
could do most of the work necessary for a racially integrated regional school system.16  Indeed, 
in the long run, if housing policy returns to the more pro-integrative strategies of earlier decades 
it may be possible to have integrated schools with less pro-integrative busing than exists today.   
 
Overall, as the central city schools have collapsed under segregation and poverty, the 
central cities have been allocated nearly twice their regional fair share of tax credit funding. Most 
of the tax credit units have been placed in neighborhoods in which the schools are predominately 
poor and non-white, have failing test sores (whether public or charter) and are growing worse 
and more isolated from college and middle-income jobs.  
 
Recent MHFA tax credit allocation data also show that between 2005 and 2011, $10 
million of new construction added about 1,200 of new units in the central cities, often in 
segregated neighborhoods, while at the same time, the state rejected about $32 million worth of 
requests from suburban areas, the part of the region more likely to have higher achieving and 
more integrated schools. In the suburbs, 85 percent of these LIHTC units are in white or stably 
integrated area. In the city, 85 percent of the units are in neighborhoods with more than 30 
percent minority households and virtually all of the units are in areas with mostly non-white, 
high poverty and low performing schools. (See the table below and the map on the following 
page.) 
  
                                                          
15 Id. at 39. 
16 If a random placement of units does half the work, a pro-integrative placement of all of the units by logical 






It is also possible that suburban units could have been developed at lower expense than 
central city units. Over the last six years the average subsidy per unit according to MHFA in the 
central cities was $8,219. In the suburbs it was $7,934. In this light, it is noteworthy that, 
according to the Dakota County Community Development Agency, rents in the projects they 
have built are much more affordable in terms of both the government subsidy and the tenant rent 
than those in equivalent central city units. Such suburban units would have provided not only 
shelter to children living in them but access to schools with much better graduation and college 
attendance rates.   
 
The state’s system of sub-allocators is also highly segregative. Because it focuses so 
much effort on the two central cities, it has been a clear impediment to integration which the 
state does not identify in its Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice. The placement of 
the low-income housing tax credit by the Minneapolis and Saint Paul sub-allocators appears to 
be as segregative as the conduct by the City of Minneapolis which led to the successful fair 
housing law suit in Hollman v. Cisneros.17 Because of the extremely segregative conduct of the 
central city sub-allocators, Minnesota Housing’s obligation to create a pro-integrative scoring 
system for proposals is even more clear.   
 
    
                                                          
17 Civ. No. 4-92-712 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 21, 1995); see also Timothy L. Thompson, Promoting Mobility and Equal 





% Minority in Tract HTC Units 30% 50% 80% % Minority in Tract HTC Units 30% 50% 80%
0 to 19% 73 1,246 13,396 23,903 0 to 19% 1,127 6,954 26,301 60,473
20 to 29% 263 2,135 9,963 16,023 20 to 29% 507 4,874 23,254 51,749
30 to 49% 426 6,123 18,077 28,615 30 to 49% 282 1,905 12,398 25,412
50 to 59% 200 2,915 8,823 12,693 50 to 59% 22 754 3,854 5,919
60 to 79% 545 5,840 16,742 23,743 60 to 79% 0 295 3,029 4,174
80% or more 329 3,628 6,779 9,690 80% or more 0 61 640 1,170





% Minority in Tract HTC Units 30% 50% 80% % Minority in Tract HTC Units 30% 50% 80%
0 to 19% 4.0 5.7 18.2 20.8 0 to 19% 58.2 46.9 37.9 40.6
20 to 29% 14.3 9.8 13.5 14.0 20 to 29% 26.2 32.8 33.5 34.8
30 to 49% 23.2 28.0 24.5 25.0 30 to 49% 14.6 12.8 17.8 17.1
50 to 59% 10.9 13.3 12.0 11.1 50 to 59% 1.1 5.1 5.5 4.0
60 to 79% 29.7 26.7 22.7 20.7 60 to 79% 0.0 2.0 4.4 2.8
80% or more 17.9 16.6 9.2 8.5 80% or more 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.8






Furthermore, under the QAP—contrary to the clear requirements of the Fair Housing Act—
Minnesota awards no points for racial integration at all in the proposal evaluation process. Only 
one or two points are awarded for a potential project in low poverty areas. In contrast, virtually 
all of the other criteria—worth well over 100 points—appear to promote the placement of units 
in areas of minority concentration or resegregation.  For example, “readiness to proceed” favors 
areas with less community opposition (24 points). In addition, “rehabilitation of existing 
structures” (10 points), “being part of community revitalization plan” (2 points), “using existing 
water or sewer” (10 points), “foreclosed properties” (10 points), “preservation of existing 
credits” (10 points) “permanent housing for the homeless” (110 points) “minimizing 
transportation costs” (3 points) “serves lowest income tenants” (13 points), “local philanthropic 
contribution” (which favors local CDCs operating in segregated neighborhoods) (10 points) 
would all seem to favor core city projects over areas where the schools are white or integrated 
and high-performing.18 Even housing growth (10 points), which would generally appear to be 
pro-integrative by favoring suburbs, actually prioritized housing in Minneapolis and St. Paul in 
recent years when the cities led the region in new housing starts. Most recently, in 2010 the state 
agency added a criterion for “transit oriented development” which, if given effect, could increase 
the segregation of schools, particularly on the Central Corridor between Minneapolis and Saint 
Paul.    
  
  While some of the proposed changes to the QAP may slightly ameliorate this bias, most 
of the proposed changes actually make the system more segregative. Specifically, revising the 
targeting of the State Designated Basis Boost to areas that have community revitalization plans, 
historic buildings, and a high proportion of government supported housing is segregative. Other 
changes, such as revising the top growth community criteria, philanthropic contribution credit, 
and non-financial readiness to proceed could have very minor integrative effects, but will not 
change the overall segregative character of the QAP scoring criteria.19   
 
The QAP must reflect the federal fair housing framework for stable metropolitan racial 
integration (SMRI) as articulated in the site and neighborhood standards developed under the 
authority of the 1) Fair Housing Act, 2) the Civil Right Act of 1964, and 3) the equal protection 
clause of the U.S. Constitution.20 These site and neighborhood standards are codified at 24 
C.F.R. section 941.202.21 
For purposes of stable metropolitan racial integration, the Fair Housing Act creates three 
types of metropolitan neighborhoods or communities: 
1) “Areas of minority concentration,”22 or neighborhoods or communities with more than 
30 percent non-white population in housing and/or neighborhood schools. These are 
neighborhoods or communities that are largely non-white and poor, or on a clear path toward 
                                                          
18 See Minnesota Housing, Self-Scoring Worksheet, 2012 Housing Tax Credit Program. (Scoring Criteria) available 
at http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/groups/multifamily/documents/webasset/mhfa_010882.rtf..   
19 See Proposed Revisions to the Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) and Procedural Manual, 2013 Housing Tax Credit 
Program. 
20 See Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization:  Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit, 58 Vand.L.Rev 1747, 1763-1776 (2005). 
21 See also Shannon v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). 
22 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (c)(1)(i) (2010). 
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racial and social segregation and disinvestment caused by housing discrimination. Under the Fair 
Housing Act, “color blindness is not permissible” in areas of minority concentration and the 
“increase of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima 
facie at variance with national housing policy.”23 
2) “Racially mixed areas”24 or neighborhoods or communities that are presently 
integrated, but where integration is fragile and subject to resegregation. These are neighborhoods 
or communities with a white and middle income majority, whose racial and economic stability is 
threatened by illegal and un-redressed housing discrimination including, but not limited to, a) 
steering by real estate agents, b) individual and geographic credit discrimination, c) 
discriminatory placement of government sponsored low-income family housing, d) 
discriminatory drawing of sub district school district attendance area boundaries or catchment 
areas25, and e) other discriminatory housing or education practices by state governments or by 
surrounding local governments. The Fair Housing Act requires HUD to consider the racial 
balance of schools attended by government-supported housing recipients.26 The clear implication 
of this legal requirement is that stably racially integrated schools are a central component of 
SMRI enforcement.27 
3) All other neighborhoods or communities that are predominantly white and middle or 
upper income and under no threat of resegregation caused by housing discrimination. A subset of 
these neighborhoods includes “high opportunity neighborhoods or communities” (HOC). HOCs 
are defined to include the region’s: a) best performing and best funded local public schools 
(which must also be either predominantly white and low-poverty or stably racial and 
economically integrated); b) best health facilities, services, and outcomes; c) best municipal 
facilities and services at a given tax rate, d) highest growth of entry level employment; e) highest 
concentration of luxury housing; and f) strongest, federally guaranteed, low cost prime credit 
market for housing and businesses redevelopment.28 SMRI policy requires that these types of 
communities be prioritized for the placement of new government subsidized family housing. 
Research not only shows this approach is necessary for SMRI, but also shows that placement of 
housing in HOCs provides the best result for advances in educations and employment success.29 
The QAP should be redrafted to change the implied pro-segregative incentives to pro-
integrative ones.  Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 75 percent of projects should be pro-
integrative or, at a minimum, the allocation plan must provide more pro-integrative siting 
decisions than segregative ones in each cycle.30 All segregative decisions must occur in the 
context of a properly prepared community revitalization plan that will actually revitalize the 
                                                          
23 Shannon, 436 F.2d at 821. 
24 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (c)(1)(ii) (2010).   
25 See Keyes v. Denver School District, 413 US 189 (1973)(outlined standards for fair drawing of school catchment 
areas and declaring that housing and school segregation are reciprocally related). 
26 See 436 F.2d at 822  
27 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201 (segregated school boundary drawing and segregated housing patterns have reciprocal 
effects).  
28 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (c)(2)(g);  The Fair Housing Acts requires that HUD must consider 1) the racial balance of 
schools attended by government supported housing recipients, 2)  the location of middle income and luxury housing, 
and 3) the availability of federally guaranteed low cost loans.  See Shannon, 436 F.2d at 822.   
29 See IRP, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Twin Cities Schools and Neighborhoods,” pp. 9-12, 
http:www.irpumn.org., for a review the research documenting the benefits of integrated schools. 
30 See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737-38 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
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neighborhood (as measured by school characteristics, the share of middle-income residents, and 
local business vitality). A plan that simply represents the status quo regarding segregation is 
impermissible under Title VIII.   
 
The new criteria must incentivize the placement of units in high opportunity 
communities, or geographic areas with low-poverty, high-performing schools with less than 30 
percent of the children qualifying for free or reduced cost lunch, and with less than 30 percent 
non-white students. In addition to integrated schools, the QAP should incent housing in cities 
and school districts with high levels of new entry level job growth, high fiscal capacity and low 
local tax rates, the best public health statistics, and the lowest crime rates.   
 
The MHFA should redraft its QAP to conform to the requirements of the Federal Fair 
Housing Act and use its all of its “immense leverage” to further integrated and balanced living 
patterns.31  Its scoring system should incent stable racial integration. It is both good policy for the 
region and it is the law of the land. 
 
 




      Myron Orfield 
      Professor of Law  
      Director of the Institute on Race & Poverty 
 
                                                          
31See NAACP v Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d  149 (citing NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637, 644 (D. 
Mass. 1983)). The First Circuit pragmatically argued the legislative history reflects an intention that HUD should 
“use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely 
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April 13, 2012 
 
Mr. Matt Bower 
Office of Grants and Special Projects 
307M City Hall  
350 South Fifth Street 
Minneapolis, MN 55415 
 
Re: Comments of Myron Orfield on Minneapolis FY 2012 
Housing and Community Development
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
 I submit these comments to 
Council’s public hearing on April 3, 2012. I oppose the city’s proposal to permit the city 
to use HOME and other federal affordable housing funds to build additional low income 
housing in neighborhoods that are up to 50 percent non
the current 30 percent restriction would intensify already rapidly increasing racial 
segregation in violation of the 
 
Existing federal regulations prohibit the city from using 
neighborhoods that are more than 30 percent non
building a disproportionate share of low income housing in poor and segregated, or 
integrated but resegregating, neighborhoods, when it is possible to build
housing in low poverty, high opportunity white or stably integrated neighborhoods.
Under the Fair Housing Act, 
low income housing units to poor segregated neighborhoods or unstably int
neighborhoods.4 Courts in these circumstance
concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at 
variance with the national housing policy.”
clear that, “increasing or maintaining racially segregated housing patterns merely because 
                                                
1 Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 92.202; 941.202; 983.57
3 See Shannon v. United States Dep’t 
that “increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and
prima facie at variance with the national housing policy” and therefore concluding that housing authorities 
should not site new housing in racially concentrated areas if there are viable alternatives); 
C.F.R. § 941.202(g) (requiring public housing sites to be accessible to “
health facilities and services” that are “at least equivalent to those typically found in neighborhoods 
consisting largely of similar unassisted standard housing” (emphasis added))
4 Shannon, 436 F.2d at 820; see also
5 See 436 F.2d at 821; 24 C.F.R. § 941.202; 983.57(e)(2).
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supplement my public comments at the City 
-white. I am concerned that lifting 
city’s obligation to affirmatively further fair housing
these funds in 
-white.2 The Fair Housing Act forbids 
 that same 
“color blindness is not permissible” in the decision to add 
egrated 
s have held that the “increase … of racial 
5 Moreover, the courts have made 
 
§ 3601 et seq.; 5304(b) (2006). 
(e)(2) & (e)(3) (2011). 
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see also
educational, commercial, and 
. 










 is thus 
 24 
 University of Minnesota Law School s N150 Walter Mondale Hall s 229 – 19th Avenue South  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 s tel: 612-625-8071 s fax: 612-624-8890 s irp@umn.edu s www.irpumn.org 
minority groups will gain an immediate benefit would render such persons willing, and 
perhaps unwitting, partners in the trend toward ghettoization of our urban centers.”6 As 
Judge Cote wrote in her Westchester summary judgment opinion: 
 
The HUD Guide explains that while it is often the case that minorities are 
disproportionately represented among the low-income population, simply providing 
affordable housing for the low-income population “is not in and of itself sufficient to 
affirmatively further fair housing.” This unsurprising statement is grounded in the 
statutory and regulatory framework behind the obligation to AFFH, which as already 
discussed, is concerned with addressing whether there are independent barriers to 
protected classes exercising fair housing choice. As a matter of logic, providing more 
affordable housing for a low income racial minority will improve its housing stock but 
may do little to change any pattern of discrimination or segregation. Addressing that 
pattern would at a minimum necessitate an analysis of where the additional housing is 
placed.7 
 
 The city seeks to become more segregated based on the provisions of 24 C.F.R 
section 983.57(e)(3), which states that the cities must assure: 
 
[A] reasonable distribution of assisted units each year, that, over a period of several 
years, will approach an appropriate balance of housing choices within and outside areas 
of minority concentration.  An appropriate balance in any jurisdiction must be determined 
in light of local conditions affecting the range of housing choices available for low-
income minority families and in relation to the racial mix of the locality’s population. 
 
The city was also limited by terms of the Hollman v. Cisneros consent 
agreement.8  Although the agreement is no longer in force, its definition of areas of 
minority concentration remain in effect in the city housing plan.  The city never even 
attempted to comply with this promise.  Even while enjoined by the Hollman decree, the 
city continued to locate low income housing in a manner that increased racial 
segregation. At the time of the Hollman lawsuit in 1992, plaintiffs alleged that 68 percent 
of scattered site housing was placed in neighborhoods that were more that 30 percent 
non-white. Recent HUD data show that the situation has not improved—in fact, it has 
worsened. The data show that 80 percent of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) units through 2009 and 85 percent of all subsidized units were sited in 
neighborhoods that are more than 29 percent non-white, the limit set by the decree (see 
Appendix Maps 1–2 and Table 1) and rules. Even under existing guidelines, the city has 
hyper-segregated low income housing in neighborhoods of minority concentration.  It 
now wants permission to do by law what has been doing improperly. It is fair to predict 
that, if given this permission, the city will build virtually all of its low income housing in 
areas of minority concentration and none in a pro-integrative fashion. It is important to 
                                                 
6 Otero v. New York City Hous. Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973). 
7 See United States of America ex rel Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York v. Westchester 
County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
8 See Hollman v. Cisneros, Civ. No. 4-92-712 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 1995); Timothy L. Thompson, Promoting 
Mobility and Equal Opportunity: Hollman v. Cisneros, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 
237, 248 (1996). 
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note that a federal court reviewing a very similar factual pattern of LIHTC siting recently 
held the pattern constituted a disparate impact violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act.9  
 
The evidence is clear that there are no comparable housing choices for minority 
families in areas outside minority-concentrated neighborhoods.  The city has undertaken 
no factual inquiry on this subject that would justify the rational belief that its plan would 
increase choices for non-white families.  Loosening civil rights law will have the opposite 
effect, decreasing choice and intensifying segregation.  The “local conditions” and the 
present highly segregated state of the city prove the fallacy of the city’s plan.    
 
Contrary to the city’s position, it is also clear that the concentration of subsidized 
units in areas of minority concentration for purposes of revitalization, 26 U.S.C. section 
42, does not present a “compelling government interest” in the face of the clear and 
powerful remedial civil rights commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution and the Fair Housing Act.10 It is beyond doubt that urban revitalization goals 
and incentives must be harmonized with and subordinated to superseding constitutional 
and statutory fair housing law. It is neither legal—nor possible—to revitalize a 
community by deepening governmental racial discrimination and housing segregation.11   
 
The City’s Proposal Intensifies School Segregation in Minneapolis  
 
The Fair Housing Act requires Minnesota Housing and all state sub-allocators to 
consider the racial balance of schools attended by government-supported housing 
recipients.12 The clear implication of this legal requirement is that stably racially 
integrated schools are a central component of fair housing policy. Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that school and housing segregation are reciprocally related and 
the patterns of illegal housing segregation causes school segregation and, similarly, that 
illegal school segregation causes segregation in housing.13 
 
HUD’s Fair Housing Equity Assessment Grant Applications, for example, require 
grant recipients—such as the Met Council’s Corridors of Opportunity Program—to 
monitor not only the racial balance of local schools but their academic performance.14 
                                                 
9 See Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Community Affairs, 2012 WL 953696 
(N.D. Tex., March 20, 2012); 749 F.Supp. 2d. 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
10 See 749 F. Supp. 2d. at 503–04. 
11 See id. 
12 Shannon v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 822 (3d Cir. 1970); 24 C.F.R. § 
941.202(c) (2011). The Fair Housing Act dictates that HUD must consider 1) the racial balance of schools 
attended by government supported housing recipients, 2) the location of middle-income and luxury 
housing, and 3) the availability of federally guaranteed low cost loans. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; 24 
C.F.R. § 941.202(c). 
13 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1971);  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 202–03 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974). 
14 See Addressing Equity and Opportunity: The Regional Fair Housing and Equity Assessment (FHEA) 
Grant Obligation (August 2011), 
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/Regional_FH_Equity_Assessment_HUD_Aug_2011.pdf. 
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Additionally, on February 23, 2010, Secretary Shaun Donovan clarified HUD’s fair 
housing requirements for its state grantees before Congress, stating: 
[S]ustainability also means creating “geographies of opportunity,” places that 
effectively connect people to jobs, quality public schools, and other amenities.  
Today, too many HUD-assisted families are stuck in neighborhoods of concentrated 
poverty and segregation, where one's zip code predicts poor educational, 
employment, and even health outcomes.  These neighborhoods are not sustainable 
in their present state.15  
 
  In the Minneapolis school desegregation case, Booker v. Special School District 
No. 1, a federal district court found the Minneapolis school system to be de jure 
segregated. In making this finding, the federal court specifically noted that the city’s 
housing markets were intentionally racially segregated16 and that the city’s housing 
policy had in part caused the segregation of the school system.17 Today, Minneapolis 
schools remain highly segregated and virtually all predominantly non-white schools in 
the system are in the aforementioned minority-concentrated neighborhoods, while no 
predominantly white schools and very few integrated schools are in those neighborhoods 
(see Appendix Map 3). 
 
  Federal law unambiguously requires a city to consider the racial and social 
composition of local schools in its siting of affordable housing.18 This is the case in a 
unitary school system, free of segregation. The city’s refusal to abide by this federal 
requirement in its non-unitary, dual school system is contrary to federal rules.19 
                                                 
15 Press Release, HUD, Written Testimony of Shaun Donovan: FY2011 Budget Request for HUD (Feb. 23, 
2010) (emphasis added), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/testimonies/2010/2010-02-23. 
16 351 F. Supp 799, 806 (“The record indicates a high degree of residential segregation within the 
boundaries of the defendant School District.  The near north side of the City and a large portion of south 
central Minneapolis contain heavy concentrations of minority groups.  At the same time, the perimeter of 
the city is largely White. Residential segregation in Minneapolis is in large part due to racial 
discrimination.  Prior to 1962 it was common practice for members of the Board of Realtors to only show 
minority persons houses in certain areas.”). 
17 In fact, the schools sued the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority (MHRA) and HUD, 
arguing that their segregated housing policy had frustrated the district’s efforts to comply with court-
ordered desegregation by building low income housing on the near north side of Minneapolis, which 
increased the concentration of minority residents in that area of the city.  See Cheryl W. Heilman, Booker v. 
Special School District No. 1: A History of School Desegregation in Minneapolis, MN, 12 LAW & INEQ. 
127, 166 (1993) (citing Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 1979)).  
However, the court dismissed the complaint as untimely. Id. When later interviewed, Judge Larson said that 
he had made a serious mistake in dismissing the complaint. Id.  
18 Shannon v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding that 
“increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus 
prima facie at variance with the national housing policy” and therefore concluding that housing authorities 
should not site new housing in racially concentrated areas if there are viable alternatives); see also 24 
C.F.R. § 941.202 (2011) (requiring public housing sites to be accessible to “educational, commercial, and 
health facilities and services” that are “at least equivalent to those typically found in neighborhoods 
consisting largely of similar unassisted standard housing” (emphasis added)). 
19 The federal court in the Booker case dissolved its desegregation order, but it did so relying on the state’s 
school desegregation rule, and never declared that the school district had achieved unitary status. See, e.g., 
Derek W. Black, Testimony before Minnesota Department of Education Integration Revenue Replacement 
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Regrettably, the city’s housing planning documents noticeably neglect any reference to 
schools, except to assert—on the basis of non-peer-reviewed, housing industry 
“studies”—that building more low income housing in poor neighborhoods will improve 
school performance. 
 
  Because of this intensified pattern of racially segregative construction of low-
income housing, in clear disregard of federal housing rules, the Minneapolis public 
school system has become more—not less—racially and socially segregated that it was 
when the Booker and Hollman lawsuits were filed. In 1995, there were ten schools in 
Minneapolis that were more than 90 percent non-white.20 Those schools represented nine 
percent of Minneapolis schools.21 In 2010, there were 33 schools that were more than 90 
percent non-white, representing 39 percent of all schools.22 Similarly, at the time of the 
Hollman settlement, there were 41 Minneapolis schools that were more than 70 percent 
non-white, representing 35 percent of Minneapolis schools.23 By 2010, this number had 
risen to 57 schools representing 65 percent of all Minneapolis schools.24 These schools 
are overwhelmingly composed of poor children and have some of the lowest standardized 
test scores of all schools in Minnesota.  
 
 Due to the profound segregation of its schools and housing, Minneapolis has 
experienced an enormous flight of children of all races from its schools. Since 1995, 
enrollment has declined 26 percent, with most of the losses in the areas where low 
income housing was predominant. 
  
Research Demonstrates the Likely Detrimental Effects of Subsidized Housing in 
Moderate- and High-Poverty Areas 
 The city’s new consolidated plan would potentially intensify the city’s pattern of 
racial segregation by expanding the neighborhoods eligible for subsidized housing to 
include census tracts with minority shares between 29 and 50 percent. Our research at the 
Institute on Race and Poverty shows that these types of neighborhoods are at high risk of 
resegregating.25 This research implies that neighborhoods with minority shares of roughly 
30 percent or more are more likely to become segregated than to remain integrated. This 
means that the neighborhoods the city intends to make eligible for subsidized housing are 
precisely the ones at the threshold of transition. 
 Moreover, peer-reviewed research on the effects of subsidized housing on nearby 
properties implies that these types of neighborhoods are also most likely to be adversely 
                                                                                                                                                 
Task Force Hearing on School Diversity and Integration (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.school-
diversity.org/pdf/Black_Minnesota_testimony_12-20-11.pdf.  





25 See Institute on Race and Poverty, A Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Twin Cities Schools and 
Neighborhoods 20–22 (July 2009), 
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/Regional_Integration_Draft_3_-_Long_Version.pdf. 
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affected by the addition of subsidized housing. For instance, George Galster’s literature 
review concluded that neighborhood characteristics influence how subsidized housing 
affects surrounding areas and that there is growing evidence that neighborhoods with 
moderate home values and poverty rates are at greater risk of experiencing negative 
effects, even at lower concentrations of affordable or multi-family housing. Finally, he 
also concluded that “affordable housing seems least likely to generate negative impacts 
when inserted into high-value, low poverty, stable neighborhoods.”26 
 Similarly, a literature review by Khadduri et al. of Abt Associates concluded that 
the effect of subsidized housing on nearby properties “appears to depend on the scale of 
the project and the stability of the neighborhood. A small project in a stable 
neighborhood has either no effect or a small positive effect. On the other hand, a project 
added to an unstable neighborhood, especially a large project, can either cause a decline 
in property values or prevent revitalization that would otherwise occur as a result of 
market forces.”27 
 
The City’s “Market-Building Strategy” Is Flawed and Unfounded in Evidence 
When the Institute on Race and Poverty informed city representatives of these 
articles, they responded, essentially without any evidence, that concentrating low-income 
housing subsidies in moderate-minority, moderate-poverty neighborhoods would help 
build the housing markets in these areas. They argued, among other things, that LIHTC 
housing “was not really affordable housing,” but rather “market rate housing” with higher 
rents than the local markets. They also contended that the city had to use the LIHTC units 
in segregated neighborhoods because “the market was providing no private credit” there, 
while white neighborhoods of the city were brimming with credit and new rental housing. 
Those areas received no LIHTC units because they were thriving. The poor segregated 
neighborhoods which had no private market had to be revitalized with more low income 
family housing. 
In support of this so-called “market building” strategy, the only evidence the city 
provided was a non-peer reviewed government report and a glossy industry trade 
publication that asserted—without any reviewable facts—that low income housing 
helped build the housing market in a poor, all-white rural county in Indiana. When 
questioned about the relevance of this “study” for construction of housing in racially 
segregated neighborhoods, particularly in light of several peer-reviewed studies to the 
contrary, the city could not produce relevant evidence that further concentrating low 
income housing in racially segregated neighborhoods would build these housing markets.  
  As I prepared this letter, city representatives responded with another article—a 
literature review by the Center for Housing Policy (CHP) prepared for the MacArthur 
                                                 
26 George Galster, The Effects of Affordable and Multi-Family Housing on Market Values of Nearby 
Homes, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 176–211 (Anthony Downs, ed., 2004). 
27 JILL KHADDURI, KIMBERLY BURNETT & DAVID RODDA, TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES: 
LITERATURE REVIEW, Abt Associates, Cambridge MA (2003), 41, 63. 
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Foundation.28 This piece was not peer-reviewed, but it is a reasonable summary of the 
literature. However, a significant part of it focuses on the economic effects of the 
construction activity associated with these programs and not on the question of longer-
term economic effects on the neighborhoods themselves. The effects from construction 
activities are short-lived and are unlikely to be felt primarily by neighborhood residents. 
In addition, impact studies of this sort commonly overstate secondary effects (often 
called multiplier effects). 
 
  The CHP review also highlights other issues of only limited relevance in the 
current case. These include effects on homebuyers, which are not relevant for the LIHTC 
and Section 8 programs at issue in Minneapolis. There is also a good discussion of how 
affordable housing can help local employers by providing housing for low- and 
moderate-wage workers. However, this argument is much more relevant for projects in 
areas where the non-subsidized market is high-rent or all owner-occupied, which is not 
the case in the Minneapolis neighborhoods in question. There is also some discussion of 
how projects affect nearby market values. This information is relevant, but the review 
focuses on only a particularly rosy evaluation of a single study in New York City, with 
no mention of the broader reviews noted above. Finally, there is a section on other 
potential spillover effects—an issue that is potentially very relevant. However, the 
section essentially highlights the lack of findings in this regard and recommends that 
more research is needed on the issue. 
 
  The city has practiced its “market building” strategy for many years and the 
approach has twice been found illegal by federal courts. All that it can show for its 
strategy is neighborhoods and schools that are more segregated, disinvested, and more 
economically and socially isolated. The city has—through its actions and inactions— 
shaped the racially segregated nature of the north and south neighborhoods, more than 
any other governmental entity. It now justifies further concentrating low income housing 
projects in these neighborhoods by arguing that there is no private mortgage money to 
support development in the already-segregated neighborhoods that it helped to create. 
While these neighborhoods have been redlined, and more recently exploited by the 
private subprime financial market, the city has undertaken no fair housing action of any 
kind to respond to this discrimination (see Appendix Maps 5–8). Moreover, while cities 
like Memphis and Baltimore have challenged the conduct of Wells Fargo bank, the city 
of Minneapolis has taken no action in the face of far greater racial lending disparities.29 
 
As an LIHTC Sub-allocator, the City Helped to Dismantle a Regional Pro-
Integrative Housing Strategy 
 
  In 1985, the city used its political power with the legislature to seek the creation of 
central city sub-allocators of the tax credit to ensure that it would receive a higher than 
proportional allocation of LIHTC units. In doing so, the city undermined the nation’s 
                                                 
28 Keith Waldrip, Laura Williams & Suzanne Hague, The Role of Affordable Housing in Creating Jobs and 
Stimulating Local Economic Development: A Review of the Literature, Center for Housing Policy (2011). 
29 See, e.g., Institute on Race and Poverty, ComError! Hyperlink reference not valid.munities in Crisis: 
Race and Mortgage Lending in the Twin Cities (February 2009), 
http://www.irpumn.org/website/projects/index.php?strWebAction=project_detail&intProjectID=51. 
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most effective pro-integrative housing system. The director of the Minnesota Housing 
Finance Agency, Jim Solem, opposed the proposal, as did the chair of the Metropolitan 
Council, on the grounds that these sub-allocators would thwart the pro-integrative 
regional fair housing system that had been developed under clear HUD regulation—
Metropolitan Council Policy 39. 
 
  Nevertheless, the city of Minneapolis pursued the strategy, knowing that during the 
Reagan administration, HUD would not question its strategy. It is noteworthy that one the 
most effective and pro-integrative HUD- supported housing plans in U.S. history—the 
Metropolitan Council’s Policy 39—was not undermined by white suburban opposition, 
but instead by central city politicians and developers.  
 
The City’s Qualified Allocation Plan Incents Segregative Housing Placement 
   
Together, Minneapolis and St. Paul have also adopted a qualified allocation plan 
(QAP) that directly incents the segregative placement of low-income units within the 
cities.30 Specifically, the central cities’ QAP gives over 100 points for projects likely to 
be in high-minority, high-poverty neighborhoods, no points for racially integrated 
projects, and only 10 points for “economic integration.” (By the cities’ definition, an 
economically integrative project is one in a neighborhood that is up to 50 percent non-
white and with no limits on non-white and/or poor kids in local schools.31)   A federal 
court recently found a similar QAP in Dallas to be a disparate impact violation of the Fair 
Housing Act.32 
 
Minneapolis Must Fulfill Its Federal Fair Housing Obligations 
 
 The city’s intransigence, twice acknowledged in court cases, should not be 
rewarded by HUD. Currently, the city has no civil rights plan. Moreover, it has no 
concerted desegregation plan to integrate segregated neighborhoods or to stabilize 
existing, tenuously integrated neighborhoods. 
 
                                                 
30 See Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board Low Income Housing Qualified Allocation Plan, 
available at  
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups/public/@cped/documents/webcontent/convert_254711.pdf; 
see also Memorandum from Myron Orfield to Gloria Stiehl, Minnesota Department of Employment and 
Economic Development, Comments on 2011 Minnesota Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice 
(Dec. 31, 2011), 13–14 (attached as Appendix) (outlining how the qualified allocation plan incents 
segregative placement of low-income units within the metropolitan area). 
31 Minneapolis and St. Paul have created qualified allocation plans (QAPs) that provide 10 points for a 
segregated redevelopment area, 10 points for Hennepin Home program match (in segregated 
neighborhoods), up to 20 points for working with non-profits (who, in Minneapolis, virtually all operate 
only in segregated neighborhoods), 5 points for projects with established resident aid programs (all in 
segregated neighborhoods), 5 points for projects with the support of neighborhood groups, up to 20 points 
for rehabilitation (again, almost all existing projects are in segregated neighborhoods), up to 15 points for 
projects with previous subsidies, up to 15 points for project with additional financial additional support, up 
to 15 points for intermediary support, and up to 10 points for the most active transit corridors. There are no 
points for racial integration and only 10 points for economic integration. See id. 
32 See Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Community Affairs, 2012 WL 953696 
(N.D. Tex., March 20, 2012); 749 F.Supp. 2d. 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 University of Minnesota Law School s N150 Walter Mondale Hall s 229 – 19th Avenue South  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 s tel: 612-625-8071 s fax: 612-624-8890 s irp@umn.edu s www.irpumn.org 
To fulfill its fair housing obligations, the city relies on an inadequate analysis of 
impediments to fair housing choice completed by a consortium of metropolitan cities. 
The analysis does not address the placement of government-sponsored housing, it has no 
analysis of existing evidence of discrimination, and it does not include any testimony 
from organizations that study housing discrimination. It is essentially a boilerplate 
document that lacks adequate civil rights analysis. 
 
 
The Public Hearing Structure Was Seriously Flawed 
  
 When I requested time to be heard at the City Council’s April 3, 2012 public 
hearing on the consolidated plan, I was only allowed three minutes to testify. Not only 
were three minutes insufficient for meaningful remarks, but after my short remarks were 
attacked for over twenty-five minutes, I was not permitted any time to respond. The 
response by city housing staff included many statements that were demonstrably 
incorrect. They also included ad hominem attacks which misstated or exaggerated my 
positions.33 
 
It is my firm opinion that the city’s sub-allocation authority impedes fair housing 
choice in the region. Minneapolis, even after Booker and Hollman, still fails to administer 
its federal housing programs in ways that affirmatively further fair housing. The records 
of the Metropolitan Council and Minnesota Housing, while far from perfect, are much 
better. In light of this, I believe there is no justification to loosen the requirements on the 









Professor and Director 
Institute on Race and Poverty 
University of Minnesota Law School 
                                                 
33 For instance, staff stated that my request to keep the current caps would mean that no affordable housing 
could ever be built in poor neighborhoods. They also said that I ignored clear evidence that they had given 
to me on numerous occasions that showed how the city’s housing plans will revitalize these 
neighborhoods—a comment that is particularly unjustified in light of how little evidence city staff have 
been willing to cite. Only in the last week have city staff produced any research supporting their 
revitalization claims, and, as noted above, the cited evidence is relatively weak.  Finally, a city official 
gratuitously asserted that “Orfield believed that any time non-whites chose to live together it caused 
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November 2, 2012 
 
Mr. Jonathan Sage-Martinson 
Director Central Corridor Funder’s Collaborative  
451 Lexington Parkway North 
Saint Paul, MN 55104 
 
Dear Mr. Sage-Martinson: 
 I write to express my concern with the policy recommendations of the Central 
Corridor Affordable Housing Coordinated Plan: Recommended Policies and Strategies 
(CCAHP—Report by Twin Cities LISC, January 2012). It is my understanding that 
LISC, the report’s author, is attempting to have the report’s recommendations adopted as 
official government policy. The CCAHP strategies, if adopted, will dramatically increase 
racial and economic segregation and at the same time decrease the possibility of greater 
integration in the Twin Cities. The report’s recommendations are detrimental to the 
region and contrary to both the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the purpose of the HUD 
grant supporting the research. The report should be redrafted and attempts to have it 
adopted by any unit of government should stop.  
I take the formal step of writing because I have repeatedly tried to raise the 
concerns expressed below, but my suggestions have been dismissed. I believe that there 
are many effective race-conscious strategies available to develop a racially and 
economically integrated housing plan along the corridor, but none have been 
recommended in the CCAHP. One such strategy that I believe could be particularly 
effective involves magnet schools at job centers near the University and/or between the 
State Capitol and the Saint Paul CBD, a strategy specifically endorsed in such situations 
by the Fair Housing Planning Guide. Another proven effective approach would be the 
introduction of stable integration strategies and plans that are effectively practiced in 
jurisdictions across the country, in both urban and suburban locations, in demographic 
situations very similar to those of the central corridor.   
In contrast, CCAHP recommends the construction (or preservation) of up to 4,500 
units of affordable housing along the corridor, despite the fact that the corridor already 
contains grossly disproportionate amounts of the region’s subsidized or affordable 
housing (Maps 1 and 2). Only three percent of the seven-county region’s housing is in the 
corridor, but nearly four times that percentage (11 percent) of subsidized housing units 
and more than three times that percentage of units affordable for very-low-income 
households (10 percent) are already there. Recent events also suggest that most of the 
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Central Corridor LRT (2015)
Hiawatha LRT (existing)
Southwest Corridor LRT (post 2020)
NorthStar Commuter Rail (2010)
Key:
1/4 Mile Distance from:












































































































Existing and Planned FutureCommuter Rail Lines
Central Corridor LRT (2015)
Hiawatha LRT (existing)
Southwest Corridor LRT (post 2020)
NorthStar Commuter Rail (2010)
Key:
1/4 Mile Distance from:
Regional Value:  13.5%
Legend
0.0 (123)
3.5 to 6.9% (116)
7.0 to 13.4% (133)
13.5 to 24.9% (175)
25.0 to 39.9% (129)
40.0% or more (71)
to 3.4%
No data (3)
Note:  Census Tracts with "No data" hadfewer than 50 housing units in 2006-10.
In 2006-2010, a household with 50% of the medianincome, in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro Area, couldafford a home valued at $112,218, or a monthly rentof $815. (50% of median income = $32,591)
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and lowest-opportunity neighborhoods. In sum, the central corridor already has among 
the highest concentrations of both subsidized and affordable housing in the region—it 
doesn’t need more. 
Based on recent past levels of housing production, this 4,500-unit goal would 
subsume a very large share of all of the federal, state, and local affordable-housing 
resources in the Twin Cities region. For instance, this represents about 50 percent more 
affordable units than were added to the entire region in 2009 and 2010 combined.1 
Further, this number would mean that a very large share—as high as 58 percent—of all 
housing units near light-rail stations in the corridor would be new or preserved low-
income housing. (Today there are only 7,700 occupied housing units in total within a 
quarter mile of the stations).2  
Such a lopsided effort would greatly intensify racial and economic segregation in 
the corridor, in areas that already include some of the region’s most segregated and 
lowest-opportunity neighborhoods and schools. The commitment of these resources to 
segregated, low-opportunity neighborhoods would inevitably reduce the production of 
new affordable housing in areas that offer residents better schools and higher opportunity. 
This diversion of affordable-housing resources has been a trend in the region in recent 
years. Between 2005 and 2011, $32 million of housing tax credit requests were turned 
down for suburban affordable-housing projects, $21 million of it denied in predominately 
white, high-opportunity suburbs. This funding was then often used to facilitate building 
units in areas of concentrated poverty and low opportunity.3 Many of the units that would 
have been built in predominantly white, high-opportunity neighborhoods would have 
required far less public subsidy per unit and would have lower monthly rents.4  
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the CCAHP is supported by a HUD 
Sustainable Communities grant, the plan nowhere mentions the FHA. The duty to 
affirmatively further fair housing is a broad remedial command in the FHA, which 
requires HUD and all recipients of federal housing assistance to use all their “immense 
leverage” to create racially “integrated and balanced living patterns.”5 The duty to 
affirmatively further fair housing is only fulfilled when “the racial composition in 
assisted housing, in neighborhoods which are predominantly white, reflects the racial 
composition of the region as a whole.”6 The federal courts have stated that housing plans 
and policies “that maintain or increase racial concentration” create “urban blight” and 
                                                 
1 See Metropolitan Council, MetroStats: Affordable Housing Production in the Twin Cities Region 
November 2011, at 1. 
2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010.  
3 Calculations by author of Minnesota Housing, HTC Funding Award Recipients Reports. 
4 Based on an interview with and data from Mark Ulfers of Dakota County CDA. 
5 NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing NAACP v. Harris, 
567 F. Supp. 637, 644 (D. Mass. 1983)). The First Circuit pragmatically argued the legislative history 
reflects an intention that HUD should “use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and 
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases.” NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 817 F.2d at 155. 
6 NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 371-72 (D. Mass. 1989). 
5 
 
are “prima facie” unacceptable under the FHA.7 The CCAHP report fails to even mention 
the FHA, let alone consider CCAHP’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing under 
that law. 
  The FHA requires all recipients of federal housing assistance to take racial and 
socioeconomic data into consideration in all housing planning and siting decisions; a 
colorblind approach is “impermissible.”8 Specifically, the FHA clearly requires HUD and 
all recipients of federal housing assistance to consider the racial balance of schools 
attended by government-supported low-income housing tenants.9 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that school and housing segregation are reciprocally related: illegal 
housing segregation causes school segregation and school segregation leads to 
segregation in housing.10 The FHA regulations and the federal courts have recognized 
that it is virtually impossible to create stably integrated neighborhoods without taking 
into account the racial and social composition of local schools.  
  HUD’s Fair Housing Equity Assessment Grant Applications require grant 
recipients, such as the Met Council’s Corridors of Opportunity Program, to monitor both 
the racial balance and academic performance of local schools.11 On February 23, 2010, 
Secretary Shaun Donovan made HUD’s Fair Housing priorities clear: 
Sustainability also means creating “geographies of opportunity,” places 
that effectively connect people to . . . quality public schools, and other 
amenities. Today, too many HUD-assisted families are stuck in 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and segregation, where one’s 
zip code predicts poor education, employment, and even health 
outcomes. These neighborhoods are not sustainable in their present 
state.12  
  In order to prevent racial segregation, the FHA and its regulations presumptively 
prohibit the construction of new affordable housing in “an area of minority 
concentration,”13 in neighborhoods of high poverty concentration,14 resegregating 
neighborhoods,15 neighborhoods detrimental to family life,16 those with urban blight,17 
                                                 
7 Shannon v. United States Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev. 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3rd Cir. 1970) (emphasis 
added). 
8 Id. at 820-21. 
9 Id. at 822; C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2005). 
10 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974). 
11 See FHEA, Addressing Equity and Opportunity: The Regional Fair Housing and Equity Grant 
Assessment Guidelines, August 2011. 
12 Written Testimony of Shaun Donavon, Secretary of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, FY 2011 Budget Request for HUD, Feb 23, 2010 (emphasis added). 
13 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2005). 
14 See § 941.202(d) (“The site must . . . avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a 
high proportion of low-income persons.”). 
15 See § 941.202(c)(ii) (prohibiting siting in “[a] racially mixed area if the project will cause a significant 
increase in the proportion of minority to non-minority residents in the area”). 
16 See § 941.202(e) (“The neighborhood must not be one which is seriously detrimental to family life.”). 
17 See § 941.202(e). 
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and those without access to basic, decent public facilities and services such as 
education.18 In direct contradiction to the FHA, the CCAHP uses an impermissible 
“colorblind analysis” and ignores all of HUD’s data requirements for housing planning.  
 Prior to the CCAHP, Saint Paul and Minneapolis, in accordance with the 
Gautreaux decision and the Hollman consent decree, designated a neighborhood with 
more than 30 percent non-white population as a neighborhood of minority concentration. 
Because context is important and the Twin Cities remains one of the nation’s whitest 
regions (with just 21 percent non-white residents in 2010), this number should be 
considered, if anything, an upper bound.19 This legal definition, used historically by the 
central cities, also comports well with clear social-science research demonstrating that 
neighborhoods with more than a 30 percent non-white population are unlikely to stay 
racially or economically integrated over time.20 Recent research at the Institute on 
Metropolitan Opportunity has shown that these types of neighborhoods are at high risk of 
resegregating.21 This means that many of the neighborhoods that the CCAHP intends to 
make eligible for subsidized housing are the ones at the threshold of transition. 
Driven by the CCAHP, both central cities have improperly changed their own 
definitions of minority concentration. Minneapolis raised its definition of minority 
concentration to 50 percent, twenty points past a stable integration threshold,22 and Saint 
Paul, in order to justify concentrations of affordable housing on the deeply segregated 
eastern side, has declared that a neighborhood that is 78 percent non-white is not a 
minority neighborhood.23 To put this number in perspective, HUD uses a 50 percent 
figure as its upper bound and applies it nationwide to metropolitan areas much more 
diverse than the Twin Cities.  
The Sustainable Communities Initiative Grant that funds the project requires the 
creation of a Fair Housing Equity Assessment (FHEA). The FHEA requires assessment of 
segregated areas, racially/ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, and fair housing.24 
This analysis is required to be done on a regional scale.25 The preliminary evaluation of 
                                                 
18See § 941.202(e) (“The housing must be accessible to social, recreational, educational, commercial, and 
health facilities and services, and other municipal facilities and services.”). 
19 See FHEA Data Documentation, Draft August 2012. 
20 See GEORGE C. GALSTER, NEIGHBORHOOD SOCIAL MIX: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLICY AND PLANNING, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Wayne State University (January 
2010). 
21 See MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS LUCE, AMERICA’S RACIALLY DIVERSE SUBURBS: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES, Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity (July 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/e0/65/e065d82a1c1da0bfef7d86172ec5391e/Diverse_Suburbs_FINAL.p
df; INSTITUTE ON RACE AND POVERTY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO INTEGRATE TWIN CITIES SCHOOLS 
AND NEIGHBORHOODS 20-22 (July 2009), available at 
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/Regional_Integration_Draft_3_-_Long_Version.pdf. 
22 See Minneapolis Consolidated Plan for Housing and Community Development; One Year Action Plan, 
June 1, 2012-May 31, 2013 at 38.  
23 See St. Paul Consolidated Plan Consolidate Plan and Submission 2010-14 at 63 (“The City defines an 
area of minority group concentration as a census tract that has 78 percent or more minority population.”)  




the region based on HUD’s guidelines (described below) reveals segregation and racially 
concentrated areas of poverty along the central corridor. The FHEA uses the Fair Housing 
Act as its benchmark for evaluating fair housing in the region.26 Under federal law 
grantees are also required to conduct an Analysis of Impediments that addresses 
impediments to fair housing.27 The CCAHP plan contravenes federal housing law and the 
pro-integrative, pro-fair housing, intent of the HUD Sustainable Communities Initiative.  
Segregation and Poverty in the Central Corridor 
Neighborhoods surrounding the Central Corridor have had persistent patterns of 
racial segregation and increasing concentrations of poverty. Minneapolis and Saint Paul 
planning districts that contain parts of the central corridor were 39 percent non-white in 
2010, a slight increase from 2000 (Table 1).28 Areas neighboring LRT station sites on the 
corridor have detrimental patterns of segregation, concentrated poverty, and low incomes 
(Table 1 and Maps 3 and 4). The population living in census blocks within a quarter mile 
of LRT stations was 59 percent non-white—fully 20 points higher than in the larger 
planning areas. Poverty rates were also higher and climbing faster in areas close to LRT 
stations compared to the larger area. The poverty rate for those in census tracts 
intersecting station sites was 39 percent and climbing. Income and income growth were 
also much lower closer to the station sites.  
 
                                                 
26 Addressing Equity and Oppurtunity: The Regional Fair Housing and Equity Assessment Grant 
Obligation (webinar). 
27 Id. 
28 The poverty rate in the planning area was 27 percent in 2006-10, up 7 points from 2000. Similarly, 
household income was $45,346, just 70 percent of the regional median income in 2006-2010, and had 
increased at a rate less than inflation during the decade. 
      Table 1: Race, Poverty and Income in Central Corridor, 2000 to 2010
2000 2010* Change
Corridor Planning Districts Area
Percent Non-White 38 39 1
Poverty Rate 21 27 7
Median Income $37,305 $45,346 22
Areas Near LRT Stations
Percent Non-White 61 59 -3
Poverty Rate 27 39 12
Median Income $29,466 $31,165 6
*2010 poverty and income figures are from 2006-2010 U.S. Census American Community Survey
Minority population includes Hispanics, regardless of race. 
Median Income Change is reported as percentage change, the remaining change figures are
recorded as percentage point changes.  The 2000 figure is not adjusted to 2010 dollars.
Conumer price index inflation increased 25% between 2000 and 2008.
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MAP 3: CENTRAL CORRIDOR AREAPercentage Minority Populationby Census Block, 2010
Area of Interest
Data Sources:  2005 The Lawerence Group2005 Metropolitan Council2002 Minnesota Department of Transportation2004 Ramsey County Regional Railroad Authority2010 U.S. Census SF1
Note:  University Corridor Area consists of 33  U.S. Census Transportation Analysis Zones that are contained or somewhat contained by the St. Paul neighborhoods of St. Anthony Park, Hamline Midway, Merriam Park, Lexington-Hamline, Thomas-Dale and the Minneapolis neighborhoods of Prospect Park/ E. River Road and University.
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MAP 4: CENTRAL CORRIDOR AREAPercentage Persons Below Poverty Lineby Census Tract, 2006-2010 (5-year Average)
Area of Interest
Data Sources:  2005 The Lawerence Group2005 Metropolitan Council2002 Minnesota Department of Transportation2004 Ramsey County Regional Railroad Authority2010 U.S. Census, American Community Survey
Note:  University Corridor Area consists of 33  U.S. Census Transportation Analysis Zones that are contained or somewhat contained by the St. Paul neighborhoods of St. Anthony Park, Hamline Midway, Merriam Park, Lexington-Hamline, Thomas-Dale and the Minneapolis neighborhoods of Prospect Park/ E. River Road and University.
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Racial and economic patterns were not uniform along the corridor. Areas near the 
eastern LRT stations, from Fairview Avenue Station to the Capitol, were considerably 
more racially segregated than the western portion of the corridor, with 2010 non-white 
shares of 75 percent in the eastern portion, compared to only 29 percent in the western 
portion (Table 2). Targeting affordable housing near the station sites on the eastern 
portion of the corridor would add to the already high levels of segregation in the area. 
Although poverty was higher and income was lower in the western portion of the 
corridor, the difference is attributable to the presence of University of Minnesota college 
students in the western portion. In 2006-10, 56 percent of residents in the western portion 
of the corridor were college students, compared to only 13 percent in the east. When 
college students are excluded from the poverty calculation, the poverty rates were 
identical in the two areas.  
  
 The compositions of the elementary schools serving the corridor show an even 
starker contrast between the eastern and the western portions (Table 3 and Map 5). The 
five schools east of the Fairview station were each more than 90 percent non-white and 
poor in 2011-12 and both rates increased in every one of those schools from 1997-98. In 
2011-12, the percentages of students in these schools who were proficient in math and 
reading were just 33 and 44 percent on average. In contrast, two of the three schools west 
of Fairview were less than 36 percent non-white and poor in 2011-12 and both rates were 
decreasing in each. Math and reading proficiency rates in these schools were 71 and 85  
   Table 2: Race, Poverty and Income in East and West Central Corridor, 2000 to 2010
2000 2010* Change
Areas Near East Station Sites
Percent Non-White 73 75 2
Percent in College 11 13 2
Poverty Rate 23 33 10
  Non-College Poverty Rate 32
Median Income $31,659 $34,318 8
Areas Near West Station Sites
Percent Non-White 21 29 8
Percent in College 50 56 6
Poverty Rate 33 47 13
  Non-College Poverty Rate 32
Median Income $26,192 $27,010 3
*2010 poverty and income figures are from 2006-2010 U.S. Census American Community Survey
Minority population includes Hispanics, regardless of race.
Median Income Change is reported as percentage change, the remaining change figures are
recorded as percentage point changes.  The 2000 figure is not adjusted to 2010 dollars.
Conumer price index inflation increased 25% between 2000 and 2008.
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percent on average. (The rates in the third western school, Pratt Elementary, fell between 




 In sum, contrary to law, CCAHP proposes to place a disproportionate share of the 
region’s affordable housing in neighborhoods that are over 50 percent non-white (beyond 
HUD’s highest threshold), that are served by segregated schools in neighborhoods, that 
are “areas of minority concentration,”29 that have high poverty concentration,30 that face 
resegregation,31 that are neighborhoods detrimental to family life,32 that have urban 
                                                 
29 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2005). 
30 See § 941.202(d). 
31 See § 941.202(c)(ii). 
32 See § 941.202(e) (“The neighborhood must not be one which is seriously detrimental to family life.”). 
Table 3: Race and Poverty in Central Corridor Elementary Schools, 1997-98 - 2011-12
% Free or Reduced Price
% Non-white Lunch Eligible
1997-98 2011-12 Change 1997-98 2011-12 Change
West of Fairview Station
Pratt* 58 75 17 53 71 18
St. Anthony Park 51 31 -20 47 23 -24
Groveland 43 36 -7 39 36 -3
Average 51 47 -4 46 43 -3
East of Fairview Station
Hancock 81 94 13 89 93 4
Galtier 70 90 21 77 93 16
Maxfield 74 97 24 78 99 21
Jackson 70 97 27 82 91 9
Franklin** 75 93 18 88 96 8
Average 74 94 20 83 94 12
*: Pratt data are for 2004-05 and 2011-12.
**: Franklin data are for 1997-98 and 2010-11.
Source: Minnesota Department of Education.
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blight,33 and that are without access to basic, decent public facilities and services such as 
education.34  
Other Social and Economic Factors 
Based on the combination of segregation and discrimination by lending 
institutions, the neighborhoods targeted by the CCAHP are also subject to other 
socioeconomic disadvantages. During the housing bubble period of 2004 to 2006, 
subprime lending rates were high in the corridor, particularly in areas near LRT stations 
east of the Fairview Avenue station (Table 4). In fact, subprime lending rates were almost 
three times higher in the eastern portion of the corridor than in the western portion. 
Likewise, recent mortgage-denial rates are also highest near station sites in the eastern 
portion of the corridor. The CCAHP outlines no plan to redress the likely increased 
lending discrimination that will undoubtedly accompany the increasing neighborhood 
segregation their plan will foster.  
 
 
Areas in the corridor also have among the worst health outcomes in the region. 
For instance, mortality rates range from a quarter to twice as high as those of the region 
as a whole (Table 5). By further concentrating poverty, already-poor health prospects in 
the corridor will diminish further. 
                                                 
33 See § 941.202(e) (“The site must be free from adverse environmental conditions, natural or 
manmade.”).). 
34 See § 941.202(e) (“The housing must be accessible to social, recreational, educational, commercial, and 
health facilities and services, and other municipal facilities and services.”). 




Corridor Planning Districts Area 20 18
Near LRT Stations 26 24
Near East Station Sites 29 26
Near West Station Sites 10 16
Total Metro 17 9





Finally, neighborhoods in the Central Corridor have some of the highest crime 
rates in the region. Crime rates are particularly high in the neighborhoods in the eastern 
portion of the corridor (Table 6). By further concentrating poverty, crime rates will likely 


















7 -County Metro Total 248
* among the population aged 25-64
Sources: Minnesota Department of Health, Wilder Research, 
The unequal distribution of health in the Twin Cities
Table 6: Serious Crime Rates per 100,000











Saint Anthony (St. Paul) 4,658
Saint Paul Total 4,811
Minneapolis Total 5,518
7 -County Metro Total 3,663
Sources: FBI Uniform Crime Report,
Minenapolis and Saint Paul PD
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Inaccurate Concerns Regarding Gentrification 
The CCAHP asserts that the new LRT lines will cause gentrification, so it is 
therefore necessary to build all of the region’s affordable housing there to assure that low-
income people can remain. But a GAO study, posted on the CCAHP website itself, 
disputes the validity of the CCAHP’s gentrification methodology and results. It 
summarizes peer-reviewed studies, demonstrating that transit stops in segregated, high-
poverty neighborhoods—as opposed to stably integrated or white neighborhoods—often 
experience a decline in property values, and are thus more likely to intensify poverty and 
segregation, rather than be associated with gentrification.35 The GAO reported the 
findings of an Atlanta study that found the presence of crime near rail stations limited 
increases in value and sometimes even decreased land value and housing values.36 It also 
reported on a study from Buffalo, NY that found a negative effect of housing values 
around stations in low-income areas.37  
It is at these types of stops that the CCAHP seeks to concentrate a 
disproportionate share of the region’s affordable housing. Moreover, despite the 
CCAHP’s posturing to the contrary, even its own study (whose methodology is 
questioned by the GAO) finds that “gentrification is not currently in progress in the 
Central Corridor.”38 Specifically, its consultant PolicyLink found that no submarket 
along the corridor met the requirements demonstrating gentrification in any of the studies 
it could find.39  
An examination of the indicators of gentrification used by PolicyLink is 
revealing. The first factor “rising rents and home values” is not met. As PolicyLink 
acknowledges, rents have risen “at a low rate” in the Central Corridor.40 However, 
PolicyLink declares that home values are “rising sharply” and that the “largest home 
value increases in [the] last decade were in the east submarket . . . and capitol 
submarket.”41 However, this analysis is based on the years 2000-2009. There has been a 
                                                 
35 United State Government Accountability Office, General Accounting Office Affordable Housing and 
Transit Oriented Development: Key Practices Could Enhance Collaboration Effort Between DOT FTA and 
HUD, September 2009 (GAO-09-871); Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing 
and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 
Representatives at 13-14. 
36 D.R. Bowes & K.R. Ihlanfledt, Identifying the Impacts of Rail Stations on Residential Property Values, 
50 J. URB. ECON. 1, 1-25 (2001). 
37 Daniel Baldwin Hess and Tangerine Maria Almeida, Impact of Proximity to Light Rail Rapid Transit 
Stations on Station Area Property Values in Buffalo NY, 22 URB. STUD. 1041 (2007). 
38 See SHIREEN MALAKAFZALI AND DANIELLE BERGSTOM, HEALTHY CORRIDOR FOR ALL: A COMMUNITY 
HEALTH ASSESSMENT OF TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA. 
TECHNICAL REPORT 65 (POLICYLINK 2011) [hereinafter, POLICYLINK, TECHNICAL REPORT].  
39 Id at 63. No submarket “meets all six indicators for gentrification in the [study period].” Referencing 
STEPHEN POLLACK, BARRY BLUESTONE, AND CHASE BILLINGHAM, MAINTAINING DIVERSITY IN AMERICA’S 
TRANSIT-RICH NEIGHBORHOODS: TOOLS FOR EQUITABLE NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (Dukakis Center for 
Urban and Regional Policy 2010) [hereinafter POLLACK ET AL., HEALTHY CORRIDOR] and MAUREEN 
KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION 
AND POLICY CHOICES (Brookings April 2001). 




dramatic decrease in housing prices over the last few years, only bottoming out in St. 
Paul in early 2012. There has also been a high rate of foreclosures in the central corridor 
during this time, with property values in the eastern and central submarkets being badly 
affected (as will be discussed below). Without knowing how the markets in these areas, 
and the corridor as a whole, have fared in the last few years, it is impossible to state that 
housing values have been “rising sharply” with any degree of relevant accuracy. Other 
indicators (property values, foreclosure rates) suggest that they have fared poorly. 
 In terms of the other indicators of gentrification, PolicyLink acknowledges that 
there has been no decrease in racial diversity and lower-income people have not been 
exiting the central corridor. In fact, there has been an increase in poverty in the corridor 
over the last 10 years. From 2000-2010 the percentage of individuals living in the central 
corridor with incomes below the county median skyrocketed from 34 percent to 60 
percent. Conversely, during the same time period, the percentage of individuals with 
double the county median income rose only slightly from 10 percent to 12 percent.42 
 PolicyLink asserts that there has been an increase in property values. However, in 
Policy Link’s “Summary Report” they examine property value changes from 2007-2010--
i.e. after the bursting of the housing bubble. During this time, only four station areas have 
seen any sort of dramatic increase in property values. The rest have seen stagnant or 
decreasing housing values, including every station area in the eastern and central 
submarkets.43 Figure 10 on page 27 of their report reveals a housing market that is very 
fragile in all but a few station areas.44 PolicyLink declares that there has been an increase 
in educational attainment in the central corridor.45 However, in their summary report they 
note that “[central corridor] residents have lower educational attainment levels than the 
county average.” 
Overall, it is clear that indicators of gentrification are not evident. The central 
corridor, and especially the east and capitol submarkets, remains impoverished and 
segregated. 
While PolicyLink offhandedly suggested a “risk of gentrification that should be 
monitored,” it actually found that the corridor did not exhibit the necessary factors to 
conclude that there was a future risk of gentrification.46 Most notably in terms of risk for 
future gentrification, PolicyLink concluded that the corridor lacked “a high density of 
amenities including youth facilities and public space” and necessary number of workers 
using public transit.47 All of the other factors present—such as proximity to transit—a 
                                                 
42 See POLICYLINK, TECHNICAL REPORT at 64-65. 
43 See SHIREEN MALAKAFZALI AND DANIELLE BERGSTOM, HEALTHY CORRIDOR FOR ALL: A COMMUNITY 
HEALTH ASSESSMENT OF TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA, 
SUMMARY, 27 fig. 10 (PolicyLink 2011) [hereinafter, POLICY LINK, SUMMARY REPORT]. 
44 Id. 
45 See POLICYLINK, TECHNICAL REPORT at 64-65.  
46 Id. at 66-68 citing KAREN CHAPPEL, MAPPING SUSCEPTIBILITY TO GENTRIFICATION: THE EARLY 
WARNING TOOLKIT (Center for Community Innovation at Institute of Urban and Regional Development, 
2009) [hereinafter CHAPPEL, MAPPING SUSCEPTIBILITY].  
47 Id.  
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high number of rental, non-family, rent-burdened households are present in virtually 
every poor urban neighborhood in America.     
PolicyLink’s analysis is flawed for another reason; they used only a single study 
to determine risk indicators of gentrification, a study that examined gentrification only in 
the California Bay Area.48 As the study noted, “[t]he Bay Area has one of the most 
expensive and challenging housing markets in the country.”49 It is therefore unclear if 
their findings of risk indicators are generalizable to other metropolitan areas.  
The relevance of the Bay Area findings to the Central Corridor, in particular, is 
very unclear. For instance, the study found that a higher percentage of non-Hispanic 
whites, a greater distance to San Francisco, and a greater percentage of three or more 
vehicles per household were factors that decrease the risk of gentrification.50 Conversely, 
non-family households and apartment buildings with a greater number of units were 
found to increase the risk of gentrification.51 It is unclear how helpful these indicators are 
except in demonstrating that single-family, white suburbs are not at risk of gentrification.  
As noted by a study from the Dukakis Center, the findings from the Bay Area 
indicated that “while some transit-rich neighborhoods were gentrifying, others were 
experiencing very different patterns of change.”52 These included areas that were 
becoming “bipolar” and lower income.53 Importantly, PolicyLink, in their technical 
report, described the central corridor as exhibiting “bipolar” trends.54 Furthermore, the 
study does not measure changes to racial segregation or integration directly.  
The study by the Dukakis Center that was cited by PolicyLink noted that the 
addition of transit to neighborhoods can lead to increased poverty.55 It also found that half 
of transit-rich neighborhoods saw their non-Hispanic white population decline or 
experience slower growth than the metropolitan area as a whole.56 Similarly, it found that 
among cases where there was a substantial racial change of non-Hispanic whites in new 
transit-rich neighborhoods, as compared to the metro area, it was more likely to be a 
relative decrease, than increase.57 These findings suggest that the new light rail stops are 
more likely to increase poverty and segregation in the central corridor than to lead to 
gentrification.  
Finally, PolicyLink’s projections for new housing units along the corridor are 
underwhelming. The estimates on page 38 of their technical report project that the growth 
in housing units will be concentrated in the western portion of the central corridor58 and 
                                                 
48 CHAPPEL, MAPPING SUSCEPTIBILITY. 
49 Id. at 1. 
50 Id. at 6. 
51 Id. 
52 POLLACK ET AL., HEALTHY CORRIDOR  at 19. 
53 CHAPPEL, MAPPING SUSCEPTIBILITY at 4.  
54 See POLICYLINK, TECHNICAL REPORT at 64. 
55 POLLACK ET AL., HEALTHY CORRIDOR at 19. 
56 Id. at 22. 
57 Id. at 27 (31 percent compared to 19 percent). 
58 See POLICYLINK, TECHNICAL REPORT at 38, fig. 3.2. 
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that market conditions will support the construction of only 6,775 new residential units 
along University Avenue in the next 20 years (with most on the western portion).59 It is 
clear from the estimates made by PolicyLink that the eastern portion of the corridor is not 
a strong enough market to enable gentrification. 
In sum, claims that the central corridor is at risk of gentrification are clearly 
overstated. The evidence points instead to a segregated area with concentrated poverty, 
which is more likely to experience further decline. Preemptively placing more affordable 
housing units in the area would only be likely to accelerate this decline. 
Research Demonstrates the Likely Detrimental Effects of Subsidized Housing in 
Moderate- and High-Poverty Areas 
 The CCAHP has already intensified the city’s pattern of racial segregation by 
successfully lobbying both Minneapolis and Saint Paul to expand the neighborhoods 
eligible for subsidized housing to include census tracts with minority shares up to 50 and 
78 percent respectively. Peer-reviewed research on the effects of subsidized housing on 
nearby properties implies that these types of neighborhoods are the ones most likely to be 
adversely affected by the addition of subsidized housing. George Galster’s recent 
literature review concludes that neighborhood characteristics influence how subsidized 
housing affects surrounding areas and that there is growing evidence that neighborhoods 
with moderate home values and poverty rates are at greater risk of experiencing negative 
effects, even at lower concentrations of affordable or multi-family housing. He concludes 
that “affordable housing seems least likely to generate negative impacts when inserted 
into high-value, low poverty, stable neighborhoods.”60 
 Similarly, a literature review by Abt Associates concluded that the effect of 
subsidized housing on nearby properties “appears to depend on the scale of the project 
and the stability of the neighborhood. A small project in a stable neighborhood has either 
no effect or a small positive effect. On the other hand, a project added to an unstable 
neighborhood, especially a large project, can either cause a decline in property values or 
prevent revitalization that would otherwise occur as a result of market forces.”61 The 
4,500 units involved in the CCAHP clearly represent a major addition to the housing 
stock, considering that there are currently only 7,700 occupied housing units within a 
quarter mile of the stations.62 
The Central Corridor’s “Market-Building Strategy” Lacks Factual Support 
When the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity (IMO) staff informed CCAHP 
representatives of these articles, they responded, without any evidence, that concentrating 
low-income housing subsidies in moderate-minority, moderate-poverty neighborhoods 
                                                 
59 See POLICYLINK, SUMMARY at 14. 
60 George Galster, The Effects of Affordable and Multi-Family Housing on Market Values of Near Homes, 
in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 176, 176-211 (Anthony Downs, ed., 2004). 
61 JILL KHADDURI, KIMBERLY BURNETT & DAVID RODDA, TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES: 
LITERATURE REVIEW, Abt Associates, Cambridge MA (2003), 41, 63. 
62 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010. 
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would help build the housing markets in these areas.63 They argued, among other things, 
that LIHTC housing “was not really affordable housing,” but rather “market rate 
housing” with higher rents than the local markets.64 They also contended that the central 
cities had to use the LIHTC units in segregated neighborhoods because “the market was 
providing no private credit” there, while white neighborhoods of the city were brimming 
with credit and new rental housing.65 In short, those areas are to receive no LIHTC units 
because they are thriving. CCAHP contends that the poor, segregated neighborhoods, 
which have no private market, have to be revitalized with more low-income family 
housing. 
This argument is obviously completely inconsistent with CCAHP’s argument that 
the massive development of low-income housing is critical to stop overwhelming 
gentrification. In support of this so-called “market building” strategy, the only evidence 
the city provided was a non-peer-reviewed government report and a glossy industry trade 
publication that asserted—without any reviewable facts—that low-income housing 
helped build the housing market in a poor, all-white rural county in Indiana.66 When 
questioned about the relevance of this “study” for construction of housing in racially 
segregated neighborhoods, particularly in light of several peer-reviewed studies to the 
contrary, the CCAHP could not produce relevant evidence that further concentrating low 
income housing in racially segregated neighborhoods would build these housing markets.  
  Eventually, CCAHP representatives did produce a literature review by the Center 
for Housing Policy (CHP) prepared for the MacArthur Foundation.67 This piece was a 
non-peer-reviewed partial summary of the literature on related, but ultimately irrelevant, 
topics. A significant part of the article focuses on the economic effects of the construction 
activity associated with these programs and not on the question of longer-term economic 
effects on the neighborhoods themselves. The effects from construction activities, 
however, are short-lived and unlikely to be felt primarily by neighborhood residents.  
  The CHP review also highlights other issues of only limited relevance in the 
current case. These include effects on homebuyers, which are not relevant for the LIHTC 
and Section 8 programs at issue in the corridor. There is also a discussion of how 
affordable housing can help local employers by providing housing for low- and 
moderate-wage workers. But this argument is more relevant for projects in areas where 
the non-subsidized market is high-rent or largely owner-occupied, which is not the case 
in the development area in question. There is some discussion of how projects affect 
nearby market values. This information is relevant but the review focuses on only a 
particularly rosy evaluation of a single study in New York City, with no mention of the 
broader reviews noted above. Finally, there is a section on other potential spillover 
                                                 
63 See Testimony of Thomas Streitz, April 3, 2012, Minneapolis Community Development Committee 
Meeting.  
64 See correspondence with city staff (attached as Appendix). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 KEITH WALDRIP, LAURA WILLIAMS & SUZANNE HAGUE, THE ROLE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN 
CREATING JOBS AND STIMULATING LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, 
CENTER FOR HOUSING POLICY, 2011. 
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effects—an issue that is potentially very relevant. However, the section essentially 
highlights the lack of findings in this regard and recommends that more research is 
needed on the issue. 
  In response to a draft version of this letter, two additional studies were cited to 
counter claims that LIHTC housing can have detrimental effects on moderate- and high-
poverty neighborhoods.68 The response claims that “it’s clear that well designed and well 
managed affordable housing tends to stabilize low income neighborhoods and that new 
tax credit housing tends to increase median neighborhood income” However, the cited 
studies do little to support this claim. Baum-Snow & Marion (2009) in fact conclude: 
“We find that LIHTC developments depress local median household income . . . in 
owner occupied housing units within 1 km of these projects.”69  
The other study (Deng (2009)) examines the impacts of LIHTC developments in 
Santa Clara County.70 The study notes that Santa Clara has an unusually “tight market 
environment”,71 “few distressed neighborhoods”, and “thanks to strong economic 
growth”72 is “largely dominated by low-density developments”.73 Furthermore, the 
county has a median income twice that of the national average, meaning that “LIHTC 
tenants with 50% or 60% AMI in Santa Clara County may have income[s] similar to 
middle-income families in other places”.74 Importantly, the distribution of LIHTC 
housing in Santa Clara County by neighborhood type was as follows: 
Upper income, white dominated 17 percent 
Upper income, white/Asian mix 10 percent 
Middle class, white dominated 24 percent 
Working class, white Asian mix 33 percent 
Working class, Asian/Hispanic mix 4 percent 
Low income, Hispanic dominated 7 percent 
Low income, racially mixed 5 percent75 
LIHTC units were concentrated in upper income and white middle income 
neighborhoods, with only 16 percent of units placed in low income or working class 
Asian/Hispanic neighborhoods. This is the type of pro-integrative placement strategy that 
I endorse and would encourage the CCAHP to adopt. It stands in sharp contrast to the 
CCAHP’s current plan, which concentrates LIHTC units in poor and segregated parts of 
the region.   
                                                 
68 Nathaniel Baum-Snow and Justin Marion, The Effects of Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Developments on Neighborhoods, 93 Journal of Public Economics 654, 665 (2009) and Lan Deng, The 
External Neighborhood Effects of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects Built By Three Sectors, 33 
Journal of Urban Affairs 143. 
69 Baum Snow & Marion at 665 (emphasis added). 
70 Deng at 143. 
71 Id. at 145 
72 Id. at 146 
73 Id. at 145. 
74 Id. at 149. 
75 Id. at 152. 
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Furthermore, even though the study found that housing values rose around LIHTC 
developments the authors conclude with the caveat that: 
Yet, while this study has found positive impacts from the LIHTC projects in 
both high-income and low income neighborhoods, the Denver studies have 
emphasized more about neighborhood contexts. Scattered-site public housing 
developments in Denver increased nearby property value in middleclass 
neighborhoods, but their impacts became negative in low-income, black 
neighborhoods (Galster et al., 2003; Santiago et al., 2001). Part of the 
difference may be because the LIHTC projects in Santa Clara County serve 
households with much higher income than the public housing projects in 
Denver. As a result, even if the LIHTC projects were placed in low-income 
neighborhoods, they did not significantly increase the concentration of poverty. 
Moreover, since Santa Clara County only has a very small share of black 
residents, about 3% countywide, it may also be difficult to discern the 
projects’ impacts in black neighborhoods.76 
Clearly, the Santa Clara results are of very limited relevance, and other cited studies of 
areas much more like the Corridor support my arguments regarding the negative impacts 
of adding subsidized units to low-income or segregated neighborhoods.  
 For these reasons, I request the opportunity to present further proposals to the 
board of the Central Corridor Funder’s Collaborative. I have suggested many ideas to 
create a pro-integrative plan on the corridor, particularly the addition of magnet schools 
at job centers near the University or between the State Capitol and the Saint Paul CBD. It 
would also be beneficial to develop a stable, racially integrated, mixed-income housing 
strategy. The Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity would be happy to help undertake the 
necessary revisions to housing strategy and the report that will help it conform both to the 
terms of HUD Sustainable Communities grant and to the larger framework of the FHA. 
This can be quickly accomplished to the benefit of the region’s non-white citizens and the 
quality of life in neighborhoods along the central corridor.  
              
        Sincerely, 
 
 
         
        Myron Orfield 
Professor of Law and Director of the 
Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity, 
University of Minnesota 
                                                 
76 Id. at 161. Emphasis added. 
